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Abstract
The first two chapters of this thesis provide insights into the determinants of occupational
gender segregation in both developed and developing countries. The third chapter of this
thesis goes beyond gender to understand how different aspects of individual identity,
namely values, affect selection and performance in the workplace.
Across the developed world, traditionally female-dominated sectors are growing and
traditionally male-dominated sectors are shrinking. And yet, sectorial male shares are
not changing accordingly. Why don’t men enter female-dominated occupations? In the
first chapter, I study men’s selection into social work, a fast-growing occupation where
the share of men has historically been below 25 percent. I embed a field experiment in the
UK-wide recruitment of social workers to analyse barriers to men’s entry and the nature
of men’s sorting into this occupation. I modify the content of recruitment messages to
potential applicants to exogenously vary two key drivers of selection: perceived gender
shares and expectations of returns to ability. I find that perceived gender shares do not
affect men’s application decisions, which suggests no role for gender identity or social
stigma in their choices. Increasing expected returns to ability encourages men to apply,
and improves the average quality of the applicants and performance on the job of the
new hires, indicating that men are negatively sorted into social work. In turn, a higher
(perceived) share of male workers improves the quality of female hires by discouraging
the least talented women from applying. These findings suggest that breaking barriers to
men’s entry in female-dominated occupations may help employers increase the diversity
and overall quality of their workforce.
The second chapter deals with gender segregation in the growing urban marketplaces
of the developing world. Commerce between strangers requires trust, but trust is difficult
when one group consistently fears expropriation by another. If men have a comparative
advantage at violence and there is little rule-of-law, then unequal bargaining power can
lead women to segregate into low-return industries and avoid entrepreneurship alto-
gether. In this paper, we present a model of female entrepreneurship and rule of law
that predicts that women will only start businesses when they have both formal legal
protection and informal bargaining power. The model’s predictions are supported both
in cross-national data and with a new census of Zambian manufacturers. In Zambia, fe-
male entrepreneurs collaborate less, learn less from fellow entrepreneurs, earn less and
segregate into industries with more women, but gender differences are ameliorated when
women have access to adjudicating institutions, like Market Chiefs and a Small Claims
Court. We experimentally induce variation in local institutional quality in an adapted
trust game, and find that this also reduces the gender gap in trust and economic activity.
iv
The third chapter of this thesis studies the primitives of corporate culture: employees’
values. It is well known that shared values can mitigate the adverse consequences of in-
complete contracts and reduce coordination costs. Misalignment in values - either actual
or perceived by the employees - could make such inefficiencies worse, reducing produc-
tivity and creating resistance to change. We provide evidence by means of a survey that
measures the perceived and actual value misalignment between employees, their col-
leagues, and top management in a multinational bank. The data, which covers 30,000
employees across 55 countries, reveals that values dissonance is negatively correlated
with individual and team level performance, as well as with self-reported trust in the
bank’s executives and intent to stay. Within countries, we show how bankers’ values
compare with the ones listed by World Value Survey respondents. Employees whose
values are further from common citizens perform better, but this is mainly explained
by their higher position on the career ladder. We conclude by showing how aggregate
shocks to societal perceptions of banking, such as the 2008 financial crisis, might shape
organizational culture.
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11 Breaking Gender Barriers:
Bringing Men into the Pink-Collar
Jobs of the Future
1.1 Introduction
The shift from brawn-intensive to brain-intensive occupations has decreased the tradi-
tional advantage that men enjoyed in the labour market. The manufacturing share of em-
ployment in the US fell from 29.7 to 12.7 percent between 1968 and 2008, while the service
share rose from 56 to 75 percent in the same period (Ngai and Petrongolo, 2017). Female-
dominated industries, such as health and education, displayed the highest growth, and
yet their gender composition barely changed despite falling male economic activity (Blau
and Kahn, 2017). Understanding the barriers to men’s entry in these occupations is im-
portant to help workers in declining industries move towards new opportunities.
In this paper, I study men’s selection into one of such high-growth female-dominated
occupations: social work. Over the next decade, the growth rate of social workers is
expected to be twice the average growth of US occupations (Bureau of Labor Statistics,
2019), but the male share of social workers has not changed since 1970 (Blau et al., 1998).
This can be the result of men not applying or employers not selecting those who ap-
ply. Understanding the nature of sorting is crucial to design tools that increase diversity
without lowering the quality of the expanding workforce in this sector.
Guided by a theoretical framework, I explore the barriers to men’s entry and the na-
ture of their sorting into female-dominated jobs by generating experimental variation in
the recruitment strategy for a real job in social work and then following what happens
to applicants of both genders. This allows me to say whether - and how - bringing more
men into female-dominated jobs is good for employers and whether this has spillovers
on women’s selection.
I embed a field experiment in the UK nationwide recruitment of social workers to
exogenously vary two key determinants of selection: perceived gender shares and ex-
pectations of returns to ability. The former embodies non-pecuniary factors related to the
association between an occupation and a certain gender, which have been shown to be
relevant in labour supply decisions (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), and the latter represents
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standard incentives in occupational choice. Disentangling these two channels in obser-
vational data is difficult as it requires two independent sources of exogenous variation.1
A controlled setting allows me to overcome this identification challenge, but might still
affect the behaviour of participants through novelty or experimenter effects.
I overcome these risks by working in collaboration with one of the main organiza-
tions in the sector and introducing variation in the content of recruitment messages sent
to their potential applicants.2 By conducting the experiment in a double-blind manner,
I do not interfere with the natural course of the hiring process and I can follow partici-
pants from applications to job offers and, afterwards, on the job. I can thus check whether
more applications lead to more and better hires. Compared to alternative sources of vari-
ation, for instance monetary incentives, my design preserves the organizational systems
in place, is easily scalable and mimics common low-cost policies that employers use to
increase gender diversity.3
I generate exogenous variation in perceived gender shares in the job by showing the
photograph of a real worker, who was randomized to be of the same or of different gen-
der of the potential applicant.4 While it is possible that photographs merely increase
receivers’ attention to the email or salience of gender, auxiliary surveys show that the
two photographs induce an average difference in the perceived job female share of 6
percentage points (9% of the average female share). This treatment captures the fact
that a predominantly female composition can affect men’s choices by imposing a fixed
cost on their utility, independently of occupational talent. For instance, working in a
female-dominated job might threaten men’s social image (Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017)
and identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005). Men may also have an innate distaste
for working with a majority of women (Becker, 1957) or anticipate employers’ and cus-
tomers’ preferences for female workers.5 These different channels similarly predict that
a male photograph achieves a positive utility shock for men by increasing the perceived
male share in a female-job.
1This is analogous to the empirical challenge of distinguishing preference-based from inference-based
discrimination (Altonji and Blank, 1999; Guryan and Charles, 2013; Neumark, 2018).
2Potential applicants need to register their interest in applying on the website of the partner organization.
This implies that the experimental sample is selected on the basis of a minimum level of interest in the job.
First, a minimum interest in the job makes this the relevant sample from a policy perspective. Moreover,
the brevity of the form and the application rate after registration (between 50% and 60%) reduce concerns of
external validity or sample selection bias.
3The organization does not use performance bonuses or other monetary incentives. The effect of in-
troducing them for the first time could create novelty or surprise effects on the participants, which would
confound the interpretation of the experiment as a change to expected returns to ability.
4I draw on the design of audit (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004) and priming (Benjamin et al., 2010)
studies.
5Some authors find evidence of discrimination against men in female-dominated jobs (Booth and Leigh,
2010; Rich, 2014). This explanation is second order in my context, where the employer wants to attract more
men and trains its recruiters against implicit biases in the selection of men and minorities (Bertrand et al.,
2005).
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To shock expected returns to ability, I disclosed the aggregate performance of a se-
lected past cohort of workers, which had either moderate or high success.6 Half of the
sample were informed that, in a previous year, 66% of workers were high-performers
and the other half that 89% of workers were high-performers.7 I interpret these statistics
as signalling high and low marginal returns to ability on the job, respectively. Intuitively,
lower past success (66%) signals that individual ability makes a larger difference in per-
formance relative to a very high past success (89%).8 Indeed, auxiliary surveys show that
lower past performance makes high ability people increase their beliefs on the likelihood
of being better than the median applicant from 38% to 45%, while low ability people re-
duce it from 37% to 32%. This second variation captures the fact that a predominantly
female composition can affect men’s choices indirectly, by imposing informational con-
straints, and interact with their job-specific talent. Men may not know and underestimate
whether jobs to which they have little exposure, such as female-dominated ones, offer
them opportunities to be successful. Success and recognition have traditionally been im-
portant determinants of men’s work satisfaction (Goldin, 2006), but seeing only a few
highly-selected members of their own gender creates uncertainty on the possibility to get
rewards for talent in female-jobs (Arrow, 1998).9
I use a Roy-type framework to formalize how policies addressing these two chan-
nels affect the number and type of men who select into female-jobs. Candidates decide
whether to apply for a female-dominated job or to choose an outside option. They care
about monetary earnings, workplace gender shares and to what extent their ability im-
pacts the employer’s output. To capture the informational disadvantage of being the
minority, I assume that men’s priors on returns to ability in female-jobs are more uncer-
tain and with lower mean than women’s (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973). An increase in the
perceived share of own gender in the job shifts expected utility, while a change in ex-
pected returns to ability affects the steepness of utility with respect to job-specific talent.
Tools that leverage the former channel can attract more men, but hires increase only if
men are negatively sorted in the job. Tools that increase expected rewards to ability ben-
efit high ability applicants, but might discourage low ability people if the job appears to
be more difficult. Thus changing expected returns to ability may improve the quality of
6I use actual records of the organization in the previous three years. This allowed to communicate
truthful but partial information, which on average affects beliefs differently between experimental groups
(Dal Bó et al., 2017).
7Being a high-performer means getting the highest assessment in practice tests when interacting with
customers. See Section 1.3 for the exact wording.
8Notice that the reactions to the information manipulation would differ if potential minority applicants
are trying to infer the likelihood that the employer will discriminate against them. Information indicat-
ing low performance could signal that the employer is statistically discriminating, which would generate a
negative reaction by men.
9People might care about rewards to ability for extrinsic reasons, if performance is tied to incentives or
career promotions, or intrinsic motivation, if they care about social recognition, feeling competent or about
the actual impact generated in the job. Men should be particularly interested in returns to ability if norms
that elect them as household breadwinners skew their choices towards jobs with steep careers (Bertrand et
al., 2005).
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applicants when there is either positive or negative sorting in female-jobs. In either case,
the joint change in application rates and quality of the applicants identifies whether men
(and women) are negatively or positively sorted in social work.
I find that perceived gender composition does not affect men’s application behavior.
Men apply slightly more when they receive a female rather than a male photograph, but
the effect is small and not statistically significant (3.2 percent). This null effect of gender
composition on men’s applications is in line with estimates by Hsieh et al. (2019), who
find little room for occupation-specific preferences in explaining changes in the allocation
of talent in the last decades. This is also consistent with Wiswall and Zafar (2018), who
show that neither men nor women are willing to receive a lower wage to work alongside
a greater proportion of people of their same gender.10
Expected high returns to ability increase men’s applications by 15% vis-à-vis expecta-
tions of lower returns. This means that being informed about moderate past performance
encourages men to apply more than being informed about outstanding past outcomes.
This contrasts with most role model interventions, whose standard design provides par-
ticipants with optimistic information of past success (Porter and Serra, 2017; Breda et al.,
2018; Del Carpio and Guadalupe, 2018). Crucially, my paper shows that information of
high past success can be interpreted as signal of low returns to ability rather than the
unconditional probability of success, which might encourage only low-ability people to
apply for the job.11
The magnitude of the effect of information is large, which is a particularly valuable
outcome considering that the treatment is costless for the employer.12 I further quantify
the economic relevance of this treatment by estimating my theoretical model in a discrete-
choice framework. At mean ability, the estimated effect of the experimental variation in
returns to ability on applications is comparable to a 16.6% increase of the wage in the job
(an increase in the hourly wage from 16.5 to 19.24 GBP). I also find that the difference in
application rates between the two information treatments is larger among men who have
been exposed to gender-segregated labour markets. This shows that new information is
more valuable for people with limited experience in female-dominated jobs, a fact which
is consistent with the hypothesis that they hold more uncertain and/or biased expecta-
tions.
Average male quality is higher in the treatment with expected higher returns to ability
than lower returns to ability. Applicants in the former group are better in terms of observ-
able characteristics such as cognitive skills, volunteering experience and achievement of
10The positive coefficient of the female photograph on men’s application also recalls evidence by Bertrand
et al. (2010), who show that adding female photographs in adverts increase the demand of credit by both
men and women.
11High average success coupled with low returns to ability provides insurance for low ability people
against failure.
12The effect is over half the effect size of doubling wages found in Abebe et al. (2019) and increasing
wages by 33% in Dal Bó et al. (2013), which show increased application rates of 18% and 26%, respectively.
The effect is a quarter of that reported by Del Carpio and Guadalupe (2018), a difference which can be
attributed to either higher application costs or more outside opportunities for participants in my setting.
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high grades in university. They also receive more job offers (50%) and are equally likely
to accept them compared to applicants with low expected returns to ability. Crucially,
once on the job, men attracted by higher returns to ability show a quarter of a standard
deviation higher performance vis-à-vis the low returns to ability treatment. Assuming no
spillovers on inframarginal workers, the performance of those hires induced to apply by
the treatment is two thirds of a standard deviation higher.13 Interpreted through the lens
of the model, these results show that men are negatively sorted in the job and that the
marginal male applicant is facing an outside option which has steeper returns to ability
than the average applicant. Increasing expected returns to ability in the job consequently
improves the quality of the applicants.14
I conclude by checking for a trade-off between men’s entry and women’s exit. A
common limitation of field experiments is that they are silent on general equilibrium
effects. Nevertheless, showing a male photograph allows me to simulate a counterfactual
world, in which men represent a higher (perceived) share in the job and see how women
behave as a result. I find that there are 7.5% fewer women’s applications in the male
vis-à-vis female photograph treatment. This decrease in women’s applications benefits
the employer, however, as women who applied in this treatment arm received a higher
offer rate and perform significantly better once on the job than women in the female
photograph treatment. This suggests that a higher proportion of male workers in this job
can improve female selection by discouraging the least talented women from applying
or accepting the job. I also find that women are insensitive to information provision on
average.
I rule out several competing explanations for my findings, such as social compari-
son or on-the-job dating opportunities, and different interpretations of the experimental
manipulations by exploiting information on candidates’ background and using auxiliary
survey data.
Taken together, my results suggest that breaking informational barriers to men’s en-
try in female-dominated jobs might increase gender diversity, as well as improve overall
workforce quality in a gender-neutral way. This yields an optimistic message for policy.
Both the stigma associated with working in a female-occupation and men’s perceptions of
their returns to ability in typically female tasks have been central in the US debate around
the conversion of unemployed men into service jobs, as they have different policy impli-
cations.15 The femaleness associated with some occupations may be difficult to modify
13Offer rates and performance on the job are available only for the subset of people who succeed in the
hiring process and, for the latter, also accept the job. To attribute differences in these variables to the causal
effect of the experiment on selection, the identifying assumption is that the treatment affects the composition
of the pool of applicants and not their effort or the employer’s screening criteria. This is guaranteed by the
double-blind nature of the design. I also provide empirical evidence in Table 1.5.
14Better men with high opportunity costs might also have a lower likelihood of accepting and keeping
the job (Abebe et al., 2019). This seems unlikely in my sample, where I see that the predicted hourly wage in
the U.K. job market is skewed towards the left to the earnings distribution.
15See, for instance, this New York Times article (Miller, 2017).
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and changes in gender composition take time. While people can be monetarily compen-
sated or compositional changes can be accelerated through quotas, uncertain or incorrect
expectations can be more cheaply tackled through information provision and incentives
for experimentation. If men had correct priors on rewards to ability in female-dominated
jobs, my results suggest that low-cost organizational practices, such as recognition for
good performance, may still attract a more diverse and qualified pool of applicants.
I contribute to three main streams of literature. First, personnel economics studies on
the effect of posted wages or amenities on candidates’ application and quality (Dal Bó et
al., 2013; Marinescu and Wolthoff, 2016; Ashraf et al., 2019; Deserranno, 2019; Abebe et
al., 2019). Both the methodology and the analysis of my paper draw on this work, but I
further show that posted ads might address information frictions which prevent minori-
ties from applying for jobs which are uncommon for their demographics. By showing
the importance of expectations of non-monetary returns to ability, I contribute to studies
that explore how subjective expectations of earnings drive educational and occupational
choices (Nguyen, 2008; Jensen, 2010; Zafar, 2013; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2014;
Wiswall and Zafar, 2015, 2018) and models of job search which relax the assumption of
complete information (Conlon et al., 2018). Both the motivation and experimental de-
sign of the paper are related to work on identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005; Ak-
erlof, 2017; Bursztyn et al., 2018) and stereotypes (Steele, 1995; Stone et al., 1997; Hoff
and Pandey, 2006; Bordalo et al., 2016). I contribute to these studies by comparing the
impact of identity and (beliefs on) economic incentives on career choices outside of the
laboratory, in a natural field setting. My work is also related to several experiments on
competition and gender (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Wozniak et al., 2010; Dreber et
al., 2014; Reuben et al., 2017). Preferences for competitive environments are another way
in which returns to ability may enter the individual decision problem. This implies that
the implications of incorrect inferences about returns to ability across occupations might
be amplified through their interaction with preferences for competition.16
1.2 Institutional context
During 2017, I collaborated with one of the main UK recruiters of public sector social
workers. The organization offers a two-year on-the-job training position targeted to ei-
ther final year students from a variety of disciplines or current workers across all indus-
tries.17 Workers are assigned to teams allocated to Local Authorities across England and
earn a stipend which is comparable to the average entry salary in social services (26k
GBP), primary school teaching (24k GBP) and nursing (22k GBP) in the UK. The daily
job involves both office tasks (e.g., case writing) and meetings with families in need and
16Along these lines, Reuben et al. (2017) show that attitudes by gender are correlated with different
expectations of earnings across occupations.
17Professionals and students in the same field are not eligible. Eligible applicants should have a bachelor
degree with 2:1 or higher and have obtained at least a C in Maths and English pre-university qualifications.
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other stakeholders such as lawyers, medical professionals and the police. The program
is a fast-track into the public sector with opportunities for faster career progression than
standard routes into the profession. After the first two years, the majority of workers
stay in similar positions (between 60% and 70%). Among those who leave the job, many
switch to policy-making positions in the UK government or in international organiza-
tions.18
This is an ideal setting to answer my research question for several reasons. First,
women historically represent more than 75% of social workers across the developed
world, as shown in Figure 1.1 for the US. Most of the skills needed for the job are so-
cial in nature and commonly associated with women’s comparative advantage (Ngai
and Petrongolo, 2017). For instance, the website O*Net lists active listening, speaking,
reading comprehension and social perceptiveness among the top skills needed for the
job.19 The stable gender ratio and the required skillset explain why stereotypes about so-
cial work as a “pink-collar job" have been persistent and widespread.20 Men might lack
information to estimate their own likelihood to succeed in the job and face social costs
from peer pressure and gender norms.
Secondly, informational constraints are particularly relevant in my setting. In contrast
to other female-dominated service jobs such as nursing or teaching, the average citizen
has limited direct exposure to social work.21 The organization also targets both men and
women of any experience level, across disciplines and industries. This recruitment strat-
egy implies that my sample features substantial heterogeneity in background exposure
to social work and, consequently, variation in the information that people have about the
occupation.
Third, in both the US and UK, social work is expected to grow in the next decades.
The growth rate of social workers is expected to be twice the average growth across all US
occupations, and to be greater in areas of high male joblessness (see Figure 1.A.1, Bureau
of Labor Statistics 2019).
Figure 1.2 illustrates the timeline of the organization’s 2017 nationwide recruitment.
The experiment happened between September and November, which is the application
period.22 The hiring process consists of different assessment stages (e.g., interviews),
which are conducted in a centralized manner either online or at the organization’s head
office in London. The overall duration of the hiring process from application to job offer
18The selective nature of the program weakens applicants’ concerns regarding low social status that are
typical of this industry. See, for instance, this article about the recruitment crisis in social care (Whittingham,
2018). This feature makes informational and psychological constraints more likely to have a first-order effect
on selection.
19For more information about O*Net, go to the website O*Net Online.
20See, for instance, this BBC news article by Hemmings (2018).
21According to the Department for Education, the number of social workers in England was 7% of the
total number of teachers in state-funded schools in 2018.
22The experiment is registered in the AEA RCT Registry with ID AEARCTR-0002351 and was approved
by the LSE Ethics Committee in August 2017.
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is around ten weeks. If a person was hired and accepted the job, actual work in local
authorities started in July 2018.
1.3 Experimental design
Experimental participants are people who are interested in applying for the job offered by
the partner organization. To express this interest, potential applicants (also labeled “can-
didates" from hereon) should fill-in a short registration form on the organization’s web-
site which contains eligibility and demographic questions. Completing this form takes
between three and five minutes. If eligible to apply, respondents receive an invitation-to-
apply email immediately after registration. The email contains their candidate number,
which is necessary to access the application process, and some basic information about
the hiring process.23 I introduce exogenous variation in the content of the invitation-
to-apply email along two dimensions: perceived gender shares and expected returns to
ability.24 The two experimental conditions were cross-randomized in a fully nested de-
sign, leading to a total of four treatment emails. Participants could also be randomly
assigned to receive a fifth “pure control" email containing no manipulation, which I used
to compare the treatments with business-as-usual for the organization. Randomization
was at the individual level, with stratification by gender (man/woman) and ethnicity
(white/non-white). The experiment was double-blinded: participants were not aware
that the invitation-to-apply email was part of a research study and recruiters were not
aware of candidates’ treatment assignment. This design limits experimental biases that
arise from candidates’ knowledge of being part in a research study and prevents re-
cruiters’ assessment of candidates from being influenced by their treatment.25 I discuss
each experimental manipulation in the following paragraphs.
Variation in perceived gender shares. The invitation-to-apply email contained a photo-
graph of a real worker, who was randomized to be either a man or a woman. This exper-
imental condition varies potential applicants’ perceived gender shares if seeing a male
photograph generates a perception of a higher male share than seeing a female photo-
graph. While this is the main interpretation that I adopt in the paper, photographs may
also vary the salience of the predominantly-female composition of the job.26 I use my the-
oretical framework to show that these two interpretations are observationally equivalent
23Respondents who do not meet the eligibility requirements receive a standard rejection email.
24The need to register implies that all the people in the experimental sample are selected on the basis of
a minimum level of interest in the job. However, the brevity of the form and the low application rate after
registration (between 50% and 60%) reduces concerns of external validity or sample selection bias. Moreover,
a minimum interest in the job makes this the relevant sample from a policy perspective.
25At registration, participants had to agree with the organization’s data policy, which allowed for the
possibility of impact evaluations and data sharing for evaluation and monitoring purposes. Anecdotally,
participants thought that treatment emails were part of standard organizational practices.
26My main interpretation of the photographs manipulation is aligned with the design of audit studies
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004), where non-white sounding names increase the employer’s rational ex-
pectations that the candidate is going to be non-white. The alternative interpretation based on variation in
salience is more aligned with priming studies (Benjamin et al., 2010).
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and provide manipulation checks that are consistent with the former one.
This manipulation identifies the utility given by the workplace gender composition
(or related attributes), assuming that photographs affect choices mainly through chang-
ing perceived gender proportions. Various confounders might threaten this identifica-
tion strategy, including ethnicity: if white female candidates apply more after seeing an
email portraying a white woman than a non-white man, we wouldn’t know whether to
attribute the effect to the gender or ethnicity match. Moreover, showing photographs
of white people right before starting a selection process might create negative emotions
and anxiety in non-white subjects, as suggested by a rich literature on stereotype threat
(Steele, 1995). For these reasons, I assigned different photographs to white or non-white
people and matched the ethnicity of photographed workers with that of each candidate.
White people received pictures of white people and non-white people received pictures
of non-white people (randomizing gender).27
Different elements in the design of this manipulation address candidates’ limited at-
tention to the email contents and other potential confounders. To attract the candidate’s
attention to the photograph, I added a short text where the photographed person ad-
dresses the candidate by name and recalls that she/he was also once an applicant. Draw-
ing on studies on role models (Marx and Ko, 2012) and information retrieval (Schwarz
et al., 1991), this message should facilitate the candidate’s relatability to the portrayed
person and the gender group she/he belongs to. The photographed people are real
workers who didn’t feature in other advertising campaigns or multimedia content from
the organization for the duration of the intervention (until March 2018). This eliminates
unobserved heterogeneity in candidates’ exposure to the organization’s media channels
and recruitment materials. All photographs show the same background and are of the
same size to limit visual differences.28 Other issues might arise if there is a systematic
correlation between portrayed workers’ characteristics and their gender. I discuss these
concerns in Appendix 1.B, where I present the results of a complementary survey I con-
ducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk to check for differences between people portrayed
in the photographs, such as friendliness, attractiveness or work satisfaction.
Variation in expected returns to ability. This type of variation is difficult to induce for
several reasons. In the ideal world, one would like to communicate to each person what
their expected impact on the job will be, given their ability. But ability is imperfectly ob-
served and this is a new position for the applicants, so no historical data can be used.29
Moreover, the effect of individualized information on beliefs depends the level of peo-
ple’s priors, which was unobservable to me.
27To simultaneously test for the effect of workplace gender and racial composition on applications, the
ideal design should randomize both gender and ethnicity match/mismatch. However, while not being the
main focus of the paper, this would also require a larger sample size.
28The background portrays the real courtyard of one of the offices where workers are located.
29Generating a prediction based on observables was impossible for legal reasons, but also unlikely to
reflect common practices.
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I overcome these challenges by providing information about how others performed in
the job, allowing participants to infer their returns to ability. To do this, I communicated
to subjects the outcome of a selected past cohort of workers, which had either low or high
aggregate performance. The exact wording was the following (see Figure 1.3):
Did you know that in a past cohort X% of participants got commendable
or excellent feedback to their interaction with families?
where X was equal to 66 or 89 in the two experimental treatments. Commendable or
excellent are the highest grades that people can achieve in their performance assessments
in the job. In the experiment, these grades referred to the evaluation that workers got
when interacting with their customers (i.e. families), thus these statistics refer to the social
output obtained by previous workers. Both statistics were computed using actual records
of the organization. This enabled to communicate truthful but partial information, which
on average creates a wedge in beliefs between experimental groups (Dal Bó et al., 2017).30
By presenting the job as more challenging (i.e. with 66% rather than 89% of successful
workers), a lower past percentage of high performers strengthens the perceived relation-
ship between ability and job outcomes. In contrast, seeing that everyone did well in the
past means that there is almost no relationship between ability and outcomes. Lower
past success thus signals that talent is rewarded more in the job as compared to a situ-
ation in which everyone is successful. Thus, I label the treatment disclosing a low past
percentage of high achievers (66%) as “High Expected Returns to Ability" and the one
disclosing an outstanding past performance (89%) as “Low Expected Returns to Ability",
which I consider as the default.31 Updating on the returns to ability in the job, in turn,
affects the expected performance for both low and high ability people and increases the
differences between them. As a high ability person is more likely to perform well in a
challenging job, her expected difference in impact should be greater between the two
treatment groups than that of a low ability person. Low ability people might even be
discouraged by a lower past success.32
This manipulation identifies the effect of expectations of returns to ability under the
assumption that statistics of performance affect choices mainly through a change in ex-
pectations of this parameter. I show manipulation checks in the next section and discuss
alternative interpretations in Section 1.10.
I reported information about on-the-job success in frontline interactions with clients
for several reasons, primarily to induce variation in people’s beliefs of their effectiveness
30The need to communicate truthful information limited the range of possible statistics that I could use.
The chosen ones were the most related to the constraint I am interested in studying and had the largest gap
between cohorts.
31Qualitative interviews conducted with candidates show that 89% was the percentage of high achievers
they expected to see, while 66% was surprising to most people.
32The given interpretation of the information manipulation relies on the assumption that experimental
subjects keep fixed the range of abilities that workers in the job have in both treatment groups. Anecdotally,
this is consistent with the high reputation that the organization has as a selective employer.
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in generating output for the employer.33 Performance metrics on client service are also
rarely collected and/or published in the industry, a fact which increases the likelihood
that the provided information will affect a candidate’s beliefs. Additionally, the quality
of clients’ interactions is one of the crucial objectives of the organization’s mission and
it is an important variable that candidates consider when applying (Besley and Ghatak,
2005).34 Finally, the scores received in practice tasks are the joint outcome of workers’
skills and clients’ reactions. A low score can signal clients’ hostility and/or discrimi-
nation towards the employees, which can disproportionately affect men and non-white
candidates’ judgements about their returns on the job (Fisman et al., 2006).35
Figure 1.3 shows an example of treatment email. From hereon, I will denote the four
treatment groups by (W,L), (W,H), (M,L) and (M,H), where W or M are for receiving the
female or male photograph, respectively, and L refers to low returns to ability information
(which is 89%) while H refers to high returns to ability information (which is 66%).
1.3.1 Main manipulation checks
Do photographs and information affect beliefs as planned in the experimental design?
I provide manipulation checks conducted on external samples matched on observables
with the field participants.36
Between November and December 2018, I administered an online survey to 565 peo-
ple belonging to two distinct samples of respondents: 2018/2019 applicants of the partner
organization and workers on the platform ”Prolific Academic”. The sampling strategy
maximizes the similarity to my field sample. Job applicants of the following year are very
similar on observables and also capture possible unobservables that people interested in
this particular job and organization share. I selected the sample on Prolific Academic by
matching the composition of the field sample on several observables criteria.37 Both sam-
ples were incentivized for participation and the survey had an average completion time
of 15 minutes. Appendix 1.B describes the sampling strategy and questions in detail.
In a between-subject design, I randomly assigned respondents to see one of the four
treatment emails used in the field experiment. After mandatory understanding checks,
33Information on the probability of getting a job offer was also available, but it would have been less
appropriate for my research question and could have caused anxiety during the selection process, as shown
in studies on information provision before tests (Payne, 1984; Osborne, 2001) and on stereotype threat (Steele,
1995), also on white people (Stone et al., 1997). By being long-term outcomes, the chosen statistics can
affect beliefs about expected returns on the job, while avoiding negative emotional reactions with direct
implications on short-term performance.
34To make this even more salient, the box was positioned below a summary of the organization’s mission,
which is focused on the challenge of improving outcomes for disadvantaged communities.
35Men and non-white people should be less likely to apply when seeing that the job is more difficult if
they fear discrimination by the clients. The opposite effect would thus exclude this interpretation.
36I couldn’t directly elicit participants’ beliefs on gender proportions and expected returns to ability be-
cause the survey could have interacted with reaction to the treatment (for instance, by making gender too
salient).
37I selected participants on Prolific Academic to match the share of people in full time employment, who
studied subjects related to social jobs and of non-white ethnicity in my field sample. All people are from the
UK and of age between 18 and 64.
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the survey elicited beliefs on a variety of characteristics of the job and the pool of appli-
cants. Figure 1.4 shows the distribution of answers to the question “Consider 100 people
who apply for this job. How many do you think are women?", separately for respondents
assigned to the email with a female or male photograph. The graph shows that the distri-
bution of perceived female shares is shifted to the right in the female as compared to the
male photograph treatment. The mean perceived female share is 73.8% and 68% respec-
tively in the two groups (p-val < 0.001). This is consistent with the interpretation of the
photograph treatment in terms of a shock in perceived gender shares. In Appendix 1.B
I show evidence against confounders related to differences between photographs (e.g.,
work satisfaction or attractiveness of the portrayed subjects) as well as to other types of
information that photographs might convey (e.g., discrimination by clients).
Testing whether people update expected returns to ability in the job requires two in-
gredients: knowing their approximate position across the ability distribution and their
corresponding returns. The left panel of Figure 1.5 shows the distribution of answers to
the question “How do you expect a person with your skills and experience to perform
in interacting with families in need?" on a scale from 1 (min) to 10 (max). The graph
shows that there are no differences in the distribution of answers between the two in-
formation treatments, which suggests that people do not change what they think their
job-specific ability is as a result of the experimental manipulation. I can then use this
question to classify people into low (high) ability depending on whether their answer is
below (above) the median.38 The right panel of Figure 1.5 shows mean answers to the
question “Consider 100 people who are applying for this job. Based on the ad you just
viewed, on a scale from 1 (worst) to 100 (best), how would you rank yourself for the
job among them?", by information treatment and ability level. There are two main take-
aways from the bar chart. First, the difference in mean ranking between the 66% and 89%
information treatment is negative for low ability applicants, indicating that they expect
to be less successful when there are fewer high achievers in the job (difference = -5.70,
one-sided p-val=0.03). Secondly, the difference in mean ranking between two treatments
is positive for high ability applicants, indicating that they expect to be more successful
when there are fewer high achievers in the job (difference = 3.01, one-sided p-val=0.11).
Overall, these differences imply that respondents perceive the job to have higher returns
to ability when reading the statistic that 66% of people in the past were high achievers
than the 89% statistic, as demonstrated by the larger difference in expected rankings be-
tween high and low ability people in the former case.
38The downside of classifying people’s ability based on self-reported measures is that they might strategi-
cally inflate their scores (from demand bias, if real applicants think that the employer will see their answers)
or being overconfident. These issues, however, become problematic only to the extent that individual mis-
reporting or overestimation alters the ranking of abilities in the sample. The literature on overconfidence
reports mixed results on this possibility (see Moore and Healy, 2008, Coffman et al., 2019). Moreover, the
manipulation checks reported in this section are still valid even in the case of altered ranking across people
as long as the self-reported ability is an accurate measure of the beliefs that drive people’s choices.
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The identification of the effect of perceived gender shares separately from expecta-
tions of returns to ability in a fully nested design requires the interaction between the
two treatments to be negligible. Data from the auxiliary surveys provide supporting evi-
dence for this requirement. First, respondents’ perceived gender shares are not different
in the two information treatments. Secondly, updating on success on the job and expected
returns to ability go in the same direction independently of the photograph received (see
Appendix Figure 1.B.1). Appendix 1.B rules out alternative interpretations of the infor-
mation provided, such as updating on job amenities (e.g., wage, promotions, training
quality).
1.4 Theoretical framework
In this section I propose a simple model of individual job application where employer’s
messages affect expectations of returns to ability (“expectations effect") and utility from
gender composition on the job (“gender effect"). The main goal is to guide the empirical
analysis and generate predictions on the size and quality of the applicants’ pool in each
treatment group and for different parameters’ ranges.
1.4.1 Environment, preferences and beliefs
Potential applicants are characterized by group belonging g and ability ai. Everyone can
observe own and others’ group g ∈ {M, W}, where M stands for men and W for women.
Individual ability level ai is private information, with ai ∼ U[.].39 They decide between
applying for a female-dominated job or taking an outside option. Utility in the outside
option is a linear function of wage and returns to ability, which I allow to differ by gender:
Uo(ai) = wog + vgai. Utility on the job is given by a taste component, which is a function
of job gender composition, and expected monetary and non-monetary returns, which are
a function of wage and ability:
U j(ai) = αisg + w + θg(ai − aˆg)
where sg the share of workers of gender g in the job, w is the wage, θg are returns to
ability and aˆg is a minimum ability requirement. I define the difference between the wage
in the job and in the outside option (both known) as wg = wog − w.40
39The assumption that ability ai is known can be relaxed and replaced with an unbiased expectation of
ability. Different transformations of ability are also possible (e.g., coming from overconfidence) and do not
affect the theoretical predictions as long as they do not alter the ranking of abilities in the sample. The liter-
ature on overconfidence shows that a reversal in rankings is atypical (see Moore and Healy, 2008, Coffman
et al., 2019).
40The organization cannot offer differentiated wages because of the regulation in the sector. I assume that
experimental participants know the wage and that this is independent of performance. This assumption
comes from the transparency policy of the organization, which publishes the stipend level on the website
and a variety of advertising materials.
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The utility component θg(ai − aˆg) formalizes the fact that agents are motivated by do-
ing a better job than required. This can come from warm glow (Andreoni, 1989), need
for feeling competent (Elliot and Dweck, 2005) or internalization of the impact that ac-
tions have on the employers’ output (Besley and Ghatak, 2005). Alternatively, people
might care about impact for extrinsic reasons, if performance is tied to career promo-
tions. Qualitative interviews indicate that both social impact and career opportunities
are among people’s main motivations for applying. 41 In this view, θg can be interpreted
as the believed marginal product that a person of gender g with ability ai achieves in the
job and which determines either monetary or non-monetary gains. The parameter aˆg is
the level of ability which is not affected by changes in marginal returns to ability, while
ability levels above (below) aˆg get higher utility from higher (lower) θg.42
The component αisg formalizes agents’ utility from workplace gender composition,
which I assume to be linear in the share of their own gender g. Agents are unsure of the
exact gender share. Their priors are normally distributed sg ∼ N(sg, σ2sg) with sW > 0.5
and sM = 1− sW . I assume that αi ∈ [0, 1], meaning that people prefer working with own
gender and are heterogeneous in this preference. I interpret this preference as a reduced
form utility component that can arise from different channels. In my context, social image
concerns (Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017) and threats to identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000,
2005) might be particularly important for men.43
The second source of uncertainty is in returns to ability. Agents don’t perfectly know
how much reward they are going to get from being above the minimum ability require-
ment. A key feature of this framework is that priors are distributed differently for the
two genders: θg ∼ N(θ¯g, σ2g), with θW ⊥ θM. I assume that, on average, men think that
they have weakly lower job-specific returns to ability in the female-job than women, but
they are less certain about this than women.
Assumption 1. Gender differences in beliefs about returns to ability
On average, men believe their returns to ability are lower in the female-job than women: θ¯M ≤ θ¯W .
Assumption 2. Gender differences in uncertainty
Men’s priors on the returns to ability of both genders are noisier than women’s: σ2M ≥ σ2W .
41In 2016, the partner organization asked 83 applicants about their motivations for applying. 51% men-
tion career opportunities, 37% mention social impact and 31% mention the “challenge” of making things
better in local communities.
42In Lazear et a. (2018), this is the marginal worker whose productivity is the same in hard and easy tasks.
43It is beyond the scope of this paper to micro-found the origin of this preference parameter. Papers
in evolutionary psychology (Brewer and Hewstone, 2004) and neuroscience (Eisenberger et al., 2003) show
that people fear being in the minority and even feel physical pain when excluded by a group. A rich litera-
ture shows evidence of people’s preferences for homophily in social networks, including gender similarity
(McPherson et al., 2001; Jackson, 2009). The work by Akerlof and Kranton (2000; 2005) assumes that choosing
an activity which is uncommon for own group determines a direct loss of utility, either from anticonformism,
social exclusion or the cognitive cost of self-image updating (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). When it represents in-
ternalized social stigma, the individual component αiMsg can be micro-founded through a game between
applicant i and his peers. In such a setting, −αiM can be the cost of social punishment for selecting a female
job and sg is the likelihood that the punishment will be enforced.
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The combination of assumptions 1 and 2 is equivalent to assuming risk aversion in the
utility function and keeping only the assumption of asymmetric uncertainty.44 Appendix
1.F.1 provides empirical evidence that men tend to have lower and more dispersed expec-
tations of own group’s performance in social work than women.45 This setting predicts
a lower number of men’s applications than women at baseline and it builds on a stan-
dard Roy model (1951) with perfect correlation between skills in the female-job and in
the outside option.
1.4.2 Reaction to employers’ messages: gender shares and expectations
The employer posts recruitment messages to potential applicants in order to increase
application rates from one or both gender groups.46 The employer includes two pieces of
information: the photograph of a worker, who can be a man or a woman, and information
on the difficulty of the job. As the employer’s profits are increasing in the quality of the
workforce, the information provided aims at increasing not only applications’ numbers,
but also the quality of applicants.
Recruitment messages are a vector (P, S) such that p ∈ {M, W} and signal S ∼
N(θ, σ2s ), where
1
σ2s
is the signal precision and θ is the average return to ability for work-
ers in the job. From hereon, I will denote the experimental realizations of the signal
s ∈ {sL, sH}.47 I will maintain this definition of sL and sH throughout this section.
The timing of the model is as follows. At time 0, potential applicants know ai and aˆg
and hold common priors s¯g and θg. At time 1, the employer posts ad (P, S). A certain
realization (p, s) impacts the individual decision through changes in sg and θg. At time
2, potential applicants decide whether to apply or not given their posteriors on sg and θg.
The following paragraphs describe the updating process in period 1 in detail.48
Pictures p ∈ {M, W} contained in the posted advertisements have a direct utility
effect by changing perceived gender shares. Seeing a photograph of gender g will in-
crease the perceived share of that gender in the job: E[sg|p = g] > E[sg|p 6= g]. If the
predominantly-female composition discourages men from applying, seeing a person of
44For instance, results go through assuming a CARA utility function in combination with the normality
of priors.
45This evidence come from the auxiliary online experiments described in Appendix 1.B.
46Workers’ diverse composition might positively affect output through different channels, for instance
through skills complementarities (Lazear, 1998), better matching between clients and employees (Hoogen-
doorn and Van Praag, 2012) or organizational reputation (Erhardt et al., 2003; Carter et al., 2003; Flabbi et al.,
2019).
47To design the experiment, I considered the overall mean performance across years as the empirical cut-
off for θ and then chose two realizations of yearly performance sL and sH respectively below and above the
overall mean.
48I assume that advertisements do not affect the knowledge of individual ability ai. This is a common
assumption in the literature (Ashraf et al., 2019; Abebe et al., 2019). It is also consistent with evidence
described in the manipulation checks and the fact that information was about aggregate performance and
not about people similar to the recipient. Another way of capturing the crucial message of the model if
allowing ai to be updated as an effect of the intervention, but increasingly in ai. This can happen, for instance,
if people have more precise prior beliefs about their own ability in the left than right tail of the distribution,
or if people are underconfident at the higher end of the ability distribution.
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the same gender will increase men’s expected utility on the job. An alternative way in
which photographs can affect utility is through αi, by changing the salience of gender (as
in priming studies, for instance, Benjamin et al., 2010). I do not disentangle these two
explanations, but I showed manipulation checks consistent with a change in sg (Section
1.3.1).
Under the assumption that photographs p have no effect on the way people inter-
pret information, agents form a posterior belief on own returns to ability in a standard
Bayesian fashion. Given normality, the posterior θ
′
g is a weighted average of the prior
and signal s:
θ
′
g =
σ2s
σ2s + σ
2
g
· θ¯g +
σ2g
σ2s + σ
2
g
· s
One of the caveats of predicting people’s updating is that both direction and magni-
tude depend on priors, which are unknown to the researcher. A convenient feature of
the experimental design is that identification does not rely on assumptions about priors.
As long as the two signals have the same precision and people are Bayesians, random
assignment should guarantee that average posteriors on θg in the group who received
sH should be higher than in the group who received sL independently of priors. This relies
on the following expression for the difference in posteriors between the two information
treatments:
∆θg = (θg|sH)− (θg|sL) =
σ2g
σ2g + σ
2
s
· (sH − sL) (1.1)
∆θg is decreasing in priors’ precision and independent of priors levels. This is the
identification strategy I will use in the empirical section. Assumption 2 of asymmetric
uncertainty by gender implies that men will update more than women when receiving
the same signal: ∆θM > ∆θW .
1.4.3 Predictions
Potential applicants apply for the female-job if U j(ai) − c > Uo(ai), where c is a small
application cost. Application choices are fully characterized by ability level ai. Under a
single crossing condition, the decision rule defines a unique threshold of ability a∗g such
that U j(a∗g)− c = Uo(a∗g).49 I denote as a∗g the ability of the marginal applicant. Define
ag as the average ability of the applicants’ pool of gender g and Ng as its size. Sorting on
ability depends on the slope of utilities with respect to ability in the job and in the outside
option, which are given by U j
′
(ai) = θg and Uo
′
(ai) = vg, respectively. Lemma 1 states
that the marginal applicant is more skilled than the average one when returns to ability
in the job are lower than in the outside option.
49See Appendix 1.F for the formal proof.
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Lemma 1. Relationship between marginal and average quality
Under the conditions for existence of a∗g: if U j
′
(ai) < Uo
′
(ai), then a∗g > ag.
Result 1 states that more applications when people of gender g receive a same-gender
(p = g) than other-gender (p 6= g) photograph identify the effect of gender shares on
utility. The quality of such larger pool of applicants is higher when returns to ability in
the female-job are lower than in the outside option (negative sorting) and lower in the
opposite case (positive sorting).
Result 1. The effect of a shock to perceived gender shares
When p = g, the pool of applicants Ng is larger than when p 6= g.
If U j
′
(ai) < Uo
′
(ai): when p = g, marginal ability a∗g and average ability ag are greater than
when p 6= g.
Let dsg = E[sg|p = g] − E[sg|p 6= g] be the difference in perceived gender shares
between receiving a gender matched (p = g ) or mismatched (p 6= g) photograph. The
difference in the size of the applicants’ pool between the two photographs’ treatments is
increasing in dsg, αi and decreasing in vg. Figure 1.6 shows the graphical intuition for
Result 1. The solid thick line shows the expected utility in the outside option and the two
solid thin lines the expected utility on the job, conditional on a certain photograph p = g
or p 6= g. The top panel shows the case illustrated by result 1 (U j′(ai) < Uo′(ai)) and the
bottom panel shows the alternative case (U j
′
(ai) > Uo
′
(ai)).
The second result focuses on the effect of a change in expected returns to ability θg.
The effect of this treatment on the size and quality of the pool of applicants depends
on two margins. First, whether the marginal applicant has ability above or below aˆg.
Second, whether expected returns to ability when receiving a high (sH) or low (sL) signals
are greater or lower than the returns to ability in the outside option.50 Define B = αisg −
wg − c− vg aˆ.
Result 2. The effect of a shock to expected returns to ability
If B > 0: when s = sH, the pool of applicants Ng is larger than when s = sL.
If U j
′
(ai) < Uo
′
(ai) and B > 0: when s = sH, marginal ability a∗g and average ability ag are
greater than when s = sL.
When priors on the returns to ability in the female-job are lower than returns in the
outside option, Result 2 shows that raising expected returns to ability improves the aver-
age quality of the pool of applicants.51 Figure 1.7 shows the graphical intuition for Result
2. The top panel shows the case illustrated by Result 2 (U j
′
(ai) < Uo
′
(ai)) and the bottom
50Notice that the posterior expected returns to ability when receiving sH could be higher than vg and the
posterior expected returns to ability when receiving sL could be lower than vg. I only consider the case in
which posteriors when receiving either signal are both higher or both lower than vg. This means that the
change in returns to ability is small enough not to invert the sign of the difference θg − vg.
51If B < 0 and U j
′
(ai) < Uo
′
(ai), when s = sH , Ng is smaller and both the marginal and average abilities
are lower than when s = sL.
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panel shows the alternative case (U j
′
(ai) > Uo
′
(ai)). Condition B > 0 limits the result
to the case in which the marginal applicant has ability level above the minimum ability
requirement aˆ when s = sL, thus an increase in returns to ability increases its utility on
the job.52 If there is negative sorting (U j
′
(ai) < Uo
′
(ai)) and B < 0, then an increase in
returns to ability θg discourages the marginal candidate, whose utility decreases because
of the increased job difficulty.
The difference in utility between the treatment providing s = sH and s = sL is pro-
portional to the change in beliefs between the two conditions ∆θg. A straightforward
implication of Bayesian updating is that people with the weakest priors will update the
most when receiving new information. This comes from the fact that σ
2
s
σ2s +σ¯
2
g
is decreasing
in σ2g. The implication is that, ceteris paribus, updating will be stronger for men than
women because of their higher σ2g.
In sum, an increase in the perceived share of own gender in the job can increase appli-
cations, but the ability level of the pool of applicants depends on the nature of sorting in
the job. Changes in expected returns to ability benefit high ability applicants, but might
discourage low ability people if the job appears to be more difficult. This implies that
changing expected returns to ability can potentially improve the quality of applicants
when there is either positive or negative sorting in female-jobs.
1.5 Sample, balance and empirical strategy
The experimental sample consists of 5417 candidates, of whom 1013 are men. Table 1.1
presents summary statistics by gender and balance checks for the overall experimental
sample. Candidates’ average age is 27 and 3 out of 10 are ethnically non-white. Ap-
proximately 32% of the candidates studied in a top-tier UK university.53 The proportion
of people from lower socio-economic backgrounds is substantial: 19% of subjects come
from families where parents had an unskilled occupation, 27% of subjects received eco-
nomic support in school and 2% were looked after by a social worker as a child.54 Almost
half of the sample (41%) currently work full time (FTE from hereon), mostly in the public
sector or healthcare, but a substantial share also comes from science, business or technol-
ogy.
52Notice that the only source of variation in the sign of B is the level of aˆ. If aˆ = 0, the conditions for the
existence of a∗g imply that B is negative if θg > vg and positive if θg < vg. This means that the quantity and
quality predictions of Result 2 do not depend on B if returns to ability are positive for everyone (for aˆ = 0).
53As the student population in these universities represent 15% of higher education institutions in the
UK, the program disproportionally attracts students coming from selective universities. I define top-tier
universities as those belonging to the Russell group. The Russell Group Profile 2017 is available here.
54A care leaver is a person who has been looked after by a local authority for at least 13 weeks since the
age of 14. In 2012, the total number of care leavers represented 0.12% of the total UK population between
16 and 25, while they make up 1.6% of applicants up to 25 years old. Estimates are based on the 2011 UK
Population Census (available here) and the “2012 Care leavers in England data pack" by the Department for
Education (available here).
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Men and women tend to have a similar socio-economic background and experience
with the organization, but differ in demographics, education and employment. Men tend
to be older and, therefore, more likely to have graduated before 2016 or to be in FTE. The
same proportion of men and women attended a top UK university or got a first grade, but
men are more likely to have studied scientific subjects and, if working, to be in corporate,
scientific or business jobs.
Table 1.1 also shows that treatment assignment is balanced on observables. Columns
7 and 8 report the F-statistics and the related p-value of a regression for each of the row-
variables on the set of four treatment indicators. The last column of Table 1.1 reports the
minimum p-value of pairwise t-tests for the difference in means between each pair of
treatments along the 23 variables reported.For the few variables with a significant mini-
mum p-value, only one difference out of ten is significant, with the exception of “Young
carer" (for which 3/10 comparisons are significant).
Table 1.D.1 compares the experimental sample with a random subsample from the
UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) with the same age distribution. Both men and women
in my experiment are more likely to be of non-white ethnicity, less likely to be married,
less likely to have graduated before 2016 and more likely to have worked in the public
sector or healthcare. These differences confirm that people in the experiment are selected
on interest in public sector or healthcare jobs, a fact which has implications for the in-
terpretation of the empirical results. First, it might indicate that the sample is selected
on the weight given to gender shares αi or priors on θg, which are the parameters tar-
geted by the experiment. For instance, men in the sample might care less about gender
composition than the average male LFS respondent (as suggested by the likelihood of
being employed in healthcare). This should bias downward my estimates of the effect of
varying perceived gender shares. Secondly, participants to the experiment might have
different outside options than average LFS respondents (differing in parameters such a
vg or wog). This implies that selection on talent could be different in other samples facing
different structural parameters. Nevertheless, I think that there is scope for generaliz-
ability as this is a relevant sample for policy. Conditional on interest in the sector, the
experimental pool is representative of job applicants to similar programs.55
1.5.1 Main specifications and identification assumptions
In the following sections I present evidence on the effect of photographs and information
on the applicant pool’s size, quality and performance on the job. The empirical strategy
relies on the independent random assignment of these two manipulations.56 I perform
55For instance, people in my sample resemble applicants for Teach For America (Coffman et al., 2017).
56The partner organization was interested in which of the recruitment messages worked best in increasing
applications compared to their standard email. This comparison is hard to interpret because each treatment
email simultaneously changes information and photographs. For instance, the simple addition of creative
contents to email advertising can modify consumers’ behaviour (Gonzales and Loureiro, 2014; Bertrand et
al., 2010). I thus only compare treatment emails with each other, leaving aside the pure control email.
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separate estimations for men and women. Given the nature of the job, the marginal
female and male applicant might be very different from each other, thus a fully interacted
model seems the appropriate specification.
Consider a potential applicant i that decides whether to apply (yi = 1) or not. My
main specification is the following:
yi = c + β1PicMi + β2Returns
H
i + X
′
iλ+ ei (1.2)
where PicMi is a dummy equal to one if i was assigned to receive a male photograph
and ReturnsHi is a dummy for the high returns to ability information. The vector of con-
trols Xi contains the following variables: dummy for non-white ethnicity, whether the
person applied in the past and whether the person registered before the official open-
ing date. As randomization was at the individual level, I use Eicker-Huber-White robust
standard errors.57
I define the application dummy yi to be one if a candidate submits the application
form and keeps showing up at any later stage of the selection process, conditional on
reaching that stage. This definition implies that I do not consider as “applicant" a can-
didate who is called to the second round of interviews but decides to not show up.
This variable thus represents the cumulative effect of the treatment throughout selection
stages.58 Other outcomes will be whether i receives a job offer (conditional on applica-
tion), where she/he accepts and average performance scores on the job. To be able to
interpret differences in these outcomes as the causal effect of the treatment on the com-
position of the pool of applicants, the identification assumption is that the individual
probability of being successful from one stage to the following is independent of treat-
ment assignment. This was guaranteed by the double-blind design of the experiment
(see Section 1.3).
In model (1.2), coefficient β1 tests the null hypothesis of no effect of perceived gender
shares on applications. Failing to reject the null indicates that either the treatment does
not change perceived gender shares (dsg = 0) or that the workplace gender composition
does not affect application decisions (αi = 0). Coefficient β2 tests the null hypothesis of no
effect of expected returns to ability on applications. Failing to reject the null indicates that
either people do not update their expected returns to ability (∆θg = 0) or that the ability
of the marginal applicant is so close to aˆg that changes in marginal returns to ability
do not affect utility. Parameters β1 and β2 identify the causal effect of gender shares
and expectations, respectively, under the assumption of no interaction between the two
manipulations. In order to check whether this assumption is empirically valid, I can
57Results are robust to adding a bias-reduction modification, which is analogous to the modification by
McCaffrey and Bell (2002), as proposed in Imbens and Kolesar (2016).
58In order to apply for the job, candidates have to submit an application form and take an online test
within seven days of the application submission, for an estimated time of completion between 4 and 6
hours. The application form contains motivational questions and several sections on qualifications and
employment experience. The average application rate across years is 60% of registered candidates and it is
higher for women than men (by 5 to 10 pp).
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combine the two manipulation to study whether there is an effect of their interaction.59 I
use the following specification:
yig = c + δ1 · Picgi · ReturnsHi + δ2 · Pic−gi · ReturnsLi + δ3 · Pic−gi · ReturnsHi + X′iλ+ ei
(1.3)
where Picgi (Pic
−g
i ) is a dummy equal to one if i was assigned to receive a picture of
the same (opposite) gender and ReturnsHi (Returns
L
i ) is a dummy for high (low) returns
to ability information. Specification (1.3) uses the email that combines the same-gender
picture with low-returns information as omitted category.60 Model (1.3) tests three null
hypotheses: δj = 0, with j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
To check for the robustness of the results, I use randomization inference. This method
has been increasingly recommended to analyse data from randomized experiments, es-
pecially in small samples (Young, 2018; Gerber and Green, 2012).61 The main idea is
that there is some chance that a treatment-control difference would arise because of the
units assigned to the treatment group, even if the treatment has no effect. Randomization
inference re-assigns the treatment status at random for many repetitions and computes
the probability of differences of various magnitudes under the null hypothesis that the
treatment had no effect.
1.6 Results: men’s entry
1.6.1 The effect of a shock to perceived gender shares
A higher perceived share of own gender in the job does not affect men’s applications.62
Receiving an email with a male person reduces men’s applications by 1.8 percentage
points with respect to an email featuring a female person (Column (1) of Table 1.2). How-
ever, this coefficient is imprecisely estimated and I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no
difference between the two photographs. This is a surprising null result in light of many
policy proposals that try to attract men in female sectors through ads portraying people
of the same gender (Abadie, 2018).63
One way to reconcile this evidence with current policies is thinking about sample
selection. If self-selection into registration is negatively correlated with tastes for work-
place gender composition (or tastes for correlated attributes), men in my sample could
potentially have a lower αi than the average man. This implies that the estimated effect
of perceived male shares is a lower bound of what should be expected for the average
59This model has to be taken with a grain of salt as the study is underpowered to look at the interaction.
60This control group seems also a natural benchmark inspired by many studies in psychology and eco-
nomics which attempt to increase minorities’ performance expectations through successful role models (Das-
gupta and Asgari, 2004; Cheryan et al., 2011). Moreover, qualitative interviews and focus groups indicated
that priors are relatively closer to the “Low Returns” information.
61I use the code provided by Alwyn Young on his website.
62Figure 1.8a shows application rates across treatment groups from the raw data.
63See, for instance, the article “Male Nurses: not just a woman’s job" in The Economist (August 2018) at
this link.
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man. Nevertheless, in a complementary experiment with the same organization, I show
that ads portraying men are not enough to encourage even a more common population of
male students to apply (see Appendix 1.H). This extends the external validity of the null
result of Table 1.2 and implies no role for that either gender homophily with co-workers
or social stigma in men’s choices.
This null effect of gender composition on men’s applications is in line with estimates
by Hsieh et al. (2019), who find little room for occupation-specific preferences in explain-
ing changes in the allocation of talent in the last decades. Moreover, data from the US
between 1970 and 2018 show that the wage gender gap is smaller in female-dominated
than in male-dominated occupations.64 This evidence goes against the hypothesis that
men might get compensating differentials for a distaste in predominantly-female occu-
pations. This null result is also consistent with Wiswall and Zafar (2018), who show that
neither men nor women are willing to receive a lower wage to work alongside a greater
proportion of people who share their gender. The positive coefficient of the female pho-
tograph on men’s application also relates to Bertrand et al. (2010), who show that female
photographs increase the demand of credit by both men and women through a non-
deliberative reaction to adverts’ creative contents. However, it’s not clear whether such a
System-1 effect should arise in my setting, where photographs represent testimonials of
previous applicants and aim to trigger the recipient’s comparison between them.65
1.6.2 The effect of a shock to expectations of returns to ability
Men react strongly to the expectations manipulation. This is shown in the bottom row
of Column (1) of Table 1.2. The coefficient on the treatment dummy ReturnsHi shows
an increase in applications of 7 percentage points in the treatment with higher expected
returns as compared to the omitted category, with a p-value of 0.04. This represents 14%
of the mean in the low expected returns treatment and 12% of the pure control mean.
In other words, men’s entry into this job is positively affected by information of lower
past success among workers. This result is novel and contrasts many role model inter-
ventions, whose standard design provides high statistics of success to minority members
to increase their perceived likelihood to succeed in uncommon jobs. For instance, Del
Carpio and Guadalupe (2018) show that girls are more likely to apply for a coding boot
camp if they are first exposed to information on a same-gender role model, availability
of female networks and high probability of success in the tech sector. The insight that I
add to these studies is that a high probability of success might be interpreted as signal of
low returns to ability rather than the unconditional probability of success, which might
encourage only people of low ability to apply for the job. This might contribute to explain
why, on average, Del Carpio and Guadalupe get negative selection in their experiment.
64Data are from the CPS March supplement. Tables are not reported in this paper.
65I discuss this point further in Section 1.10.
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The increase in application rates in the high expected returns to ability treatment sug-
gests that the marginal applicant has ability a∗ greater than pivot ability aˆ. In the opposite
case, higher expected returns to ability could even attract less applicants. The theoretical
interpretation of the treatment as a rotation of expected utility on the job with respect to
ability also implies that the change in application rates should be positively correlated
with job-specific ability. I test this in Table 1.A.1, where I show that the effect of higher
expected returns to ability on applications is stronger among men with above-median
predicted performance on the job (Columns (1) and (2)) and linearly increasing in this
proxy of job-specific ability (Column (3)).66
This result suggests that informational constraints might be important barriers to
men’s entry in female-dominated jobs. It is surprising that limited information plays
a role in my context, where one could assume there are nearly unlimited opportunities
for learning and experimentation. But the willingness to experiment is itself a function of
the expected usefulness of information. The sheer fact that some occupations are almost
exclusively done by women can impair men’s inclination to collect - or even simply pay
attention to - information on careers that are uncommon for their gender. This might be
especially the case for people with a more valuable outside option.
Men’s reaction to the information treatment also uncovers the importance of expec-
tations of non-monetary returns to ability in their choices. A rich literature in labour
economics explores how subjective expectations of earnings drive educational and occu-
pational choices (Nguyen, 2008; Jensen, 2010; Zafar, 2013; Stinebrickner and Stinebrick-
ner, 2014; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015, 2018). My information treatment does not change
expectations of incentive schemes or earnings, but more broadly the extent to which peo-
ple think their talent will be rewarded in the job. This seems an important dimension to
complement the traditional view of returns to ability. My result is also in line with recent
models of job search that find that the costs of information frictions are sizable, but can
be mitigated by learning (Conlon et al., 2018).
How large is the increase in men’s applications in the most successful treatment? Ap-
plications increase by 12% in treatment (W,H) as compared to the pure control group.
This effect is a quarter of the one reported in Del Carpio and Guadalupe (2018), but this
gap can be explained by differences in the application and opportunity costs between
settings as well as the level of application rates in the control group (7% in their setting
versus 53% in my context).67 However, the magnitude seems relatively large when com-
pared to the effect of doubling posted wages in Abebe et al. (2019), who get an increase
66I compute predicted performance on the job using baseline variables that are available for everyone. I
use the observed scores on the job to impute the predicted score to an individual with missing actual score
using a linear truncated regression. I use the following set of variables: ranking and average completion
rate of the university attended by the candidate, subject studied, obtaining a first grade, whether the grade
is expected or obtained, age, age squared and whether the person is in FTE. The implicit assumption is that
the way in which these variables affect on the job performance is independent of being hired and treatment
status. See details in Section 1.9.
67In my experiment, completing the application form takes between 4 and 6 hours, almost ten times more
than in the Guadalupe and Del Carpio’s setting.
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in application rates of 18%, and Dal Bó et al. (2013), who show an increase of 26% for a
33% higher wage. An effect between two thirds and a half of the one obtained in these
papers is quite substantial given the light touch nature of my treatments, which were
nearly costless to the employer.
Appendix Table 1.A.2 shows that the difference in men’s applications between the
two information treatments is nearly the same when combined with a male or a female
photograph. In other words, in men’s aggregate sample, I cannot reject the null hypothe-
sis of equal effects of emails (W,H) and (M,H), on the one hand, and (W,L) and (M,L), on
the other. This means that the additivity assumption used in the standard version of the
model seems appropriate.68
1.6.3 From the model to the data: heterogeneity by gender norms and priors’
uncertainty
Do gender composition or expectations of returns to ability matter relatively more for
men not used to seeing other men in the job? The model comparative statics predict that
the impact of a change in gender composition is increasing in individual taste parameter
(αi) and that the impact of new information is increasing in initial uncertainty on job
returns (σ2g).
I build an individual-level measure of exposure to labour market gender segregation
during teenagehood as an empirical proxy of the individual weight on gender composi-
tion αi and uncertainty of men’s returns in female-jobs σ2M. A rich literature shows that
segregation is associated with social norms of what are appropriate activities for men
and women (Blau et al., 1998; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005; Goldin, 2014; Cortes and
Pan, 2018).69 Exposure to gender segregation can also affect the persistence of biased be-
liefs on group ability, an insight used by Arrow (1973, 1998) to explain the persistence of
long-term statistical discrimination.70 I posit that a similar channel can limit minorities’
knowledge of their own returns to ability in uncommon jobs.
The construction of my proxy for traditional gender norms and uncertainty on men’s
returns in female-jobs exploits heterogeneity in the geographical origins of candidates.
Using microdata from the 2011 U.K. Census, I construct the Duncan index of occupa-
tional segregation (Duncan, 1955), which identifies the percentage of women (or men)
that would have to change occupations for the occupational distribution of the two gen-
ders to be equal.71 Using a bridge, I merged the index with my experimental data through
68Manipulation checks discussed in Section 1.3.1 also gave reassurance of this assumption.
69While gender norms may cause men and women to choose different occupations, exposure to job gen-
der segregation may in turn make people internalize gender norms which make occupational differences
persist over time (Blau and Kahn, 2000, 2017; Charles et al., 2018; Bell et al., 2019).
70In Arrow’s words (1998, p.97): “To the extent that discrimination takes the form of segregation, then
there will in fact be little experimentation to find out abilities".
71The Duncan index is computed using the following formula: 12 ∑
N
i=1 |miM − fiF |, where mi and fi are the
male and female population, respectively, in occupation i and M and F are the total working population of
the local labour market. It takes values between 0 (complete integration) and 1 (complete segregation).
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the subjects’ secondary school postcode and, when missing, home postcode.72 I use this
index as an individual level measure of exposure to gender-segregated labour markets in
the decade prior to the job application, under the assumption that the choice of residence
is not affected by the index itself.
Table 1.3 estimates heterogeneous treatment effects by splitting the sample between
subjects exposed to higher-than-median (Column 1) and lower-than-median (Column 2)
occupational gender segregation. The top row shows that exposure to occupational gen-
der segregation does not mediate reaction to photographs. In contrast, the bottom row of
Table 1.3 shows that men exposed to higher-than-median occupational gender segrega-
tion react significantly more to the high returns to ability information. Their applications
increase by 16.5 pp, which represents 34% of the mean in the low expected returns group.
This suggests that occupational gender segregation can affect men’s choices of occupa-
tions through a limited information channel, which increases their uncertainty and/or
biases in beliefs about gendered returns to different occupations.
The main caveat for the interpretation of Table 1.3 is that there might be omitted fac-
tors which vary by exposure to job genderization which confound my estimates, but
results are unchanged by the inclusion of controls for observable differences between
men coming from areas with high versus low gender segregation.73 Columns (3) and (4)
of Table 1.3 repeat the same exercise using a different index: the average share of men
working in female-dominated occupations in the local labour market.
Appendix 1.C contains more details on the methodology and presents additional ex-
ercises. First, I designed and implemented an ad-hoc Implicit Association Test (IAT) to
show that exposure to segregation increases the automatic association between social
work and women. Secondly, using data from the British Attitudes Survey and the World
Value Survey, I show that U.K. regions with high gender segregation levels display more
traditional norms related to women’s employment. Third, using auxiliary online sur-
veys, I show that men coming from areas of with a high Duncan index tend to have
higher uncertainty in beliefs about men and women’s abilities in female-jobs.
1.6.4 From the model to the data: heterogeneity by outside option parameters
Increasing the size of the applicants’ pool is desirable for the employer as long as it allows
hiring of better workers. In the model, this depends on whether potential applicants are
facing steeper returns to ability in the outside option or in the job. In this section, I show
72I use the current location for the 62% of people on whom I have no data on the secondary school
location. For students (who are 50% of these missing cases), home location is the parents’ residence, which
is thus a proxy of where they grew up. For workers, it is the current domicile. Results are qualitatively the
same running the same set of regressions of Table 1.3 using only the subset of people with data on school
location, but power drops.
73Results are also robust to the inclusion of a regressor for the ratio of male to female unemployment at
the local area, to control for possible confounders in terms of gender differences in working opportunities.
Table 1.C.1 compares men and women coming from areas with high versus low gender segregation on a
variety of observables.
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that men with steep returns to ability in the outside option (high vg) are more likely
to apply in the high expected returns treatment than men with a flatter outside option.
This suggests that the information treatment might not be generating a quantity-quality
trade-off for the employer.
In Table 1.4, I split the sample of candidates by above/below median wage dispersion
faced in the UK labour market. For a candidate who studied subject s, wage dispersion is
computed as the weighted average of the 75/25 interquartile range of the distribution of
hourly wages across industries in the UK labour market, where weights are given by the
proportion of graduates of subject s working in each industry.74 Columns (1) and (2) of
Table 1.4 show that the difference in application rates between the low and high returns
treatment is three times greater for men facing wage dispersion above the median than
below the median. This is consistent with the theoretical case θM < vM and suggests
that we should expect the marginal applicant in the high expected returns treatment to
be better than in the low expected returns treatment.
The theoretical model further indicates that the effect of expectations of higher returns
to ability on application likelihood depends on the marginal applicant’s position in the
ability distribution. Higher expected returns are predicted to attract more applications
than lower expected returns for high ability people. However, the positive difference
is predicted to be decreasing in ai and to become negative as ai becomes lower than aˆ.
Heterogeneous treatment effects with respect to the outside option level wo provide ev-
idence of this. The last three Columns of Table 1.4 repeat specification (1.2) splitting the
candidates’ sample by quantiles of individual outside option. An individual’s outside
option is their expected hourly-wage in the U.K. labour market conditional on subject
studied, gender, race, age, British nationality and marital status. Data are from the 2017
and 2018 UK Labour Force Survey. Appendix 1.D contains a detailed summary of the
methodology used.
The evidence reported in Columns (3), (4) and (5) of Table 1.4 is consistent with the
information treatment being a change in slope of expected returns on the job. High ex-
pected returns to ability on the job increase application rates by 11 percentage points
among men in the first tercile of the male outside option distribution, an effect which
almost halves in higher terciles. This is what we should expect if men’s sorting in the
job is negative: the difference in slopes ∆θg implies a bigger difference in application
rates among low percentiles of the outside option, where the marginal applicant has a
relatively higher ability level (top panel of Figure 1.7).
Overall, this section suggests that men are negatively sorted in the job and, conse-
quently, that the larger pool of applicants attracted by raising expectations of returns to
74This index of wage dispersion is a function of the endogenous choice of university subject made by the
candidates. Thus Table 1.4 could capture heterogeneous treatment effects due to other unobservable differ-
ences between candidates who chose the same university subject. As a robustness check, Table 1.A.5 repeats
the exercise using the wage dispersion of the region where each candidate lives, under the assumption of
limited mobility across regional labour markets. In the LFS, only 16% of workers work in a region which is
different than their region of residence (excluding people working in Central London and commute).
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ability should also be more qualified. I provide evidence consistent with this prediction
in the next section.
1.7 Results: men’s quality
In this section I show two main results on applicants’ quality. First, male applicants in
the “High Expected Returns” treatment are better on observables and receive a higher
offer rate than in the “Low Expected Returns” treatment. Secondly, once on the job, male
workers from the “High Expected Returns” treatment have better qualifications, perform
better and state that are more likely to stay in social work than in the “Low Expected
Returns” treatment.
1.7.1 Applicants’ skills and job offers
Male applicants in the high expected returns treatment are better than applicants in the
low expected returns treatment on a variety of observable characteristics that are corre-
lated with receiving a job offer. I construct an index which averages the following (stan-
dardized) variables: having a first grade in university, being from a top tier university,
having volunteered frequently in the past, having cognitive skills above the median and
having obtained the maximum score in English pre-university qualifications.75 Appendix
Figure 1.A.2a shows that the distribution of this index in the high expected returns treat-
ment is shifted to the right of the distribution in the low expected returns treatment. The
positive gap between the two treatments is positive across the distribution, but slightly
higher in middle quantiles (Table 1.E.1). Men in the male photograph treatment are also
better in the same observables on average, but the effect is driven by the highest quan-
tile of the distribution (Table 1.E.1). This is consistent with an improvement at the margin
generated by the higher expected returns to ability information and the male photograph.
Men in the high expected returns treatment consequently get more job offers than
applicants in the low expected returns treatment. The offer rate is 18%, which is 6.2
percentage points higher than in the treatment providing information of low returns to
ability. This is shown in Column (2) of Table 1.2, where the dependent variable equals
one if a person received a job offer, conditional on applying.
To attribute the increased offer rate to the causal effect of the treatment on applicants’
composition one needs to exclude that the treatment affects the employer’s screening
criteria (Ashraf et al., 2019). I check this in Table 1.5, which shows the coefficients of the
following regression:
75To define cognitive and manual skills, I use the employment history reported by each applicant in the
application form. I coded the most recent reported role into standardized SOC4 categories and followed
the methodology of Acemoglu and Autor (2011) to match each occupation with the skills listed by O*Net.
For each person, the measures of cognitive and manual skills should be interpreted as the average level of
cognitive and manual skills acquired in past work experiences.
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where oi is equal to one if i received a job offer (conditional on applying), T1i and T
2
i
are indicator variables for one of the two treatments for each condition (e.g., male and
female photograph respectively) and Si are the two stratification variables (gender and
ethnicity). X ji are indicator variables equal to one if candidate i has a certain desirable
qualification. In addition to the set of variables defined above, I consider also having
studied a subject aligned with the content of the job and having received the maximum
score in Maths pre-university qualifications.76
Columns (1) and (3) report the coefficients αT
1
j and α
T2
j for the information and photo-
graph conditions, respectively. First, they show that the employer finds some qualifica-
tions more desirable than others. For instance, candidates who received a first grade in
university are 11 percentage points more likely to receive an offer, while receiving a high
score in Maths doesn’t seem to matter. Columns (2) and (4) report the p-value of tests of
equality of coefficients αT
1
j = α
T2
j . Most of the reported p-values are above 0.20, indicat-
ing that I cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of the employer’s selection criteria
across treatments. Two comparisons out of twelve are significant: the employer is more
likely to give an offer to people with a first grade in the male photograph than the female
photograph treatment and more likely to give an offer to people who studied a subject
aligned with the job in the high expected returns than low expected returns treatment.
Importantly, the latter difference is driven by female candidates and thus cannot explain
the increase in offer rates seen in the high expected returns treatment for men.77
1.7.2 Workers’ skills and performance on the job
In this section, I show that raising expectations of returns to ability allows the employer
to select male workers that are better in terms of observable qualifications and perform
better on the job. For this exercise, I consider the subset of job offerees who accepted
the offer (62 out of 88 men, of whom 43 in the treatment groups). They all start working
for the organization in July 2018. After a first month of training, they are sent to their
allocated team across communities in different UK regions.78
76I define “aligned subjects" those with knowledge in the key areas listed by the O*Net website for social
work. For instance, O*Net lists “Law and Government" as one of the knowledge components required in
the job. I thus classify subject titles containing “Law" and “Government" as an aligned subjects. I consider
aligned subjects also those titles that combine different disciplines, such as “Law and Economics".
77I also ran the same specification adding measures of cognitive and manual skills inferred by the em-
ployment history reported by the candidates. Results are robust to this inclusion. The employer selects
people with higher cognitive skills, but manual skills are deemed less important. There are also no differ-
ences in the extent to which cognitive and manual skills affect the probability of receiving an offer across
treatments.
78Allocation is based on individual regional preferences, slot availability and diversity considerations.
The organization tries to satisfy individual preferences in most of the cases: out of the ones who accepted
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Figure 1.9a shows the difference in the proportion of men who hold a certain qualifi-
cation between treatment groups, using the same set of variables defined in the previous
section. The Figure on the left shows differences between the male and female photo-
graph and the Figure on the right shows differences between high and low expected
returns to ability. Men are better in terms of observables in both the male photograph
treatment (vis-à-vis the female photograph treatment) and in the high expected returns
to ability treatment (vis-à-vis low expected returns to ability). For instance, 38% of men
in the high expected returns to ability treatment and 23% in the low expected returns to
ability treatment achieved a first grade in university. This shows that the employer is able
to hire better workers through the improvement in the quality of the pool of applicants
generated by the treatment.79 However, a limitation of this evidence is the small sample
size. I then turn to performance on the job, where repeated measures for each person are
available.
Measuring performance in public sector frontline jobs is rare. A convenient feature
of my partner organization is that workers are continuously assessed in both theoretical
and practice tests. I measure workers’ performance using the grade they received dur-
ing the first six months on the job, which is the period covered by the data available so
far.80 Between August 2018 and January 2019, new workers are evaluated in five differ-
ent assessments: a first-month performance review, three theory assignments (e.g., case
studies, essays) and one practice evaluation.81
Figure 1.9b shows the distribution of men’s average test scores by experimental treat-
ment. The distribution of test scores is shifted to the right for men in the high expected
returns vis-à-vis the low expected returns to ability treatment, with a bigger difference at
the left tail of the distribution (right-hand side figure). This suggests that higher returns
to ability improve the male workforce through a change in composition which attracts
better men and, at the same time, deters the worst men from entering the job. This corre-
sponds to the theoretical case in which the posterior beliefs on θg are higher than returns
to ability in the outside option. The model doesn’t predict the right shift in the distribu-
tion of scores for men in the female photograph vis-à-vis the male photograph treatment
(left-hand side figure).82 However, this evidence is consistent with slightly higher men’s
the offer, 70% were allocated to the first ranked region. There are a total of 52 communities in my sample
and the average team size is 4 people.
79I show dynamics of observable qualities over the hiring, stage after stage, in Appendix 1.G.
80I will keep tracking participants for the full duration of the programme until July 2021.
81The theory assessments are evaluated by experts in the sector in anonymous form. Anonymity is not
possible in the first month performance review and the practice assessment. The former is a score given
by teachers at the end of the mandatory classroom-based training phase which evaluates the ”potential”
of each worker of doing a good job once in the local communities. The practice score is given through
direct observation of the way in which a worker interacts with customers. Evaluators were not aware of
candidates’ treatment assignment or even that an experiment took place.
82This difference is driven by non-white men: they are concentrated in the male photograph treatment
and they all perform significantly and substantially worse than others (in the order of 20% lower scores on
average).
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applications in the female photograph treatment in a model where men are negatively
sorted in the job.
I estimate the following model using panel data at the worker-assessment level:
scoreia = α+ β1PicMi + β2Returns
H
i + X
′
iλ+ eia (1.4)
where scoreia is worker’s i grade in assessment a normalized by the mean and stan-
dard deviation of male workers’ grades.83 The vector Xi includes, in addition to the basic
controls of specification (1.2), dummies for the region where the worker is allocated, a
dummy for whether the worker has been allocated to his preferred region, a dummy for
whether the worker studied in a top tier UK university and the score she got in Maths
pre-university qualifications (as proxies for baseline ability). Standard errors are clus-
tered at the worker level.
Parameter β1 and β2 measure the causal effect of the experimental manipulations un-
der the identifying assumption that the change in observed job performance is due to
a change in applicants’ selection caused by the treatment. Another identifying assump-
tions is of no contamination across treatments, which seems reasonable in this context
given the time lag between hiring and working.
The bottom row of Table 1.6 shows that men with high expected returns to ability per-
form significantly better: their scores are 24% of a standard deviation higher than men
with low expected returns (p-val < 0.10). The effect increases (to 0.36) when accounting
for the fact that men in the high expected returns to ability treatment tend to be allocated
to more challenging communities. This is shown in Column (2) of Table 1.6, which adds
weights for the difficulty of the local community where a worker is allocated to.84 Ap-
pendix 1.E uses quantile regressions to show that the improvement in men’s test scores
in the high expectations treatment is concentrated among the lowest quantiles.85
Table 1.7 shows additional results on the attitudes and perceptions of men hired in the
job. The main result is that men in the high expected returns to ability and in the male
photograph treatments are more likely to say that they would like to stay in the job in the
future. This is important in a sector where as many as 50% of workers plan to stay less
than two years (Ravalier, 2018). Future data collection will shed light on whether these
intentions turn into higher retention.
83In the raw data, each grade is on a scale between 0 and 100, where 40% is the minimum threshold for
passing and grades above 70% correspond to a distinction.
84I use data from the Department for Education on the Children and Family Social Work Workforce (2017)
in England and data from the 2016/17 report of Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Education, Children’s Ser-
vices and Skills (by Ofsted). The report includes data on the outcomes of inspections carried out on all
registered social work providers in England. For more information, consult the Department for Education
website here and Ofsted website here. There are 52 local authorities where workers in my sample are allo-
cated to. For each local authority, I compute an index of “difficulty" by averaging the score in these variables:
social workers’ caseload, turnover, absenteeism and Ofsted’s scores on helping children, child care, leader-
ship effectiveness.
85The differential change at different points of the ability distribution is possible because the employer
makes job offers on a rolling basis and ranks all the candidates independently of treatment assignment in a
centralized way.
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1.7.3 Selection or self-fulfilling prophecy?
The higher quality of male job offerees and workers is consistent with better selection
generated by the high returns expectations treatment. An alternative explanation of such
an effect is a self-fulfilling prophecy: believing in higher chances to be successful might
make men put more effort and motivation over the hiring process, with a subsequent
higher offer rate (but not necessarily a change in selection). Such an effect has been doc-
umented in a few papers as a response to varied leaders’ expectations (Rosenthal, 1994;
Eden, 1992; Eden and Ravid, 1982) or to prejudice against minorities (Benyishay, 2016;
Glover et al., 2017). There are three main pieces of evidence against this explanation.
First, any motivating effect of the treatment should be stronger right after receiving the
invitation-to-apply email. In contrast, Table 1.A.6 shows that men in the two information
treatment groups do not differ in the effort put in application completion, as measured by
the percentage of fields filled-in and the number of characters used to answer the appli-
cation questions. Secondly, workers in the high expected returns treatment are better, on
observables, than workers with lower expected returns. Third, we should expect higher
effort to be correlated with higher likelihood of job acceptance, perhaps through a sunk
cost fallacy. Evidence reported in Table 1.2 contradicts this hypothesis.
A related concern is that the performance effects are an artefact of the experimen-
tal manipulation and come from a “surprise" once people compare expected and actual
returns on the job. There are two implications of this hypothesis: performance effects
should be waning over time and be driven by people surrounded by worse colleagues.
Figure 1.A.3 shows that there is no decreasing trend in the coefficients on the treatment
indicator variable in separate regressions for each of the five on-the-job assessments. I
also don’t find evidence of a greater performance by men in teams with a lower leave-
out-mean in the high versus low expected returns treatment.86
1.8 Will men’s entry into female-dominated jobs affect women?
Encouraging men’s entry in female-dominated jobs inevitably affects women, so the net
benefit for the employer is unclear if we ignore the effect that increasing minorities’ par-
ticipation will have on the majority in the job. If male shares in female-dominated jobs
actually increased, would there be any negative impact on the number and quality of
female applications? I use the photograph manipulation to answer this question. Show-
ing a male photograph allows me to simulate a counterfactual world in which people
perceive the share of men in the job to be higher and see how women behave as a result.
I find that a higher (perceived) male share discourages women from applying for the
job.87 Column (1) of Table 1.8 shows that there are 7.5% fewer women’s applications in
86Team assignment is orthogonal to expected performance and based on candidate’s regional preferences
and diversity considerations of the partner organization.
87Figure 1.8b shows application rates across treatment groups from the raw data.
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the male vis-à-vis female photograph treatment. An alternative way of interpreting this
result is that women infer that the employer is looking for men, but this doesn’t rule
out that the effect is driven by an anticipated future change in gender composition. This
alternative story would still indicate that employer’s active policies to attract more men
in female-dominated jobs might discourage women from applying.
Fewer applications by women turn out to be a positive outcome for the employer.
Women who applied despite seeing a male photograph receive a slightly higher offer rate
(not statistically significant), are more likely to accept the job and perform significantly
better in the workplace than women in the female photograph treatment. This is shown
in Columns (2) to (4) of Table 1.8. Column (4) shows that women in the high perceived
male share treatment achieve average test scores on the job which are 19% of a standard
deviation higher than women in the low perceived male share treatment.
Consistent with such increased performance, Figure 1.10 shows that female work-
ers in the male photograph treatment are better on several observables characteristics
(Panel A) and that the distribution of their on-the-job test scores is shifted to the right of
the one in the female photograph treatment (Panel B). Appendix Tables 1.A.7 and 1.E.2
confirm these results exploiting repeated assessments for each person and introducing
individual-level clustered standard errors to account for within-person correlations in
the errors. Improvements in women’s performance in the male photograph treatment are
concentrated among the middle quantiles (between the 25th and 75th, see Table 1.E.2).88
The joint change in applications and quality suggests that, in contrast to men, the
sorting of women in the job is positive. This is implied by the fact that fewer applications
are correlated with an increase in average quality. Table 1.A.4 confirms this conjecture
by showing heterogeneous treatment effects by the degree of wage dispersion faced in
the UK labour market on women’s applications. As expected, the negative effect of the
male photograph is concentrated among women with flatter outside options. This is
consistent with the theoretical case θW > vW , in which the marginal applicant in the
female photograph treatment is worse than in the male photograph treatment.
Women are insensitive to information provision on average, which is consistent with
the majority holding more precise priors on their performance in the occupation. The
second row of Table 1.8 shows that the point estimate on the ReturnsHi dummy is -0.015
and far from being statistically significant. Column (1) of Table 1.A.3 confirms that the
two genders react differently to the expected returns treatment. Overall, these results
suggest that a higher proportion of male workers in this job can improve female selection
by discouraging the least talented women from applying and/or accepting the job.
88As in men’s case, I can exclude that women’s performance differences come from a “surprise" once
people compare expected and actual gender shares on the job. Figure 1.A.3 shows that the effect of the male
photograph on female performance does not show a decreasing trend over time.
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1.8.1 Do women care about the workplace gender composition?
Women’s reaction to the photograph manipulation could suggest that women value co-
workers gender more than men do. This has been suggested by some authors (Haile,
2012; Lordan and Pischke, 2016), who show that women’s well-being is higher in work-
places with a higher female share.
Yet, some evidence invites a more cautious interpretation of women’s behaviour.
First, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that men and women react in the same way
to the photograph manipulation (Table 1.8). Secondly, the interaction between the two
manipulations is important. The dashed lines of the right panel of Figure 1.11 show that
women are less likely to apply when seeing a male photograph in combination with in-
formation of high returns to ability. When expected returns to ability are low, the impact
of the photograph manipulation on women’s application rates is reduced. This suggests
that women’s behaviour does not stem from a generalized preference for working with
own gender.
There are alternative ways to interpret women’s stronger reaction to a high perceived
male share when in combination with expected high returns to ability. One hypothesis
goes through preferences: women dislike working with men in more challenging envi-
ronments, as suggested by the literature on gender differences in preferences for competi-
tion (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Niederle and Yestrumskas, 2008). In the model, this
explanation could be accounted for by making the individual utility weight on gender
composition αi a positive function of the returns to ability in the job.89
An alternative hypothesis goes through beliefs: gender shares affect women’s infer-
ence of their expected returns to ability on the job. This is in line with work on beliefs
about gender (Coffman et al., 2019; Bordalo et al., 2019), overconfidence (Croson and
Gneezy, 2009) and a few results in the competitiveness literature (Wozniak et al., 2010;
Dreber et al., 2014). If women have a comparative advantage in female-jobs, a lower fe-
male share might signal a decrease in such advantage, which becomes relatively more
important in a job where ability matters more. An extension of my model that allows
gender shares to impact expected returns to ability might account for this mechanism.
I present such extension in Section 1.F.3, where I assume that gender shares impact ex-
pected on-the-job ability by providing information on the pivot ability level aˆ. If the
effect of gender shares on aˆ is strong enough, this model predicts a negative difference-
in-difference in application rates between the male and female photograph and in the
high versus low expected returns to ability treatments.
89See also the discussion in Section 1.10.
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1.9 Estimating structural parameters
One limitation of the experimental design is that I don’t observe people’s updating of
their expected returns to ability or the utility weight they give to the workplace gen-
der composition. In this section, I estimate these parameters using a discrete choice
framework. Consider the individual decision of whether to apply to the job or not:
Pr(apply = 1) = Pr(U j(αi, sg, θg, ai, aˆ) + ξ j > Uo(vg, ai, wg) + ξo), where ξ j and ξo are
errors with type I generalized extreme value distributions and the cost of application is
assumed to be zero.90 I use Maximum Likelihood to estimate the following logit model:
log
Pr(apply)
(1− Pr(apply)) = β1wg + β2OwnGenderi + β3ai + β4Returns
H
i + β5Returns
H
i ∗ ai
where OwnGenderi is a dummy for a same-gender photograph, ReturnsHi is a dummy
for high expected returns to ability, wg is the de-meaned difference between the log-wage
in the job and in the outside option and ai is a de-meaned proxy of job-specific ability.
This proxy is the predicted on-the-job performance score, obtained for the full sample
through a linear truncated regression using the following variables: ranking and average
completion rate of the university attended by the candidate, subject studied, obtaining
a first grade, whether the grade is expected or obtained, age, age squared and whether
the person is in FTE.91 The assumption is that the way in which these variables affect job
performance is independent of being hired and treatment status. Appendix Figure 1.A.5
compares the distribution of actual and imputed on-the-job ability for men and women.
Parameter β2 identifies the average utility weight on workplace gender composition αi
for gender g, β3 identifies (θL − vg), β4 identifies the difference (θH − θL) at mean ability
level and β5 identifies ∆θg = θH − θL.92
Figure 1.12 shows the distribution of 5000 bootstrap replications of the key coeffi-
cients β2 and β5, estimated separately for men and women using samples of the same
size (N=800). The women’s distribution of parameter α is shifted to the right of men’s,
indicating a stronger taste for working with own gender (or related attributes). On av-
erage, α equal 0.21 for women and -0.09 for men. The ratio of coefficients β1 and β2
indicates that the increase in own gender share generated by the treatment has the same
effect on women’s applications as a 30% increase in job wage w (an increase in the hourly
wage from 16.5 to 21.45 GBP). The estimated average α for women masks heterogeneity
depending on the information received and is reduced to 0.08 when estimated condition-
ally on low expected returns to ability.
90Results are similar when including the distance to London as a proxy for the cost of applying.
91Data on ranking and average completion rate of the university attended by the candidate are taken
from the 2015-2016 University and Subject League Tables, which systematically collect public data from the
Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) and the National Student Survey (NSS). For more information
see the webpages: tables, hesa and nss.
92The corresponding likelihood function is lnL = ∑j∈S lnF(xjb) +∑j 6∈S ln(1− F(xjb)), where S is the set
of all observations j, such that application outcome yj 6= 0 and F(z) = ez(1+ez) .
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The right graph of Figure 1.12 shows that men’s distribution of ∆θ is shifted to the
right of women’s, indicating a stronger updating of expected returns to ability by the job
minority. The mean ∆θ for women is 0.01 and for men is 0.032, which implies that the
ratio of priors’ uncertainty between men and women is greater than one. The estimated
difference of 0.032 in expected returns to ability for men is substantial: just above mean
ability, it is comparable to a 16.6% increase in the wage in the job (an increase in the
hourly wage from 16.5 to 19.24 GBP).
Figure 1.A.4 shows predicted margins. For both men and women, the probability of
applying is increasing in predicted on-the-job performance in the treatment with expec-
tations of high returns to ability, but decreasing in the alternative information treatment.
This is consistent with the interpretation of the information treatment as a change in the
slope of expected utility with respect to job-specific ability.
1.10 Alternative mechanisms
1.10.1 Social comparison
One way in which participants in my experiment could interpret the information pro-
vided is by forming expectations about others who are competing for the same role. Evi-
dence from auxiliary online experiments (Appendix 1.B) shows indeed that respondents
think that the proportion of applicants with the potential of being high-achievers in the
job is lower when they received the 66% than 89% statistic. Models of tournament entry
(Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Cotton et al., 2014), directed search (Wright et al., 2017;
Belot et al., 2018) and competition for jobs (Lazear et al., 2018) help us think through this
alternative channel. For instance, Belot et al. (2018) show that job posts featuring higher
wages, ceteris paribus, might receive a lower number of applications. This is driven by
low-skilled people expecting that the earnings level will attract a more skilled pool of
applicants and, thus, more competition. In the affirmative action model by Cotton et al.
(2014), low ability students are discouraged by an increase in the expected degree of com-
petition in a colour-blind contest. Similarly, in Lazear et al. (2018) low ability applicants
are negatively affected by “bad luck" when competing against more skilled candidates
for the same position. These models predict that we should expect low ability people not
to apply when receiving information of an outstanding past performance. This would
imply, consequently, an increase in average quality in the treatment featuring the 89%
statistic. This contrasts with the evidence I have shown here.
1.10.2 Attention
Photographs may differ in the extent to which they capture the agent’s attention (Gabaix,
2017).93 In turn, only attentive agents update priors according to the information in the
93I focus on the case in which attention is not optimally chosen.
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ad. I build an empirical measure of attention to explore this channel (Mas and Pallais,
2017). The experimental intervention was located right below a unique candidate num-
ber, which is needed to access the application portal. There are two options if a person
forgets this number: searching back in their inbox for the invitation-to-apply email or
asking for a reminder. Requests for reminders can be used as a proxy for endogenous
attention to the intervention because candidates who asked for fewer reminders have ei-
ther paid more attention to the original invitation-to-apply email or have looked back for
it several times.
According to this measure, men pay relatively more attention to the female than the
male photograph (see Table 1.A.8). This is in contrast with both models of salience (Bor-
dalo et al., 2013, 2017) and studies that would predict higher attention through perceived
similarity (Forehand and Deshpandé, 2001; Jaffe, 1991). However, this evidence is similar
to the results found by Bertrand et al. (2010), who show that women’s photographs trig-
ger an affective reaction which induces greater demand for credit. In my experiment, the
positive reaction to the female photograph is concentrated among men in the non-white
group, who received the photograph with the highest rating in terms of attractiveness
(see Section 1.B). This suggests visceral influences might also play a role in explaining
job applications (see also Loewenstein, 1996). For women, demand for reminders is not
different between the two photographs, which rules out that attention could be driving
their behaviour.
1.10.3 On-the-job dating market
Suppose that the main driver of choice is finding a partner on the job. Given that this is
a female-dominated occupation, we should expect the proportion of single men who ap-
ply to be higher than the proportion of single women. The proportion of male applicants
who are married or in a civil partnership is 19% while the proportion of married female
applicants is only 12%.94 On average, men seem not to be motivated by the on-the-job
marriage market reasons. Nevertheless, the particular types of single men and women
that apply for this job could still be motivated by the possibility of finding a dating op-
portunity. If this is the case, they might interpret employer’s recruitment messages in
terms of dating opportunities. This hypothesis has some testable implications.
First, we should expect heterosexual and non-heterosexual people to react in oppo-
site ways to the same photograph. Secondly, among heterosexual people, the positive
effects of seeing a person of the opposite gender should be weaker for married people.95
Table 1.A.9 tests these predictions. The first two columns show results for women and
the last two columns for men. Columns (1) and (3) test for differential treatment effects
by sexual orientation, Columns (2) and (4) by marital status. Overall, the data do not
seem to support the on-the-job dating channel. A picture of the same (different) gender
94The gender difference in marriage rates survives when I control for age.
95This is based on the assumption that faithfulness is a value for a non-zero proportion of married people.
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increases applications the most for heterosexual (non-heterosexual) women. Both these
results are in contrast with the tested hypothesis. For men, there are no significant differ-
ences based on marital status. However, Column (3) shows that heterosexual men react
positively to the woman’s picture and negatively to the man’s picture, and vice versa for
non-heterosexual men. These facts are aligned with the tested hypothesis, but the effect is
too small to be able not to reject this hypothesis. Moreover, the fact that non-heterosexual
men and women both react positively to the non-stereotypical photograph suggests that
this is not about dating.96
1.10.4 Gender differences in preferences
Competing explanations of my results based on gender differences in preferences need
to account not for a simple difference in updating by men and women, but the fact that
women’s updating of returns to ability is affected by gender composition. I consider risk
aversion, overconfidence and competitiveness (for reviews see Croson and Gneezy, 2009;
Bertrand, 2011).
A wealth of studies show that men tend to be less risk averse than women (Holt and
Laury, 2002; Dohmen et al., 2005; Eckel and Grossman, 2008). However, risk aversion can
account for the observed behaviour only if we assume that women’s risk preferences or
their perception of riskiness are a function of contextual factors (for instance, the male
photograph might trigger negative emotions which affect risk evaluation). Even if some
studies show that women anticipate negative outcomes with greater fear than men (e.g.,
Fujita et al., 1991; Brody, 1993; Lerner et al., 2003), I don’t have data on women’s emo-
tions to test this hypothesis. More importantly, more variance in past success does not
necessarily imply higher uncertainty if people know their own ability.
Another stream of work shows that both men tend to be more overconfident than
women (Lundeberg et al., 1994; Beyer and Bowden, 1997; Beyer 1998; Niederle and
Vesterlund, 2007; Grosse and Reiner, 2010; Dreber et al., 2014; Coffman, 2014; Bordalo
et al., 2019). However, the realm in which overconfidence is assessed matters (Jakobsson
et al., 2013; Coffman et al., 2019) and the gender gap shrinks or even reverses in typical
female domains. I check this in a subsample of my experimental participants (N=633). I
ask them to rate themselves in ten skills on a scale from 1 (max) to 10 (max). The skills are
both general (e.g., critical thinking, creativity, adaptability) and job specific (e.g., empa-
thy, client support). For each person, I construct a measure of overconfidence by counting
96We might also think of a more complicated model of decision making, in which the information asso-
ciated with a certain photograph signals the quality of potential partners. For instance, a non-heterosexual
man could interpret the ad portraying a man with low performance as saying that the quality of potential
partners’ in the job is low. This is not what happens in the experiment, as the highest application rate for
non-heterosexual men is in the treatment combining the male photo and low past performance.
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the number of skills rated above the sample mean.97 Table 1.A.10 shows that men in my
sample tend to be less overconfident than women, especially in job-specific skills. Ap-
pendix 1.I reports results from an additional exercise where I show that the increase in
men’s applications is driven by men with low confidence in their estimates of people’s
performance in female-dominated jobs. As long as confidence about others’ performance
is correlated with confidence in own ability, it suggests that the effects are actually driven
by the least confident men (Moore and Healy, 2008).
Finally, high returns to ability might signal that the job is competitive. Well-known
results are that men are more likely to select into competitive environments than women
(Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Datta Gupta et al., 2013)
and that this gap is larger for tasks which are perceived as more “masculine" (Dreber et
al., 2014; Grosse et al., 2014; Flory et al., 2014).98 This interpretation presupposes that
beliefs about the returns to ability must have changed, otherwise people would have no
reason to get competitive. Thus my main interpretation of the information treatment is
still needed for preferences for competition to contribute to explain the results.
I then check whether reaction to the treatment differ by participants’ competitive
background. I identify two types of candidates: those used to competition, who stud-
ied a male-dominated subject in a top-tier university, and those not used to competition,
who studied a female-dominated subject in lower-tier universities.99 Figure 1.A.6 shows
that both men and women react similarly to the expectations treatment independently of
this proxy of competitiveness, suggesting that competitive attitudes might not be a main
driving force of the results. I further explore whether women who attended a single sex
school react differently to the information manipulation, but find no evidence for this.100
1.11 Discussion
Is attracting more men by raising expected returns to ability a free lunch? Information
of higher impact of ability attracts more and better men, but it does not affect women’s
97Invitation to the survey was sent to everyone in the invitation-to-apply email and subsequently encour-
aged through an ad-hoc email adding monetary incentives. This subsample is made of all the people that
participated in the survey. The survey sample is representative of the overall pool of candidates in the field
(e.g., balanced on gender, treatment assignment, FTE status).
98The intervention didn’t change the structure of incentives on the job, as in Flory et al. (2014). People
know that their earnings will not depend on their ranking. In qualitative interviews with participants, I
asked them to indicate the extent to which some words came to mind by looking at the intervention email.
The word “competition" had an average answer of 4.5 out of ten for both performance statistics. Moreover,
if interest in a female-dominated job is negatively correlated with competitiveness, we should expect people
who self-select into my experimental sample to be less competitive than average.
99The performance of these two groups once on the job is the same on average.
100Single-sex education has been shown to mitigate the gender gap in competitive attitudes by some stud-
ies, but results are ultimately mixed (Booth and Nolen, 2012; Lee et al., 2014; Laury et al., 2019). I find that
women from single-sex schools (14%) react negatively to information of high expected returns to ability and
even more so when combined with a female photograph (effect of 12 percentage points). If sex schooling
makes women more tolerant of competition, these results go against an interpretation of the treatments in
terms of competitiveness on the job. Information on schools come from the Department for Education and
is available for 72% of the sample.
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applications on average. In turn, a higher perceived male share improves women’s se-
lection. This suggests that breaking down barriers to men’s entry into female-dominated
jobs may improve the overall quality of the workforce in a gender-neutral way, amelio-
rating both men’s and women’s selection.
Table 1.9 provides evidence of this free lunch. The male photograph entails a decrease
in applications by women as well as a slightly higher offer and acceptance rate by men.
As women are better in this treatment and represent more than 75% of the workforce,
their better quality drives an improvement in the overall workforce quality. Providing
information of high expected returns to ability achieves the second-best overall perfor-
mance of the workforce and the highest men/women gender ratio. Table 1.9 suggests
that, in the short-term, the entry of men in female-dominated jobs might improve their
selection without substantial negative spillovers on women. Once male shares increase,
an improvement in women’s selection might follow.
What do my results imply for talent allocation in the aggregate economy? In a world
with two sectors (e.g., social and private), this ultimately depends on the nature of men’s
and women’s sorting in each. If men’s sorting in female-dominated jobs is negative, as
my results indicate, their reallocation will improve average skills in both sectors of the
economy. This comes from the fact that switchers are the ones with the lowest private-
sector ability. Things are more complicated if we consider the effects on the crowd-out of
women. There will be aggregate gains from talent reallocation if women are positively
sorted in female-jobs, as my evidence suggests, and negatively sorted in the outside op-
tion, because switchers from female-dominated jobs to the alternative will improve aver-
age quality in both. If instead women are positively sorted in both sectors the net effect
of both women and men’s relocation will be ambiguous.
In the US, Hsieh et al. (2019) show that the increase of women’s and black men’s
shares in high-skilled occupations since 1960 is related to a weakening of group-specific
occupational barriers. In turn, this has positive effects on aggregate growth outcomes
as the newcomers into high-skilled professions have also high occupation-specific talent.
While I do not have data to provide evidence on aggregate effects, my experiment com-
plements this work by showing that men might similarly be facing occupation-specific
barriers in female-dominated jobs. Under some assumptions on the correlation of skills
in the economy, this implies that men’s current allocation in female-dominated jobs is
suboptimal and talented male social-workers are not reaping the highest returns to their
ability.
1.12 Concluding remarks
Blue-collar employment is shrinking across the developed world (Autor et al., 2013; Au-
tor et al., 2018). These trends challenge the traditional role of men both in society and
within households by creating male idleness and financial insecurity, especially on the
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left tail of the ability distribution (Autor et al., 2018; Coile and Duggan, 2019). At the
same type, female-dominated sectors such as healthcare and education are growing and
face relatively little risk of automation in the future (Nedelkoska and Quintini, 2018).
And yet, male labour supply is still relatively untapped as a resource for addressing the
shortage of teachers and nurses in many industrialized economies. Understanding the
interaction between traditional gender norms and gender-specific information in rapidly
changing labour markets is crucial to let men in declining industries achieve new oppor-
tunities (Binder and Bound, 2019).
In this paper, I provided evidence that the limited entry of men into female-dominated
jobs can be explained by limited information on returns to ability rather than job-gender
composition. I show that providing information on the chances of standing out increases
men’s applications, especially when their experience in the sector is limited and they
grew up under traditional gender norms. Men with expectations of higher returns to
ability are more likely to be hired by the employer and perform better once on the job. At
the same time, a higher male share discourages the entry of less talented women in the
job.
My paper assumes that men and women only differ in terms of the information they
are endowed with. This contrasts with many studies on gender differences in preferences
(for a review see Bertrand, 2011) and moves the focus of research from natural to nurtural
differences which emerge as a result of being the minority in a certain occupation. This
implies that the impact of raising expectations of returns to ability should similarly affect
women’s entry in male-dominated occupations. Preliminary results from a pilot experi-
ment I conducted on an online platform seem to confirm this. I sent 900 invitations for
a web development job to freelancers listed on the website, of whom women represent
30 percent. I randomized the content of the invitation in the same manner as in the field
experiment presented in this paper. I replicate the result that higher expected returns to
ability in the job attract more applications (7.5% compared to an average of 5%) and find
that this is especially the case for women (but not statistically significant, see Table 1.10).
My results offer an optimistic view on the possibility to affect career choices among
adults who completed their education and, in some cases, already spent several years in
the labour market.101 This is crucial for the future of work, which involves workers’ quick
adaptation to new roles (OECD, 2019). A related message is that recruitment strategies
have the potential to reduce occupational gender segregation. Historically, job adver-
tisement has been a common strategy to change the demographic composition of male-
dominated occupations. Rosie the Riveter is a long-lived testimonial of the crucial role
of advertising in recruiting women in supply-short male jobs during WWII (Honey 1984;
Milkman 1987). This legacy inspired recent attempts to attract men in female-dominated
101This is despite the evidence that men’s and women’s career preferences start diverging as early as in
pre-school age (Liben et al., 2001; Cvencek et al., 2011; Betrand and Duflo, 2017).
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sectors portraying masculine men working as nurses or teachers. My results are a cau-
tionary tale against strategies designed to promote a new male identity in these roles
without addressing informational constraints.
Many questions are left for future research. How do informational asymmetries be-
tween men and women form? How do supply-side and demand-side factors interact in
determining whether men apply and whether they get hired in female-dominated jobs?
Are men’s expectations of social stigma correct? Hopefully answers to these questions
may prevent communities as the ones in the Rust Belt or the North of England from
being left behind by a rapidly evolving economy.
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1.14 Figures
FIGURE 1.1: Female shares in selected occupations in the U.S.: 1970 to 2016
Note. Data for 1970 to 1990 are from Blau et al. (1998), who use the U.S. Census Data (U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census) Data for 2016 are from the American Community Survey. The category
“Nurses" include: licensed and registered nurses, licensed practical and vocational nurses and nursing
aides. The category “Therapists" includes: occupational, physical, speech and others. The category “Social
care workers" includes: social workers, childcare workers, social welfare workers, social and community
service occupations/managers, community health workers. The category “Health aides" excludes nurses.
FIGURE 1.2: Recruitment timeline
Note. The Figure shows the recruitment timeline of the partner organization from the candidates’ per-
spective. Applications were open from September until November 2017. Randomization of the invitation-
to-apply was happening between online registration and application submission. After submitting the
application, the hiring process consisted of different assessment stages (e.g., interviews). If a person was
hired and accepted the job, actual work in local authorities started in July 2018.
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FIGURE 1.3: Intervention email template
Note. The Figure shows a stylized example of one of the email templates used in the intervention.
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FIGURE 1.4: Gender shares shock: manipulation checks
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Note. The figure shows the distribution of answers to the question “Consider 100 people who apply for
this job. How many do you think are women?", separately for respondents assigned to the email with a
female or male photograph. Data are from the auxiliary online surveys. The dashed (solid) line is for the
male (female) photograph treatment. The number of respondents is 504, of whom 262 are from the Prolific
Academic sample and 242 from the organization’s sample.
FIGURE 1.5: Expectations shock: manipulation checks
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Note. The left panel shows the distribution of answers to the question “How do you expect a person with
your skills and experience to perform in interacting with families in need?" on a scale from 1 (min) to 10
(max), separately for respondents assigned to the email with a statistic of 66% (solid line) or 89%(dashed
line) of past high achievers. The right panel shows mean answers to the question “Consider 100 people
who are applying for this job. Based on the ad you just viewed, on a scale from 100 (best) to 1 (worst),
how would you rank yourself for the job among them?", by information treatment and ability level. The
ability level is defined above or below the median of the answers reported in the left-hand side graph.
Green bars are for the 66% statistic and blue bars for the 89% statistic. Data are from the auxiliary online
surveys. The number of respondents is 504, of whom 262 are from the Prolific Academic sample and 242
from the organization’s sample.
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FIGURE 1.6: Theory: effect of a shock to perceived gender shares
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Note. The figure plots the application decision for potential applicants of gender g. The top panel considers
the case U j
′
(ai) < Uo
′
(ai) and the bottom panel the case U j
′
(ai) > Uo
′
(ai). The solid thick line shows expected
utility in the outside option. The dashed and thin solid lines show the expected job utility when receiving a
photo of the same (p = g) or different gender (p 6= g), respectively. The vertical distance between these two
lines comes from the assumption of the model E[sg|p = g] > E[sg|p 6= g]. The two thresholds of ability for the
marginal applicants a∗g and a∗∗g are determined from the intersection of the expected job utility and expected
outside option. From Result 1, the size of the applicants’ pool is greater when p = g than p 6= g. In the top
panel, the marginal applicant a∗∗g is more skilled than a∗g. The opposite result for quality holds in the bottom
panel.
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FIGURE 1.7: Theory: effect of a shock to expectations of returns to ability
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Note. The figure plots the application decision for potential applicants of gender g. The top panel considers
the case U j
′
(ai) < Uo
′
(ai) and the bottom panel the case U j
′
(ai) > Uo
′
(ai). The solid black line shows
expected utility in the outside option. The two thin dashed and solid lines show the expected job utility when
receiving information of high (s = sH) or low (s = sL) returns to ability. The different slope of these two
lines is explained by E[θ|s = sH ] > E[θ|s = sL], as higher returns to ability correspond to a higher slope. The
two thresholds of ability for the marginal applicants a∗g and a∗∗g are determined from the intersection of the
expected job utility and expected outside option. From Result 2, the applicants’ pool is larger when s = sH
than s = sL as long as B > 0 and U j
′
(ai) < Uo
′
(ai). In the top panel, the marginal applicant a∗∗g is more skilled
than a∗g if B > 0. The opposite result for quality holds in the bottom panel.
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FIGURE 1.8: Application rates by treatment and gender
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Note. Panel A shows application rates for men by photograph treatment (left-hand side) and information
treatment (right-hand side). Panel B shows application rates for women by photograph treatment (left-hand
side) and information treatment (right-hand side). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.
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FIGURE 1.9: Men’s qualifications and average on-the-job test scores by
treatment
(A) Qualifications
(B) Average on-the-job test scores
Note. The figure shows differences in the proportion of men that hold a certain qualification between treatment
groups (Panel a) and the cumulative distribution of men’s average test scores during the first semester on the
job (Panel b), after controlling for ethnicity, past application and early registration. Figures on the left-hand side
show the distributions by photograph treatment and the dashed lines are for the male photograph. Figures on
the right-hand side show the distributions by information treatment and the dashed lines are for high expected
returns to ability. Workers are assessed on five different assessments on a scale from 0 (min) to 100 (max), where
50 is the minimum score for passing the test.
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FIGURE 1.10: Women’s qualifications and average on-the-job test scores by
treatment
(A) Qualifications
(B) Average on-the-job test scores
Note. The figure shows differences in the proportion of women that hold a certain qualification between treat-
ment groups (Panel a) and the cumulative distribution of women’s average test scores during the first semester
on the job (Panel b), after controlling for ethnicity, past application and early registration. Figures on the left-
hand side show the distributions by photograph treatment and the dashed lines are for the male photograph.
Figures on the right-hand side show the distributions by information treatment and the dashed lines are for
high expected returns to ability. Workers are assessed on five different assessments on a scale from 0 (min) to
100 (max), where 50 is the minimum score for passing the test.
Chapter 1. Breaking Gender Barriers: Bringing Men into the Pink-Collar Jobs of the
Future
60
FIGURE 1.11: Interaction between photographs and information on appli-
cations
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Note. The figure shows the effect of the treatment on application rates for each of the four experimental
groups. The figure on the left-hand side shows the difference in application rates between the high and
low expected returns treatments conditional on each type of photograph. That is, (p, H) − (p, L) with
p ∈ {M, W}. The figure on the right-hand side shows the difference in application rates between the male
and female photograph treatments conditional on each type of information. That is, (W, s)− (M, s) with
s ∈ {H, L}. Dashed red lines are for women and blue solid lines are for men.
FIGURE 1.12: Structural parameters’ estimates
Note. The figure shows distributions of the estimated parameters α on the left-hand side and ∆θ on the
right-hand side. Blue bars are for men and red bars are for women. Vertical lines are the mean value of
the parameters for each gender. Multiple estimations are obtained through 5000 bootstrap replications of
the logit model described in the main body of the paper.
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1.15 Tables
TABLE 1.1: Balance checks and summary statistics
Men Women Joint Pairwise
VARIABLES N Mean SD N Mean SD F-stat p-val min p-val
Demographics
Male 1013 1.00 0.00 4404 0.00 0.00 0.04 1.0 0.72
Non-white 1013 0.28 0.45 4404 0.27 0.45 0.08 1.0 0.60
Age 1013 28.7 9.2 4404 26.4 7.9 0.29 0.88 0.42
Married 995 0.19 0.4 4331 0.12 0.33 0.19 0.95 0.47
Caring duties 1013 0.16 0.36 4404 0.16 0.37 0.96 0.43 0.11
Non heterosexual 959 0.13 0.34 4131 0.07 0.26 0.36 0.84 0.33
Education and employment
Top UK University 1013 0.33 0.47 4404 0.32 0.47 0.205 0.936 0.38
First Grade 1013 0.2 0.4 4404 0.18 0.39 0.697 0.594 0.13
Graduate 1013 0.46 0.5 4404 0.35 0.48 0.473 0.756 0.19
Scientific Subject 1013 0.09 0.28 4404 0.05 0.21 0.496 0.738 0.18
FTE 1013 0.49 0.5 4404 0.42 0.49 0.25 0.911 0.41
in: public sector 500 0.46 0.5 1840 0.56 0.5 1.06 0.373 0.05
in: healthcare 500 0.16 0.36 1840 0.17 0.37 0.87 0.483 0.11
in: corporate/business 500 0.32 0.47 1840 .22 .41 1.17 0.324 0.05
Registration
Past application 1013 0.07 0.26 4404 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.99 0.61
Pre-submission call 1013 0.11 0.32 4404 0.08 0.28 0.48 0.75 0.27
Early registration 1013 0.04 0.2 4404 0.05 0.21 0.31 0.87 0.40
Registration by November 1013 0.53 0.5 4404 0.57 0.5 0.02 1.00 0.83
Any event 1013 0.00 0.05 4404 0.01 0.11 0.13 0.97 0.52
Socio-economic background
Economic school support 1013 0.27 0.44 4404 0.27 0.45 0.62 0.65 0.15
Low socio-econ status 1013 0.60 0.49 4404 0.62 0.49 1.23 0.30 0.08
Young carer 999 .04 .2 4339 .04 .2 0.62 0.15 0.02
Care leaver 1006 .03 .17 4369 .02 .15 0.46 0.76 0.26
Note. The Table shows summary statistics for the overall experimental sample. “Caring Duties" is a dummy equal to
one if the respondent is a primary or secondary carer of children. I define top U.K. universities those belonging to the
Russell Group (see here). “Graduate" is a dummy for whether the candidate graduated in 2016 or before. “Scientific
Subject" assumes value one if the person studied engineering, IT/Computer Science, Maths or Natural Sciences. “Past
application" is a dummy equal to one if the candidate applied already in the past for the same job. “Pre-submission call"
indicates whether the candidate received a call from a recruitment officer to encourage submission of the application.
“Early registration" is a dummy equal to one if the person had access to an early opening of the application. “Registra-
tion by November" is a dummy for whether the person started the application process before the end of October. “Any
event" is a dummy equal to one if the candidate participated in any of the organization’s career events. “Economic
school support" is a dummy equal to one if the candidate received free school meals or any other type of economic
support (e.g., scholarship) during school. “Low socio-econ status" equals one if the occupation of the household’s high-
est earner in candidate’s family was unemployment, routine manual or routine semi-manual or for parents with no
degree. Columns 4 and 5 (under “Joint”) report the F-statistic and p-value from a joint test of the significance of the set
of treatment dummies in explaining each variable in a regression with pooled genders and with robust standard errors.
The last Column report the minimum p-value from the associated t-test between pairs of treatment groups with robust
standard errors and with pooled genders.
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TABLE 1.2: Men’s results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV: Applied and Received Accepted Avg. Score
never DO Offer Offer on-the-job
Male Photo -0.017 0.055 0.090 -0.316
(0.035) (0.034) (0.124) (0.228)
High Exp Returns 0.071** 0.061* -0.023 0.467*
(0.035) (0.033) (0.128) (0.249)
Observations 807 440 67 43
R-squared 0.018 0.062 0.035 0.210
Basic Controls Y Y Y Y
Mean Dep Var 0.52 0.10 0.70 0.13
Photo = Exp Ret p-val 0.08 0.89 0.53 0.02
Rand Inf p-val
Photo 0.63 0.11 0.47 0.19
Exp Returns 0.04 0.08 0.83 0.07
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS estimates for men only. The table reports results of four different regressions. The omitted category
is the treatment group which received the female photograph and information of low returns to ability. The
regressor “Male Photo" is a dummy equal to one for the male photograph treatment and the regressor “High
Exp Returns" is a dummy equal to one for receiving information of high returns to ability (specification (1.2)
of Section 1.5.1). The dependent variables are indicators dummies for application, receiving a job offer (con-
ditional on applying) and accepting the job offer (conditional on receiving the offer) in Columns (1), (2) and
(3). The dependent variable in column (4) is the average on-the-job test score achieved in the first five assess-
ments during the first semester on the job. The score is standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing
by the standard deviation of the gender-specific distribution. All the regressions control for the basic set of
controls Xi made of the following dummies: past application, access to early registration, non-white ethnicity.
The rows “Rand Inf p-val" contain the p-values of the coefficients on the indicated treatment dummies from
randomization inference (randomization-t) with 1000 repetitions.
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TABLE 1.3: Treatment effects by exposure to gender occupational segrega-
tion
DV: Applied and never DO = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Job Genderization Men in Pink-Collar
High Low Low High
Male Photo -0.026 -0.011 -0.010 -0.020
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
High Exp Returns 0.167*** -0.021 0.112** 0.036
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Observations 390 402 394 398
R-squared 0.038 0.017 0.022 0.030
Basic Controls Y Y Y Y
Mean Dep Var 0.48 0.57 0.53 0.52
Photo = Exp Ret p-val 0.01 0.88 0.08 0.43
Rand Inf p-val
Photo 0.58 0.80 0.86 0.70
Exp Returns 0.00 0.66 0.03 0.47
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS estimates for men only. The table reports results of four different regressions. The omitted
category is the treatment group which received the female photograph and information of low returns
to ability. The regressor “Male Photo" is a dummy equal to one for the male photograph treatment and
the regressor “High Exp Returns" is a dummy equal to one for receiving information of high returns
to ability (specification (1.2) of Section 1.5.1). The variable “Job Genderization" is the Duncan index of
occupational segregation by gender computed at the local area level (MSOA) where the subject went to
secondary school or live (either currently or in the past). The index is computed using data from the
2011 U.K. Census. The level “high" or “low" is defined for values of the index respectively above or
below the gender-specific median in the experimental sample. The variable “Men in Pink-Collar" is the
average share of men in female-dominated jobs at the local area level (MSOA) where the subject went to
secondary school or live (either currently or in the past). The index is computed using data from the 2011
U.K. Census. I defined female-dominated occupations the ones that have more than 75% female workers
for England overall. At the local level, I then computed the following average male proportion in those
occupations as: ∑Ni=1
mi
mi+ fi
, where mi and fi are respectively the number of men and women in female-
dominated occupation i in a certain MSOA. The level “high" or “low" is defined for values of the index
respectively above or below the gender-specific median in the experimental sample. All the regressions
control for the basic set of controls Xi made of the following dummies: past application, access to early
registration and non-white ethnicity. The rows “Rand Inf p-val" contain the p-values of the coefficients on
the treatment dummies from randomization inference (randomization-t) with 1000 repetitions.
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TABLE 1.4: Treatment effects by wage dispersion and level of outside op-
tion
DV: Applied and never DO = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Wage dispersion Quantiles of outside option
Low High 1st 2nd 3rd
Male Photo -0.014 -0.025 -0.060 -0.011 0.048
(0.046) (0.055) (0.062) (0.061) (0.059)
High Exp Returns 0.036 0.122** 0.103* 0.050 0.069
(0.046) (0.055) (0.061) (0.062) (0.059)
Observations 477 330 260 266 281
R-squared 0.012 0.033 0.029 0.029 0.061
Basic controls Y Y Y Y Y
Mean Dep Var 0.56 0.45 0.55 0.49 0.52
Photo = Exp Ret p-val 0.44 0.06 0.06 0.49 0.79
Rand Inf p-val
Photo 0.74 0.67 0.34 0.84 0.41
Exp Returns 0.40 0.026 0.09 0.40 0.25
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS estimates for men only. The table reports results of five different regressions. The omitted
category is the treatment group which received the female photograph and information of low returns
to ability. The regressor “Male Photo" is a dummy equal to one for the male photograph treatment and
the regressor “High Exp Returns" is a dummy equal to one for receiving information of high returns to
ability (specification (1.2) of Section 1.5.1). In Columns (1) and (2) wage dispersion is defined in the fol-
lowing way. For a candidate who studied subject s, the variable “Wage Dispersion" is computed as the
weighted average of the 75/25 interquartile range of the distribution of hourly wages across industries
in the UK labour market, where weights are given by the proportion of graduates of subject s working in
each industry.The level “high" or “low" is defined for values of the index respectively above or below the
gender-specific median in the experimental sample. The outside option in Columns (3) to (5) is computed
as the imputed expected wage in the UK labour market conditional on subject studied, gender, race, age,
British nationality and marital status. Data are from the 2017 and 2018 UK Labour Force Survey. All the
regressions control for the basic set of controls Xi made of the following dummies: past application, access
to early registration and non-white ethnicity. The rows “Rand Inf p-val" contain the p-values of the coef-
ficients on the treatment dummies from randomization inference (randomization-t) with 1000 repetitions.
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TABLE 1.5: Employer’s hiring criteria
Information Photographs
(1) (2)
DV: Offer p-val Offer p-val
Top University * T1 0.054*
0.67
0.070**
0.69
(0.028) (0.028)
Top University * T2 0.071** 0.054*
(0.029) (0.029)
First Grade * T1 0.110***
0.19
0.063**
0.04
(0.032) (0.030)
First Grade * T2 0.109*** 0.160***
(0.032) (0.034)
Aligned Subject * T1 -0.010
0.06
0.007
0.75
(0.019) (0.019)
Aligned Subject * T2 0.029 0.013
(0.020) (0.020)
Past Volunteering * T1 0.047**
0.76
0.053***
0.85
(0.020) (0.020)
Past Volunteering * T2 0.056*** 0.048**
(0.020) (0.020)
Maths Pre-Uni Score * T1 0.004
0.31
-0.029
0.38
(0.027) (0.024)
Maths Pre-Uni Score * T2 -0.033 0.004
(0.026) (0.029)
English Pre-Uni Score * T1 0.084***
0.57
0.089***
0.34
(0.025) (0.024)
English Pre-Uni Score * T2 0.064** 0.056**
(0.025) (0.026)
Observations 2,295 2,295
R-squared 0.058 0.059
Stratification Controls Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: OLS estimates. In Column (1), T2 indicates information of high returns to ability (and T1 the al-
ternative information). In Column (2), T2 indicates a male photograph (and T1 a female photograph).
All regressions include controls for gender and ethnicity (stratification variables). Independent variables
are interacted with the treatment and control dummies. “Top University" is equal to one if the candi-
date attended a top tier university in the U.K. “First Grade" is equal to one if the candidate got a first
grade in university. “Past Volunteering" is equal to one if the candidate volunteered frequently in the
past."Maths Pre-Uni Score" and “English Pre-Uni Score" are equal to one if the candidate took the highest
grade in Maths and English pre-university qualifications. The same results hold adding interactions for
high cognitive and high manual skills, defined using the employment history reported by candidates in
their application form. I find no differences in the extent to which the employer considers these skills
desirable between treatments (p-vals > 0.14 for cognitive skills and p-vals > 0.4 for manual skills).
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TABLE 1.6: On-the-job performance: panel data
DV: First Semester Std. Scores
(1) (2)
Male Photo -0.110 -0.255
(0.145) (0.193)
High Exp Returns 0.246* 0.361**
(0.129) (0.142)
Observations 215 215
R-squared 0.235 0.293
Basic Controls Y Y
Mean Dep Var 0.04 0.04
Clustered standard errors in parentheses (ind. level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS panel estimates for men only. The table reports results of two different regressions. The omitted
category is the treatment group which received the female photograph and information of low returns to abil-
ity. The regressor “Male Photo" is a dummy equal to one for the male photograph treatment and the regressor
“High Exp Returns" is a dummy equal to one for receiving information of high returns to ability (specification
(1.2) of Section 1.5.1). Column (2) introduces weights for an index of “difficulty" of the community where the
worker is allocated to. For each local authority, I compute an index of “difficulty" by averaging the score in
these variables: social workers’ caseload, turnover, absenteeism and scores on helping children, child care,
leadership effectiveness. All the regressions control for the basic set of controls Xi made of the following
dummies: past application, access to early registration, non-white ethnicity, workplace region and score in
Maths pre-university tests. Standard errors are clustered at the worker level.
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TABLE 1.7: Perceived social impact and intent to stay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DV: Perceived impact Confidence Recommend Intent to stay
at work outside own practice programme in LA in job
Male Photo 0.215* 0.075 0.136 0.084 0.237 0.265**
(0.123) (0.154) (0.144) (0.111) (0.144) (0.107)
High Exp Returns 0.195 0.024 0.092 0.300** 0.104 0.363***
(0.117) (0.153) (0.138) (0.116) (0.131) (0.112)
Observations 38 38 38 38 38 38
R-squared 0.215 0.052 0.183 0.256 0.138 0.417
Basic Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Mean Dep Var 0.60 0.20 0.67 0.87 0.60 0.87
Photo = Exp Ret p-val 0.91 0.84 0.83 0.15 0.51 0.52
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS estimates for men only. The table reports results of six different regressions. The omitted category is
the treatment group which received the female photograph and information of low returns to ability. The regressor
“Male Photo" is a dummy equal to one for the male photograph treatment and the regressor “High Exp Returns"
is a dummy equal to one for receiving information of high returns to ability (specification (1.2) of Section 1.5.1).
“Perceived impact" is an indicator equal to one if a worker feels that he is having positive social impact in his work
(Column 1) or outside work (Column 2). “Confidence in own practice" is equal to one if the worker feels confident
in interacting with families in need. “Recommend the programme" is equal to one if the worker would recommend
the job to others. “Intent to stay" is an indicator equal to one if the worker says he is moderately or very likely to
stay in the same community (Column 5) or in the same job (Column 6). All the regressions control for the basic set
of controls Xi made of the following dummies: past application, access to early registration, non-white ethnicity.
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TABLE 1.8: Women’s results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV: Applied and Received Accepted Avg. Score
never DO Offer Offer on-the-job
Male Photo -0.051*** 0.013 0.131** 0.194+
(0.017) (0.015) (0.055) (0.136)
High Exp Returns -0.015 0.004 -0.002 -0.018
(0.017) (0.015) (0.055) (0.136)
Observations 3,513 2,062 301 191
R-squared 0.013 0.025 0.028 0.280
Basic Controls Y Y Y Y
Mean Dep Var 0.60 0.14 0.55 -0.21
Photo = Exp Ret p-val 0.12 0.67 0.08 0.25
Rand Inf p-val
Photo 0.00 0.40 0.03 0.15
Exp Returns 0.35 0.81 0.98 0.90
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15
Note. OLS estimates for women only. The table reports results of four different regressions. The omitted
category is the treatment group which received the female photograph and information of low returns to
ability. The regressor “Male Photo" is a dummy equal to one for the male photograph treatment and the
regressor “High Exp Returns" is a dummy equal to one for receiving information of high returns to ability
(specification (1.2) of Section 1.5.1). The dependent variables are indicators dummies for application, receiving
a job offer (conditional on applying) and accepting the job offer (conditional on receiving the offer) in Columns
(1), (2) and (3). The dependent variable in column (4) is the average on-the-job test score achieved in the first
five assessments during the first semester on the job. The score is standardized by subtracting the mean
and dividing by the standard deviation of the gender-specific distribution. All the regressions control for the
basic set of controls Xi made of the following dummies: past application, access to early registration, non-
white ethnicity. The rows “Rand Inf p-val" contain the p-values of the coefficients on the indicated treatment
dummies from randomization inference (randomization-t) with 1000 repetitions.
Chapter 1. Breaking Gender Barriers: Bringing Men into the Pink-Collar Jobs of the
Future
69
TABLE 1.9: Gender ratio and on-the-job performance: summary
M/W gender ratio On-the-job performance
Applicants Offerees Workers Women Men Overall
Photograph
Female Photo 21% 18% 19% 57.77 60.59 58.22
[8.0] [7.0]
Male Photo 22% 26% 25% 59.36 56.57 58.80
[7.6] [9.9]
Information
Low Exp Returns 20% 17% 18% 58.96 55.46 58.43
[7.9] [10.0]
High Exp Returns 23% 28% 27% 58 59.77 58.66
[7.7] [8.2]
Note. The first three columns of this table show the men/women gender ratio among applicants (Column 1),
people who received a job offer (Column 2) and workers (Column 3). The last three columns show the average
test scores achieved on the job by women (Column 4), men (Column 5) and the weighted average of these two,
where weights are given by gender shares. Digits in square brackets report the standard deviation of average
test scores. The average on-the-job test score is computed as the average of the first five assessments during
the first semester on the job. The score is between 0 (min) and 100 (max).
TABLE 1.10: Replicating the experiment in a male-dominated sector: re-
sults from a pilot
DV: Applied = 1
(1) (2) (3)
Women Men
High Exp Returns 0.023* 0.034 0.015
(0.014) (0.023) (0.022)
Observations 900 408 492
R-squared 0.039 0.058 0.055
Basic Controls Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y
Mean Dep Var 0.05 0.05 0.05
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. Preliminary results from a pilot experiment conducted on an online platform. I sent 900 invitations
for a web development job to freelancers listed on the website. The regressor “High Exp Returns" is a
dummy equal to one for receiving information of high returns to ability, which in this context was “Did
you know that 68% of freelancers hired for similar jobs got 4.9 or 5 stars in clients’ feedback?". In the
alternative treatment, the percentage was 87. All the regressions control for the basic set of controls Xi
made of the following variables: ethnicity, gender and being above/below median posted hourly price
(stratification variables), day of invitation, number of skills listed, having wed-development skills, having
had less than five clients, having missing client feedback.
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1.A Appendix figures and tables
FIGURE 1.A.1: Social work growth and male labour force participation
Note. The figure shows a binned scatterplot between the 2018 male labour force participation (on the x-
axis) and employment growth in social work between 2018 and 2028 (on the y-axis) across US states. The
graph controls for the overall growth rate across occupations and the state-level female labour force partici-
pation. Data are from the US Bureau of Labor Statistic Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) and the
Employment Projections program.
TABLE 1.A.1: Expectations effect and job-specific ability
DV: Applied and never DO = 1
(1) (2) (3)
Ability
Low High
High Exp Returns 0.041 0.101** -0.178
(0.049) (0.051) (0.653)
Ability ai -0.001
(0.008)
High Exp Returns * Ability ai 0.004
(0.011)
Observations 410 397 807
R-squared 0.016 0.035 0.019
Basic Controls Y Y Y
Mean Dep Var 0.52 0.50 0.51
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS estimates for men only. The regressor “High Exp Returns" is a dummy equal to one for in-
formation of high expected returns to ability (specification (1.2) of Section 1.5.1). “Ability" is computed
as the predicted performance on the job and takes values between 0 and 100. Predicted performance is
calculated using a truncated linear regression with the following independent variables: ranking and av-
erage completion rate of the university attended by the candidate, subject studied, obtaining a first grade,
whether the grade is expected or obtained, age, age squared and whether the person is in FTE. The level
“high" or “low" is defined for values of the variable respectively above or below the median in the experi-
mental sample. All the regressions control for the basic set of controls Xi made of the following dummies:
past application, access to early registration and non-white ethnicity.
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TABLE 1.A.2: Treatment effects: photographs and information interacted
DV: Applied and never DO = 1
(1) (2)
Men Women
(W,H) 0.088* 0.025
(0.050) (0.023)
(M,H) 0.066 -0.067***
(0.049) (0.024)
(W,L) 0.011
(0.050)
(M,L) -0.011
(0.023)
Observations 807 3,513
R-squared 0.018 0.014
Basic Controls Y Y
Mean Dep Var 0.50 0.60
Tests of coefficient equality
(−g, H) = (g, H) 0.65 0
(−g, L) = (−g, H) 0.12 0.02
(W, L) = (M, H) 0.27 0.12
Rand Inf p-val
(−g, H) 0.08 0.01
(g, H) 0.15 0.27
(−g, L) 0.83 0.67
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS estimates run separately for men (Column 1) and women (Column 2). For each gender g,
the omitted category is the treatment group (g, L). Each regressor (P,S) is a treatment dummy for the
combination of a male (M) or female (W) picture and high (H) or low (L) expected returns information
(specification (1.3) of Section 1.5.1). All the regressions control for the basic set of controls Xi made of the
following dummies: past application, access to early registration and non-white ethnicity. The rows “Rand
Inf p-val" contain the p-values of the coefficients on the indicated treatment dummies from randomization
inference (randomization-t) with 1000 repetitions.
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TABLE 1.A.3: Do women and men react differently to treatments?
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Applied and Received Accepted
never DO Offer Offer
Male Candidate -0.103*** -0.045 0.056
(0.033) (0.029) (0.128)
Male Photo -0.051*** 0.013 0.132**
(0.017) (0.015) (0.055)
Male Photo x Male Candidate 0.034 0.040 -0.048
(0.039) (0.037) (0.133)
High Exp Returns -0.015 0.004 -0.002
(0.017) (0.015) (0.055)
High Exp Returns x Male Candidate 0.087** 0.058 -0.055
(0.039) (0.037) (0.132)
Observations 4,320 2,502 368
R-squared 0.015 0.029 0.025
Basic Controls Y Y Y
Mean Dep Var 0.60 0.14 0.55
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS estimates for the pooled sample of men and women. The omitted category is the treatment
group which received the female photograph and information of low returns to ability. The regressor
“Male Photo" is a dummy equal to one for the male photograph treatment and the regressor “High Exp
Returns" is a dummy equal to one for receiving information of high returns to ability (specification (1.2)
of Section 1.5.1). The dependent variables are indicators dummies for application, receiving a job offer
(conditional on applying) and accepting the job offer (conditional on receiving the offer) in Columns (1),
(2) and (3). All the regressions control for the basic set of controls Xi made of the following dummies: past
application, access to early registration, non-white ethnicity.
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TABLE 1.A.4: Treatment effects by outside option parameters (women)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wage dispersion Quantiles of outside option
Low High 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Male Photo -0.063*** -0.017 -0.059* -0.010 -0.065* -0.068**
(0.019) (0.033) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
High Exp Returns -0.018 -0.009 -0.029 -0.037 -0.014 0.012
(0.019) (0.033) (0.031) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034)
Observations 2,619 894 937 828 874 874
R-squared 0.014 0.011 0.016 0.016 0.014 0.019
Basic controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Mean Dep Var 0.62 0.56 0.71 0.58 0.60 0.51
Photo = Exp Ret p-val 0.10 0.86 0.50 0.56 0.29 0.09
Rand Inf p-val
Male Photo 0.00 0.60 0.05 0.76 0.04 0.04
Exp Returns 0.34 0.77 0.31 0.29 0.663 0.73
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS estimates for women only. The table reports results of five different regressions. The omitted
category is the treatment group which received the female photograph and information of low returns
to ability. The regressor “Male Photo" is a dummy equal to one for the male photograph treatment and
the regressor “High Exp Returns" is a dummy equal to one for receiving information of high returns to
ability (specification (1.2) of Section 1.5.1). In Columns (1) and (2) wage dispersion is defined in the fol-
lowing way. For a candidate who studied subject s, the variable “Wage Dispersion" is computed as the
weighted average of the 75/25 interquartile range of the distribution of hourly wages across industries
in the UK labour market, where weights are given by the proportion of graduates of subject s working in
each industry. The level “high" or “low" is defined for values of the index respectively above or below
the gender-specific median in the experimental sample. The outside option in Columns (3) to (5) is is
computed as the imputed expected wage in the UK labour market conditional on subject studied, gender,
race, age, British nationality and marital status. Data are from the 2017 and 2018 UK Labour Force Survey.
All the regressions control for the basic set of controls Xi made of the following dummies: past applica-
tion, access to early registration and non-white ethnicity. The rows “Rand Inf p-val" contain the p-values
of the coefficients on the treatment dummies from randomization inference (randomization-t) with 1000
repetitions.
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TABLE 1.A.5: Treatment effects by regional wage dispersion
DV: Applied and never DO
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men Women
Wage dispersion: Wage dispersion:
Low High Low High
Male Photo 0.004 -0.075 -0.055*** -0.045
(0.042) (0.061) (0.020) (0.030)
High Exp Returns 0.058 0.113* -0.007 -0.032
(0.042) (0.062) (0.020) (0.030)
Observations 555 252 2,449 1,064
R-squared 0.014 0.065 0.018 0.007
Basic controls Y Y Y Y
Mean Dep Var 0.51 0.54 0.60 0.58
Photo = Exp Ret p-val 0.37 0.03 0.09 0.77
Rand Inf p-val
Photo 0.91 0.24 0.007 0.13
Exp Returns 0.18 0.07 0.75 0.30
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS estimates run separately for men (Columns 1 and 2) and women (Columns 3 and 4). “Wage
dispersion" is computed as the 75/25 interquartile range of the gender-specific distribution of hourly wages
across industries in the UK region where the candidate lives. The level “high" or “low" is defined for values
of the index respectively above or below the gender-specific median in the experimental sample. All the
regressions control for the basic set of controls Xi made of the following dummies: past application, access to
early registration and non-white ethnicity. The rows “Rand Inf p-val" contain the p-values of the coefficients
on the treatment dummies from randomization inference (randomization-t) with 1000 repetitions.
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FIGURE 1.A.2: Applicants’ index of desirable qualifications by treatment
(A) Men
(B) Women
Note. The figure shows the distribution of a standardized index of desirable qualifications between treatment
groups for men (Panel a) and women (Panel b). Figures on the left-hand side show the distributions by pho-
tograph treatment and the dashed lines are for the male photograph. Figures on the right-hand side show the
distributions by information treatment and the dashed lines are for low expected returns to ability. The index
is computed as the average of the following standardized variables: receiving a first grade, being from a top
tier university, frequent past volunteering, high cognitive skills and score in English pre-university tests.
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TABLE 1.A.6: Effort in application completion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Access to portal # edits % completed Qst 1 length Qst 2 length
High Exp Returns 0.009 4.373** 0.026 34.178 42.509
(0.025) (1.970) (0.023) (55.655) (46.081)
Observations 804 807 807 807 807
R-squared 0.033 0.043 0.030 0.022 0.027
Basic Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Week dummies Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS estimates for men only. The omitted category is the treatment group that received information
of low expected returns to ability. The variable “Access to portal" is a dummy for whether the person ever
accessed the application portal to make changes to the application. The variable “# edits" counts how many
times a candidate logged-in to make changes to the application form before submitting it. “% completed"
is percentage of fields filled-in (not blank) in the application form. The variables “Qst 1 length" and “Qst 2
length" count number of characters used in each of the two motivational questions contained in the applica-
tion form. All the regressions contain dummies for the week in which the candidate registered. The regressor
“High Exp Returns" is a dummy equal to one for information of high expected returns to ability (specification
(1.2) of Section 1.5.1). All the regressions control for the basic set of controls Xi : past application, access to
early registration and non-white ethnicity.
FIGURE 1.A.3: On-the-job test scores differences by treatment over time
Note. The figure reports the coefficients from a regression of each of the five on-the-job assessment scores on
the treatment dummy for receiving a male photograph (on the left) and the high expected returns statistics
(on the right). The left figure is for women only and the right figure for men only. Scores have been stan-
dardized by subtracting the mean score and dividing by the standard deviation. Coefficients are reported in
chronological order from the top (first assessment) to the bottom (most recent assessment). All the regres-
sions control for the basic set of controls Xi made of the following dummies: past application, access to early
registration, non-white ethnicity, workplace region and score in Maths pre-university tests.
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TABLE 1.A.7: Women’s on-the-job performance
DV: First Semester Std. Scores
(1) (2)
Male Photo 0.126+ 0.168*
(0.082) (0.091)
High Exp Returns -0.031 -0.025
(0.080) (0.068)
Observations 955 955
R-squared 0.132 0.131
Basic Controls Y Y
Mean Dep Var 0.07 0.07
Clustered standard errors in parentheses (ind. level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15
Note. OLS panel estimates for women only. The table reports results of two different regressions. The omit-
ted category is the treatment group which received the female photograph and information of low returns
to ability. The regressor “Male Photo" is a dummy equal to one for the male photograph treatment and the
regressor “High Exp Returns" is a dummy equal to one for receiving information of high returns to ability
(specification (1.2) of Section 1.5.1). Column (2) introduces weights for an index of “difficulty" of the commu-
nity where the worker is allocated to. For each local authority, I compute an index of “difficulty" by averaging
the score in these variables: social workers’ caseload, turnover, absenteeism and scores on helping children,
child care, leadership effectiveness. All the regressions control for the basic set of controls Xi made of the
following dummies: past application, access to early registration, non-white ethnicity, workplace region and
score in Maths pre-university tests. Standard errors are clustered at the worker level.
FIGURE 1.A.4: Predicted margins from logit by treatment
Note. The figure shows predictive margins from the logit discrete choice model. The graph on the left-
hand side shows results for men and on the right-hand side for women. The variable on the x-axis is
the de-meaned predicted on-the-job performance. Predicted on-the-job performance is calculated using
a truncated linear regression with the following independent variables: ranking and average completion
rate of the university attended by the candidate, subject studied, obtaining a first grade, whether the grade
is expected or obtained, age, age squared and whether the person is in FTE.
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FIGURE 1.A.5: Comparison of imputed and actual on-the-job performance
Note. The figure shows the comparison of imputed and actual on-the job performance distributions. The
histograms on the left-hand side are for men and on the right-hand side for women. Ability is on a scale
from 0 (min) to 100 (max). Imputed performance is calculated using a truncated linear regression with
the following independent variables: ranking and average completion rate of the university attended by
the candidate, subject studied, obtaining a first grade, whether the grade is expected or obtained, age, age
squared and whether the person is in FTE.
TABLE 1.A.8: Attention to experimental emails
DV: Never asked for reminder
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men Women
Male Photo -0.071** -0.069** 0.004 0.004
(0.028) (0.028) (0.013) (0.013)
High Exp Returns -0.042 -0.040 -0.030** -0.030**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 799 799 3,476 3,476
R-squared 0.038 0.042 0.023 0.024
Basic Controls Y Y Y Y
Outside Option Control N Y N Y
Mean Dep Var 0.84 0.84 0.80 0.80
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS estimates. The dependent variables is a dummy equal to one if the candidate never asked
for a reminder of his/her unique candidate number, which is needed to access the application portal and
is shown in the invitation-to-apply email. The regressor “Male Photo" is a dummy equal to one for the
male photograph treatment and the regressor “High Exp Returns" is a dummy equal to one for receiving
information of high expected returns to ability (specification (1.2) of Section 1.5.1). All the regressions
control for the basic set of controls Xi (past application, access to early registration, non-white ethnicity)
and for the number of times the candidate accessed the application portal.
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TABLE 1.A.9: Treatment effects by sexuality and marital status
DV: Applied and never DO
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Women Men
Male Photo -0.065*** -0.054*** -0.055 -0.037
(0.017) (0.017) (0.038) (0.039)
Non Hetero 0.010 -0.130*
(0.049) (0.070)
Male Photo * Non Hetero 0.080 0.148
(0.064) (0.105)
Married 0.002 -0.020
(0.035) (0.066)
Male Photo * Married -0.011 0.018
(0.051) (0.088)
Observations 3,294 3,455 757 793
R-squared 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.020
Basic controls Y Y Y Y
Mean Dep Var 0.60 0.61 0.53 0.54
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS estimates. The regressor “Male Photo" is a dummy equal to one for the male photograph treatment.
All the regressions control for the basic set of controls Xi made of the following dummies: past application,
access to early registration and non-white ethnicity. “Non hetero" is a dummy equal to one if the person stated
to be non-heterosexual and missing for refusing to answer the question on sexuality. “Married" is a dummy
for being married or in a civil partnership. “Age > med" is a dummy for age above median of the sample (of
men and women separately).
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TABLE 1.A.10: A measure of overconfidence by gender
Overconfidence: self-reported number of skills above the mean
Women Men
Mean SD N Mean SD N p-val
General 5.63 2.84 548 5.36 2.96 85 .43
Job specific 2.92 1.63 548 2.49 1.7 85 .03**
Control only
General 5.5 2.73 123 5.63 2.95 19 .85
Job specific 2.82 1.55 123 2.53 1.84 19 .45
Note. The measure of overconfidence is defined in the following way. I asked to a subsample of my experi-
mental participants (N=633) to rate themselves in ten skills on a scale from 1 (max) to 10 (max). The skills are
both general (i.e. complex problem solving, finance management, critical thinking, creativity, adaptability)
and job specific (active listening, effective communication, leadership, empathy, client support). For each per-
son, I construct a measure of overconfidence by counting the number of skills rated above the sample mean.
The Table shows the mean measure of overconfidence by gender across treatments (in the first two rows) and
in the pure control only (last two rows).
FIGURE 1.A.6: Shock to expectations and competitiveness
Note. The graph shows raw differences in application rates in the high and low expected returns treat-
ments by gender and a proxy of competitive attitudes. The proxy of competitive attitudes is built using
information on the candidates’ occupational background. “Competitive background" is defined as having
studied a male-dominated subject (e.g., engineering, business, math) in a top tier university in the U.K..
“Less competitive background" is defined as having studied a female-dominated subject (e.g., psychology,
languages, humanities) in a non top tier university. “Female" and “Male" indicate the candidates’ gender.
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1.B Auxiliary online experiments
In this section I first address treatment-specific issues which relate to differences in pic-
tures’ content and the interpretation of the information provided. I use auxiliary survey
evidence that I have collected on three different samples of respondents between July
and December 2018. I then turn my attention to issues that might affect results equally
across treatments.
1.B.1 Treatment-specific threats
The main goal of this section is to check for differences between photographs (messages)
used in the intervention which might confound the interpretation of the results. For
instance, photographs might not differ only in the subjects’ gender, but also in their ex-
pression, clothes and other observable or unobservable characteristics. Regarding infor-
mation, one might worry that the sentences reporting statistics of past performance could
be interpreted as signals of other job amenities (e.g., wage).
Sampling
In July 2018, I conducted checks on differences between photographs on a sample of 161
Amazon Turk workers. This allows to understand whether images differed in some im-
portant dimensions other than gender, but correlated with it. Between November and
December 2018 I administered an online survey to 565 people in the UK to understand
whether - and how - the intervention emails affect their beliefs about the job and its appli-
cants. In a between-subject design, I first showed respondents a photograph and asked
two short questions about the portrayed worker (from the previous survey on Amazon
Turk). Then participants looked at one intervention email for some time (at least 30 sec-
onds).102 After mandatory understanding checks, I elicited beliefs on a variety of dimen-
sions about the job and its applicants (e.g., wage, difficulty). I implemented the survey
using two samples of respondents: 2018/2019 applicants of the partner organization and
workers on the platform ”Prolific Academic”. The sampling strategy maximizes the sim-
ilarity to my field sample. The sample of current job applicants is meant to capture pos-
sible unobservability in characteristics of people interested in the particular job and/or
organization. However, the number of male respondents is too small to allow analyses
by gender. I selected the sample on prolific academic by matching the composition of the
field sample on several observables criteria. Participation was incentivized and average
completion time was 15 minutes. The following paragraphs describe the sampling and
subject payment in detail.103
102The intervention table was shown, as in Figure 3.
103I registered pre-analysis plans before conducting analyses on these survey data.
Chapter 1. Breaking Gender Barriers: Bringing Men into the Pink-Collar Jobs of the
Future
82
Amazon Turk photographs categorization. Respondents were Amazon Mechanical Turk
workers who hadn’t participated in any of the researchers’ previous experiment con-
ducted on the same platform and who have been granted the “Master” qualification on
the website. The survey was conducted with the pool of workers all around the world.
The survey was run in different waves between May and July 2018. A total of 188 answers
were collected (on average 47 per photograph) and I excluded answers which were only
partial (with less than 95% completed). The final sample is made of 161 answers, of which
39 for the white-woman, 38 for the white-man and 42 for the non-white photographs. The
survey took an average of 2 minutes and was rewarded 20 cents.
2018 Applicants sample. At the beginning of November 2018, I collaborated with the
partner organization to invite current candidates to participate in my online survey. In-
vitations were sent to 4500 people over two days. The sample comprises candidates at
different stages of the selection process who registered between the beginning of Septem-
ber and the beginning of November.104 As incentive for participation I compensated the
first 300 respondents with 5£, which they could keep for themselves or donate to a UK
social work charity.105 All the participants were also automatically enrolled into a raffle
for a 150£ Amazon voucher. A total of 303 people fully completed the survey, which cor-
responds to a response rate of around 7%. While men’s proportion corresponds to the
population mean - less than 20% - their number is too small to allow analyses by gender
in this sample.
Prolific Academic sample. Respondents in this sample are Prolific Academic workers
who i) haven’t participated in any of the researchers’ previous surveys conducted on the
same platform, ii) are of British nationality, iii) have an approval rate between 75 and 100
percent, iv) are between 18 and 64 years old and v) have at least a bachelor degree. The
final sample is made of 130 women and 131 men, selected through independent survey
postings on the website. I collected answers in different waves to match the composition
of the field sample on the following observables criteria: gender, ethnicity, student status,
university subject, employment status, job sector. Payment was 1.50£.
Photographs checks
In the Amazon Turk photographs categorization task, I asked respondents to rate pho-
tographs along the following dimensions: friendliness, work satisfaction, emotions evoked,
trustworthiness, attractiveness and clothing. In the other two samples, I asked respon-
dents to categorize the people portrayed in the intervention photographs along two char-
acteristics: friendliness and work satisfaction. Each respondent was asked about only
one photograph, which was the same used afterwards in displaying the full intervention.
Table 1.B.1 presents mean differences between the male and female photographs within
104The sample includes registered candidates who have yet to submit the application form, applicants
who passed the first stage of the selection process and candidates already rejected.
105Participants could select one out of two social work charities for the donation.
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each pair of white and non-white photographs. The table below shows that women’s and
men’s pictures were rated similarly in most dimensions, but there is a significant and
consistent difference in terms of perceived friendliness in the photos portraying white
people. Such a difference, however, cannot explain the results, which are the same for
both white and non-white candidates.
Information checks
In addition to the manipulation checks reported in the main body of the paper, I elicited
respondents’ beliefs about success on the job by asking the following question: “After
seeing the email ad, please indicate below the proportion of [women/men] that you
think are successful on-the-job. Interpret “success" as people who got commendable or
excellent feedback on the job." I construct a variable for the average percentage of high-
performers on the job by weighting the answers to the gender-specific questions (with 0.8
and 0.2 weights for women and men respectively). I similarly construct a variable for the
beliefs about the quality of the pool of applicants with the following question: “Consider
100 [women/men] that apply for this job in social work after seeing the email ad. How
many do you think that have the potential to get commendable or excellent feedback on
the job?". To check for possible confounders in the interpretation of the email content, I
then ask respondents to rate the job on different dimensions on a scale from 1 to 100. For
instance, I asked them: ”By looking at this ad, do you think that the job has a high or low
wage? Indicate your answer on a scale from 0 (low wage) to 100 (high wage)”.
Table 1.B.2 shows mean differences in ratings between the two information treatments
on the following job characteristics: wage, difficulty of job tasks, difficulty of promotion,
number of applicants (out of 100 interested people) and proportion of female applicants
(out of 100 applicants). Table 1.B.2 also shows mean differences in people’s opinion on
whether the job is desirable for man, whether the job is desirable for woman, whether
they think that customers discriminate workers (by race or gender) and whether the job
has a high social status. The answer was given on a 6-points Likert scale: I code the
variables in the tables as 1 if people answer that they strongly agree, agree or slightly
agree with the statement and 0 otherwise.
The main takeaway from Table 1.B.2 is that respondents’ beliefs about the quality of the
pool of applicants and percentage of high performers in the job changes according to the
experimental information treatment. The sample of current applicants also slightly up-
dates on job difficulty, social status and discrimination by customers, but the magnitude
of these differences are small. Table 1.B.3 shows that pictures do not affect updating on
job amenities or quality of the pool, except for desirability by gender and the female pro-
portion of applicants. Overall, this evidence supports the interpretation of the treatments
given in the paper. Figure 1.B.1 further checks whether information of past performance
affects perceived gender proportion (graph on the left) and whether photographs affect
updating on the proportion of successful people in the job. This is to exclude that the two
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TABLE 1.B.1: Photographs: manipulation checks
Female Photo Male Photo Diff means
Mean SD N Mean SD N P-val
Panel A: 2018 Applicants
White pictures
Friendliness .79 .41 92 .63 .48 95 .01
Work satisfaction .91 .28 92 .84 .37 95 .14
Non-white pictures
Friendliness .86 .36 28 .82 .39 28 .72
Work satisfaction .82 .39 28 .93 .26 28 .23
Panel B: Prolific Ac sample
White pictures
Friendliness .87 .34 98 .74 .44 95 .02
Work satisfaction .81 .4 98 .76 .43 95 .42
Non-white pictures
Friendliness .97 .17 33 .92 .28 36 .35
Work satisfaction .97 .17 33 .92 .28 36 .35
Panel C: Amazon Turk sample
White pictures
Happy feeling .79 .41 39 .66 .48 38 .18
Friendliness .9 .31 39 .74 .45 38 .07
Work satisfaction .87 .34 39 .76 .43 38 .22
Trust .85 .37 39 .82 .39 38 .73
Attractiveness .72 .46 39 .76 .43 38 .66
Professional clothing .38 .49 39 .87 .34 38 0
Non-white pictures
Happy feeling .9 .3 42 .9 .3 42 1
Friendliness .98 .15 42 .95 .22 42 .56
Work satisfaction .95 .22 42 .88 .33 42 .24
Trust .93 .26 42 .88 .33 42 .46
Attractiveness .95 .22 42 .74 .45 42 .01
Professional clothing .93 .26 42 .9 .3 42 .7
Note. Friendliness of the person in the picture was rated answering the question: “How does the person in the pho-
tograph appear to you?" on a 5-points scale. The variable “Friendliness" is a dummy equal to 1 if the person replied
Friendly or Very Friendly and 0 otherwise. Work satisfaction was rated answering: “In your opinion, how satisfied is
this person in his/her work?" on a 5-points scale. The variable “Work Satisfaction" is a dummy equal to 1 if the person
replied Satisfied or Very Satisfied and 0 otherwise. The question “To what extent does this image make you feel happy?"
assessed emotional reaction to the picture on a 7-points scale. The variable “Happy feeling" takes values between -3
("Extremely unhappy") and 3 ("Extremely happy"). The variable for trust is defined from answers to the question “If
this person was giving you some information about her job, would you trust him/her?", to which people answered on a
5-points scale; the variable has values between -2 ("Definitely not") and 2 ("Definitely yes"). The variable attractiveness
is defined from answers to the question “In your opinion, how does this person look like?", to which people answered
on a 5-points scale; the variable has values between -2 ("Not attractive") and 2 ("Attractive"). The variable professional
clothing is a dummy equal to one if the respondent would describe the clothes of the portrayed person as “professional"
and 0 if “unprofessional". In the Amazon Mechanical Turk sample the number of respondents for each question may
vary by design: the more sensitive questions on clothing, ethnicity, attractiveness and trust were asked only on a subset
of respondents.
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treatments are interacting, which would make hard the identification of the two separate
channels.
FIGURE 1.B.1: Interaction between photographs and information: manip-
ulation checks
Note. The left panel shows the distribution of answers to the question “Consider 100 people who apply for
this job. How many do you think are women?", separately for respondents assigned to the email with a high
or low information of returns to ability. The right panel shows the distribution of answers to the question
“After seeing the email ad, please indicate below the proportion of [WOMEN/MEN] that you think are
successful on-the-job", separately for respondents assigned to the email with a female or male photograph.
Data are from the auxiliary online surveys. The number of respondents is 504: 262 are from the Prolific
Academic sample and 242 from the organization’s sample.
1.B.2 Threats across treatments
There are two main concerns: people’s attention to the intervention and participants’
trust in the information presented. First, I cannot exclude that some people didn’t open
the invitation-to-apply email, but unfortunately I don’t have metrics on opening rates.
If the decision to not open the email is negatively correlated with interest in applying,
then the compliers to my intervention would be people with a higher baseline interest
in the job. However, the correlation could also go the opposite way: the invitation-to-
apply email contains a detailed description of the selection process that the least informed
people might be interested in.
Overall, not opening the email is very unlikely: the invitation-to-apply email contains
the candidate’s unique reference number, which is essential to be able to access the appli-
cation portal, submit the application form and have access to other steps of the process.
In the overall sample, 15% of men and 13% of women never accessed the application por-
tal, which is the upper bound of the proportion of people that might have not opened the
email. The randomization should guarantee that proportion of “types" who didn’t look
at the invitation-to-apply email is equally likely across experimental conditions, which
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should then only create an attenuation bias in the results.106
Another risk is that people did not pay attention to the intervention. There are two
main ways in which attention could affect the results. If attention is an individual trait,
such that some people are more attentive than others, it shouldn’t introduce any bias as
long as it is balanced across treatments. If attention is instead endogenously chosen by
experimental subjects, it becomes an outcome of the treatment which should be consid-
ered as a potential confounder (see Section 1.10).
The experiment was designed also to limit inattention. The intervention box was lo-
cated in the top quarter of the email and could be visualized in the email preview in any
smartphone or tablet. It was also positioned right below the candidate number, which
is one of the most important pieces of information contained in the invitation-to-apply
email. Finally, the text on the right of the picture addressed the candidates by name to
visually capture their attention (see Figure 1.3).
Participants’ lack of trust in the experimenters (i.e. the organization) can limit the ex-
periment’s validity. The invitation-to-apply email was signed by the Director of Selection,
it contained the organization’s logo and a disclaimer of confidentiality. Participants were
told that they could contact any member of the recruitment team for questions, which
in principle include doubts about the information presented in the treatment emails.107
Qualitative interviews with candidates indicate that they had not been surprised by see-
ing an email containing statistics about on-the-job performance. The organization is in-
deed well-known for its efforts of being evidence-based and statistics are frequently re-
ported on the organization website.
106I cannot test this directly as the decision to access the application portal is endogenous and could be an
outcome of the intervention itself. However, I computed Lee bounds for the treatment effects (Lee, 2009) for
the extreme case that attrition involves all the people who never accessed the portal. For men, bounds for
the effect of high expected returns to ability are tight and the effect confidence interval doesn’t cover zero.
The lower and upper bound are respectively .073 and .082, both statistically significant (p-val < 0.05). For
women, bounds for the effect of the male photograph are less tight and the effect confidence interval covers
zero at the upper bound. The lower and upper bound are respectively -0.06 and -0.02, with only the lower
bound statistically significant (p-val < 0.005).
107To the best of my knowledge, this never happened.
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TABLE 1.B.2: Information and inference on job amenities
66% Info 89% Info Diff 66% Info 89% Info
Mean Mean H-L N N
Panel A: 2018 Applicants sample
Job difficulty 65.81 60.31 -5.49** 120 121
(17.69) (21.25) (2.52)
Wage level 51.14 51.32 0.18 43 41
(12.88) (15.76) (3.13)
Promotion difficulty 55.46 55.98 0.52 120 120
(15.77) (18.04) (2.19)
Job desirable for men 0.71 0.74 0.03 120 121
(0.46) (0.44) (0.06)
Job desirable for women 0.81 0.88 0.07 120 121
(0.40) (0.33) (0.05)
Discrimination by customers 0.39 0.53 0.14** 120 121
(0.49) (0.50) (0.06)
Job high social status 0.51 0.68 0.17*** 120 121
(0.50) (0.47) (0.06)
% of high-skilled applicants 72.63 80.27 7.64*** 120 122
(19.62) (20.05) (2.55)
% of high-performers on the job 68.20 73.72 5.52*** 120 122
(11.95) (14.08) (1.68)
Number of applicants 61.72 58.36 -3.36 120 122
(17.74) (19.26) (2.38)
% female applicants 69.17 70.49 1.32 120 122
(13.60) (12.73) (1.69)
Panel B: Prolific Ac sample
Job difficulty 65.61 62.51 -3.10 130 132
(19.82) (19.56) (2.43)
Wage level 43.95 45.95 2.00 130 132
(19.64) (17.59) (2.30)
Promotion difficulty 54.29 56.20 1.91 130 132
(16.30) (17.77) (2.11)
Job desirable for men 0.69 0.61 -0.08 130 132
(0.46) (0.49) (0.06)
Job desirable for women 0.95 0.93 -0.01 130 132
(0.23) (0.25) (0.03)
Discrimination by customers 0.45 0.41 -0.04 130 132
(0.50) (0.49) (0.06)
Job high social status 0.46 0.49 0.03 130 132
(0.50) (0.50) (0.06)
% of high-skilled applicants 65.81 76.62 10.81*** 130 132
(16.43) (17.99) (2.13)
% of high-performers on the job 64.02 74.03 10.01*** 130 132
(12.42) (12.26) (1.53)
Number of applicants 47.85 51.58 3.73 130 132
(21.83) (22.49) (2.74)
% female applicants 71.32 72.87 1.56 130 132
(11.09) (11.62) (1.40)
Note. On a scale from 0 to 100, participants are asked to what extent they think that the job i) is difficult, ii) has a high wage,
iii) people get easily promoted. Rows 4 to 7 report the extent to which respondents agreed with the following statements:
“the job is desirable for a man”, “customers discriminate workers (by race or gender) in this job”, “the job is desirable
for a woman”, “the job has a high social status”. Answers were on a 6-points scale from “Strongly Agree" to “Strongly
Disagree” and I created dummy variables equal to one for the three highest options. The variable “% of high-performers
in the job" is the weighted average of answers to the questions “Now that you have seen the email ad...indicate below
the proportion of [women/men] that you think are successful on-the-job". The variable “% of high-skilled applicants" is
the weighted average of answers to the questions “Out of 100 [women/men] that apply for this job after seeing the email
ad, how many do you think that have the potential to get commendable or excellent feedback on the job?". “Number of
applicants” is the believed number of people that apply out of 100 who are considering whether or not to apply for the job.
“% female applicants” is the perceived female share among 100 applicants. Some questions were shown to subsamples
only, implying differences in the number of respondents.
TABLE 1.B.3: Photographs and inference on job amenities
Female Ph. Male Ph. Diff Female Ph. Male Ph.
Mean Mean M-W N N
Panel A: 2018 Applicants sample
Job difficulty 63.09 63.01 -0.08 119 122
(20.34) (19.16) (2.55)
Wage level 52.09 50.27 -1.82 44 40
(16.10) (12.09) (3.13)
Promotion difficulty 56.52 54.93 -1.59 119 121
(17.22) (16.63) (2.19)
Job desirable for men 0.62 0.82 0.19*** 120 121
(0.49) (0.39) (0.06)
Job desirable for women 0.96 0.73 -0.23*** 120 121
(0.20) (0.45) (0.04)
Discrimination by customers 0.51 0.41 -0.10 120 121
(0.50) (0.49) (0.06)
Job high social status 0.63 0.55 -0.08 120 121
(0.48) (0.50) (0.06)
% of high-skilled applicants 77.35 75.63 -1.73 120 122
(19.11) (21.20) (2.60)
% of high-performers on the job 72.60 69.39 -3.21* 120 122
(11.99) (14.40) (1.70)
Number of applicants 60.61 59.45 -1.16 120 122
(18.56) (18.62) (2.39)
% female applicants 72.50 67.22 -5.28*** 120 122
(12.60) (13.22) (1.66)
Panel B: Prolific Ac sample
Job difficulty 65.13 62.96 -2.17 131 131
(18.67) (20.71) (2.44)
Wage level 44.28 45.63 1.34 131 131
(19.73) (17.51) (2.30)
Promotion difficulty 53.56 56.95 3.40 131 131
(17.62) (16.36) (2.10)
Job desirable for men 0.60 0.70 0.10* 131 131
(0.49) (0.46) (0.06)
Job desirable for women 0.94 0.94 0.00 131 131
(0.24) (0.24) (0.03)
Discrimination by customers 0.47 0.38 -0.09 131 131
(0.50) (0.49) (0.06)
Job high social status 0.45 0.50 0.05 131 131
(0.50) (0.50) (0.06)
% of high-skilled applicants 70.50 72.02 1.52 131 131
(18.71) (17.36) (2.23)
% of high-performers on the job 68.48 69.64 1.16 131 131
(12.96) (13.66) (1.65)
Number of applicants 49.76 49.70 -0.06 131 131
(22.59) (21.89) (2.75)
% female applicants 74.91 69.29 -5.62*** 131 131
(10.62) (11.43) (1.36)
Note. On a scale from 0 to 100, participants are asked to what extent they think that the job i) is difficult, ii) has a high wage,
iii) people get easily promoted. Rows 4 to 7 report the extent to which respondents agreed with the following statements:
“the job is desirable for a man”, “customers discriminate workers (by race or gender) in this job”, “the job is desirable
for a woman”, “the job has a high social status”. Answers were on a 6-points scale from “Strongly Agree" to “Strongly
Disagree” and I created dummy variables equal to one for the three highest options. The variable “% of high-performers
in the job" is the weighted average of answers to the questions “Now that you have seen the email ad...indicate below
the proportion of [women/men] that you think are successful on-the-job". The variable “% of high-skilled applicants" is
the weighted average of answers to the questions “Out of 100 [women/men] that apply for this job after seeing the email
ad, how many do you think that have the potential to get commendable or excellent feedback on the job?". “Number of
applicants” is the believed number of people that apply out of 100 who are considering whether or not to apply for the job.
“% female applicants” is the perceived female share among 100 applicants. Some questions were shown to subsamples
only, implying differences in the number of respondents.
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1.C Exposure to occupational gender segregation
1.C.1 Measures and methods
I use microdata on the local occupational structure by gender from the 2011 U.K. Census
to construct the Duncan index of occupational segregation (Duncan, 1955). The dataset
contains the distribution of workers by gender across 362 detailed SOC4 occupational
categories at the MSOA level. The sample is a 10% random sample from the 2011 Cen-
sus, obtained through a special request to the National Statistical Office. MSOA stands
for Medium Layer Super Output Areas. In 2011, the median MSOA in the UK comprised
188 8-digits postcodes, with a minimum of 89 postcodes to a maximum of 1033. There are
7201 MSOA in the UK in 2011. The Duncan index is computed using the following for-
mula: 12 ∑
N
i=1 |miM − fiF |, where mi and fi are the male and female population, respectively,
in occupation i and M and F are the total working population in the local labour market.
The index takes values between 0 (complete integration) and 1 (complete segregation)
and identifies the percentage of women (or men) that would have to change occupations
for the distribution of the two genders to be equal.
Using a bridge between the Census local area codes and 7-digit postcodes, I merged
the indexes with my experimental data through the subjects’ secondary school postcode
and, when missing (for 62% of subjects), home postcode. The use of the secondary school
postcode is motivated in the main body of the paper. The subsample of subjects with only
home postcode available is made of 50% students and 50% workers. For students, home
postcode is in most of the cases the postcode of their parents’ home, which is most likely
where they grew up. For workers, it is instead the current domicile. The distribution of
the Duncan index in my experimental sample is representative of the overall Country, as
shown in Table 1.C.1. The U.K. average Duncan Index across MSOAs is 0.5839 and the
average in my sample is 0.563. Table 1.C.1 shows demographic characteristics by gender
and exposure to high versus low gender segregation.
I use the Duncan Index as an individual measure of exposure to gender-segregated
labour markets in the previous decade before the current job application. One short-
coming of this method is that it does not equalize the age of exposure to local labour
markets across candidates. Timing of exposure has been shown to be a crucial variable
for norms internalization (Heckman and Kautz, 2012). This implies that the Duncan in-
dex computed using data from 2011 is likely to be weakly correlated with gender norms
for people who were older than 23 at the moment of application. But the Duncan index
showed little change over the last two decades (Blau et al., 2013) and the correlation in
my experimental data between the 2001 and 2011 Duncan index is 0.70 (p-val = 0.000).
Nevertheless, the results of Table 1.2 are robust to assigning the Duncan index computed
from the 2001 Census data to individuals older than 23 (60% of men’s sample).
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FIGURE 1.C.1: Duncan Index in the experimental sample and in the UK
The figure on the left shows the distribution of the Duncan Index in the experimental sample by gen-
der (postcode level). We can see that men’s distribution is shifted to the left of women’s distribution
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distributions: p-val=0.019). The vertical black line shows the
mean for men (0.554) and the vertical dashed line shows the mean for women (0.564). The distribution for
the whole U.K is showed in the figure on the right (MSOA level).
TABLE 1.C.1: Demographics by exposure to occupational segregation
Duncan < med Duncan > med Diff means
Mean SD N Mean SD N P-val
Men
Non-white 0.31 0.46 498 0.25 0.43 498 0.03
Age 27.76 8.14 498 29.7 10.06 498 0
Married 0.15 0.36 487 0.24 0.43 491 0
Caring duties 0.13 0.33 498 0.19 0.39 498 0.01
Top university 0.29 0.45 498 0.21 0.41 498 0.01
First Grade 0.2 0.4 498 0.2 0.4 498 0.81
FTE 0.5 0.5 498 0.5 0.5 498 0.95
Outside Option 2.53 0.28 498 2.59 0.31 498 0
Aligned Subject 0.44 0.5 498 0.52 0.5 498 0.01
Women
Non-white 0.19 0.39 2167 0.36 0.48 2166 0
Age 26.71 8.17 2167 26.04 7.75 2166 0.01
Married 0.14 0.35 2137 0.1 0.3 2123 0
Caring duties 0.19 0.4 2167 0.14 0.34 2166 0
Top university 0.21 0.41 2167 0.29 0.45 2166 0
First Grade 0.19 0.39 2167 0.17 0.38 2166 0.16
FTE 0.44 0.5 2166 0.4 0.49 2166 0.02
Outside Option 2.42 0.24 2167 2.39 0.22 2166 0
Aligned Subject 0.73 0.44 2167 0.66 0.47 2166 0
Note. Differences in means between men (top panel) and women (bottom panel) who come from areas
with occupational gender segregation above the median or below the median along demographic, educa-
tional and employment variables. The variable “caring duties" is a dummy equal to one if the respondent
is a primary or secondary carer of children. I define top U.K. universities those belonging to the Russell
Group. “First grade" is a dummy for whether the person got a first class in university. “Aligned Subject"
is a dummy equal to one if the person studied a subject aligned with the job. “Outside option" is the
expected log hourly-wage in the U.K. job market conditional on subject studied, gender, race, age, British
nationality and marital status.
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1.C.2 Occupational segregation, social norms and beliefs about gender
The validity of the proxies for α used in Section 1.6.3 relies on the positive correlation
between labour market genderization, social norms regarding men and women’s career
choices and beliefs about their skills in different occupations. There is a well-known
relationship between occupational gender segregation and the gender wage-gap (Blau
et al., 2013; Lordan and Pischke, 2016). Moreover, sociologists have been extensively
studying the association between the former measure and gender attitudes (England,
1990). I present three data exercises to validate the proxy used.
First, I show that men who come from areas above the median of the Duncan Index
display an implicit association bias between social work and women. In the invitation-to-
apply email, all the experimental subjects were invited to participate in a complementary
research survey, which included a a Single-Target Implicit Association test (Greenwald
et al., 1998).108 I designed an ad-hoc test to measure the extent to which respondents
automatically associate social work with women.109
Subjects are presented with two sets of stimuli. The first set of stimuli are typical En-
glish female names (e.g. Rebecca) and male names (e.g. Josh), and the second set are
words related to social work (e.g., family assistance). One word at a time appears on the
screen and individuals are instructed to categorize it to the left or the right according to
different labels displayed on the top of the screen (for instance, the respondent should
categorize the word “Josh" either to the right - where the label is “Female” - or to the left
- where the label is “Male”). Subjects are required to categorize the words as quickly as
possible for four rounds. There are two types of rounds. In “hypothesis-inconsistent"
rounds individuals categorize to one side of the screen female names and to the oppo-
site side of the screen male names and social work activities. In “hypothesis-consistent"
rounds individuals categorize to one side of the screen male names and to the opposite
side of the screen female names and social work activities. The measure of implicit asso-
ciation between female gender and social work is given by the standardized mean differ-
ence score of the “hypothesis-inconsistent" rounds and “hypothesis-consistent" rounds
(Greenwald et al., 2003). The intuition behind the test is that people with a greater im-
plicit association of the job with women take longer to correctly categorize names in the
“hypothesis-inconsistent pairings", because of the cognitive cost imposed by the incon-
sistent pairing of the two concepts. Thus the higher and positive the d-score the stronger
is the association between the two concepts.110
Figure 1.C.2 shows the distribution of d-score for women (left panel) and men (right
108Response rate was 12.5% for the main survey and 6% to the IAT (604 and 300 respondents respectively).
109Many studies in economics have used the IAT as a predictive measure of employers’ discrimination
(Bertrand et al., 2005; Reuben et al., 2014; Glover et al., 2017) or sensitivity to negative stereotypes (Cvencek
et al., 2011; Nosek et al., 2002; Kiefer and Sekaquaptewa, 2007; Carlana, 2018). For a recent review, see
Bertrand and Duflo (2017).
110The order of the two types of blocks was randomized at the individual level.
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panel), splitting the sample according to exposure to different levels of the Duncan In-
dex. The distribution of d-score values for men exposed to higher-than-median gender
segregation is strikingly shifted to the right of the distribution of men from lower-than-
median gender segregation (Kolgorov-Smirnov test: p-val=0.043). A similar pattern is
observed for women, but the difference is smaller and I cannot reject the null hypothe-
sis of equal distribution between the groups (Kolgorov-Smirnov test: p-val=0.73). The
null result of the photograph manipulation on men’s applications is surprising in light of
this evidence. A few recent economics papers show that implicit biases against minori-
ties (by race or gender) are correlated with actual behaviour by managers (Glover et al.,
2017), teachers (Carlana, 2018) and employers (Ruben et al., 2014). I provide evidence
that labour market conditions correlate with implicit biases held by the minority, but I do
not find evidence for behavioural consequences.
FIGURE 1.C.2: Implicit Association Test and exposure to gender occupa-
tional segregation
Note. The figure shows kernel density estimates of the d-score computed from an Implicit Association Test
(IAT) I administered to the job candidates as part of a research survey (12% response rate). Respondents to
the IAT count 337 women and 52 men (61% of the survey respondents). The d-score measures the degree
of implicit association between female gender and social work: the higher and positive, the greater the
implicit association. The d-score is the standardized mean difference score of the “hypothesis-inconsistent"
rounds and “hypothesis-consistent" rounds. In the former type of rounds, individuals are instructed to
categorize to one side of the screen female names and to the opposite side of the screen male names and
social work activities (“hypothesis-inconsistent pairings"). The latter are rounds in which individuals
must categorize to one side of the screen female names and social work activities and to the opposite side
of the screen male names only (“hypothesis-consistent pairings").
In Figure 1.C.3 I show that U.K. regions with high gender segregation levels display
more traditional norms related to women’s employment. In the two scatter plots of Fig-
ure 1.C.3, the x-axis shows the proportion of local authorities in a certain region that
have a Duncan Index in the top quartile of the national distribution. The y-axis shows
the regional proportion of people who think that women are less successful than men in
starting their own business (left panel) and that men should have priority in hiring when
jobs are scarce (right panel). I use data from the 2013 British Attitudes Survey in the left
figure and the 1995 and 2005 waves of the World Value Survey in the right figure.
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FIGURE 1.C.3: Correlation between gender occupational segregation and
norms
Note. In both scatter plots, the variable on the x-axis is the proportion of census areas (MSOAs) within
a region which have a value of the Duncan index above the 75th percentile of the U.K. distribution. It is
thus a measure of regional occupational gender segregation. Data are from the 2011 U.K. Census. In the
left graph, the variable on the y-axis is the proportion of people in the region that replied “Slightly less
successful" or “Much less successful" to the question: “Compared to men, how successful do you think
women in general would be in setting up their own businesses?". Data are from the 2013 British Attitudes
Survey. In the right graph, the variable on the y-axis is the proportion of people in the region that agree
with the statement: “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women". Data are
from the 2005 World Value Survey.
Table 1.C.2 uses data from the auxiliary online experiments (described in Section 1.B)
to show whether people exposed to areas of high gender occupational segregation differ
in terms of beliefs on men and women’s skills in female occupations. In the surveys, I
asked people the following questions:
• On a scale from 0 (min) to 100 (max), what do you think is the performance of a
[woman/man] in social work? (0 = extremely bad, 50 = neither bad nor good, 100
= extremely good)
• On a scale from 0 (min) to 100 (max), how confident are you of your answer - that
the performance of a [woman/man] in social work is Y?
I use answers to the former question as a proxy for the priors on male and female per-
formance in social work and to the latter as a proxy of priors’ precision. The proxy for
precision is the dependent variable in Table 1.C.2. The independent variable is an indica-
tor variable for a higher than median Duncan index of the postcode where a respondent
was living when she/he was 14 years old. The regression controls for ethnicity, survey
sample and the level of beliefs elicited in the first question mentioned above. We can im-
mediately see that men exposed to higher gender occupational segregation tend to have
low confidence in their beliefs about men and women’s performance in social work.
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TABLE 1.C.2: Correlation between gender occupational segregation and
beliefs
DV: Confidence in beliefs of performance in social work
(1) (2)
Online sample: M W
Exposure to high gender segregation -7.149** 2.641
(3.319) (3.927)
Observations 110 116
R-squared 0.268 0.169
Mean Dep Var 74.66 80.18
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. The dependent variable is the average of answers to the questions “On a scale from 0 (minimum)
to 100 (maximum), how confident are you of your answer [about the performance of a man/woman in
social work]?". “Exposure to high gender segregation" is equal to one if the Duncan index of occupational
gender segregation in the postcode where a respondent was living when she/he was 14 years old is above
the median of the sample. The regression controls for ethnicity, survey wave and the average of the
answers to the questions “On a scale from 0 (minimum) to 100 (maximum), what do you think is the
performance of a [woman/man] in the social work?". Data are from the auxiliary online surveys and the
sample size is determined by the number of people who answered to the postcode question and whose
postcode could be matched with the 2011 Census.
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1.D Outside option: methodology
I compute the individual current expected hourly wage in the U.K. as a measure of the
individual outside option. Using the U.K. Labor Force Survey (LFS) quarterly data be-
tween January 2017 and December 2018, I estimate Mincerian regression of the log-hourly
wage on a set of observables which are available both in the LFS and my experimental
dataset.111 I then impute the coefficients of the Mincerian regression to my experimental
data to predict an individual-level expected wage in the UK labour market. I describe the
exercise in detail in the next subsection.
I interpret this measure as the individual outside option component wo. While provid-
ing a useful measure of the candidates’ opportunities in the labour market at the time
of application, the drawback of this measure is that it rewards experience and other ob-
servable demographics over talent, whose only measure in both the LFS and my data is
university grade. This means that it might overestimate the opportunities available to
older and less skilled people as compared to younger more skilled ones.112 Table 1.D.1
compares a random subsample from the LFS with the experimental sample. I generated
the former to reproduce the same age distribution of the latter. Both men and women
in my experiment are more likely to be of non-white ethnicity, less likely to be married,
less likely to have graduates before 2016, more likely to have worked in the public sector
or healthcare and, relatedly, less likely to have studied scientific subjects. These differ-
ences confirm that people in the experimental sample are selected on the basis of greater
interest in public sector and/or healthcare jobs.
TABLE 1.D.1: Labour Force Survey and experimental sample comparison
Labour Force Survey Experiment
Women Men Diff (1)-(2) W M
Mean SD Mean SD p-val Mean Mean
Non-white .12 .33 .14 .34 .07 0.27 0.28
Age 28.77 8.36 29.3 8.73 .01 26.35 28.68
Married .28 .45 .27 .44 .51 0.12 0.19
First Grade .15 .35 .14 .35 .3 0.18 0.20
Graduated before 2016 .73 .44 .75 .44 .19 0.34 0.45
FTE in Public Sector .49 .5 .27 .44 0 0.71 0.60
Scientific Subject .15 .36 .32 .47 0 0.05 0.09
Aligned Subject .44 .5 .27 .45 0 0.70 0.48
Note. The first five Columns of the table show summary statistics from a random sample of the LFS
which I generated to reproduce the same age distribution of the experimental sample. Column “Diff
(1)-(2)" contains the difference in the proportions of women and men that have the characteristic of the
corresponding row. “FTE in Public Sector" is an indicator variable for working in the government and
includes jobs in healthcare.
111I used the following set of dummies: university subject (16 categories), age, age squared, British nation-
ality, gender, marital status, non-white ethnicity, first grade in university.
112For instance, the LFS data do not contain the exact university attended by the respondents.
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Methodology
I use data from the eight quarters of the 2017 and 2018 Labour Force Survey in the UK.113 I
limit the sample to men and women between 16 and 64 years old. To match the eligibility
criteria of my experimental sample, I exclude from the sample people who don’t have at
least a bachelor degree or, if students, who are not currently studying towards a bachelor
degree or higher university title. I then estimate a Mincerian regression of the hourly pay
of people in employment on the following series of dummies: university subject (JACS3
macro areas), being married, being of non-white ethnicity, being a man, being born in the
UK, age and age squared, having obtained a first grade in university.
Following the LFS guidance, the variable for the hourly pay has been truncated be-
tween 0 and 99 (variable called HOURPAY) and has been derived from the variables
GRSSWK (gross weekly pay), POTHR (usual hours of paid overtime) and BUSHR (usual
hours worked in main job, excluding overtime). As the distribution looks log-normal,
I first take the natural logarithm of the HOURPAY variable before running the regres-
sion. The hourly pay is computed for all respondents who are employees and those
on a government scheme. I extract the coefficients of the estimation and apply them to
the same variables in my experimental data, in order to construct a predicted individ-
ual outside-option. I decided not to control for the fulltime employment status because
the coefficient would bias upward the estimated outside option of people in fulltime em-
ployment as compared to students in my sample. We don’t know whether the people
who are students in my sample will decide to become full-time workers or not; thus the
estimated outside option for students would be biased downward if they will become
full-time employees. Figure 1.D.1 shows the distribution of the computed outside option
by gender. Table 1.D.2 shows the coefficients of the Mincerian regression on the LFS data.
The omitted category are non-married white women who studied Arts.
FIGURE 1.D.1: Outside option distribution by gender
Note. The figure shows the distribution of outside option for men (in blue) and women (in
red). The red dashed (blue solid) line is the women’s (men’s) median.
113For more information on the Labour Force Survey, see the LFS website.
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TABLE 1.D.2: Mincerian regression to predict outside option
DV: Log Hourly Pay
Other or missing 0.0634*** Architecture 0.204***
(0.017) (0.028)
Medicine 0.518*** Social Studies 0.195***
(0.029) (0.019)
Allied to medicine 0.121*** Law 0.267***
(0.018) (0.023)
Biology 0.141*** Business 0.216***
(0.019) (0.018)
Agriculture 0.106*** Communications 0.0677***
(0.030) (0.025)
Physics 0.211*** Languages 0.122***
(0.021) (0.023)
Maths and IT 0.282*** History 0.101***
(0.020) (0.024)
Engineering 0.318*** Education 0.136***
(0.019) (0.018)
Age 0.0935*** Male 0.143***
(0.002) (0.007)
Age squared -0.001*** British 0.0173
(0.000) (0.012)
Married 0.0889*** Non-white -0.0533***
(0.008) (0.012)
First Grade 0.0954*** Constant 0.467***
(0.011) (0.048)
Observations 22325
R-squared 0.235
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS regression. The table reports the coefficients from a regression of log hourly
wage on seventeen university subject categories, age, age squared, gender, marital status,
ethnicity, British citizenship and having achieved a first grade in university. The omitted
category are non-married white women who studied arts.
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1.E Performance on the job: distributional effects
In this section, I look at the impacts of the treatments on the quality of hired workers
by measuring changes in the conditional quantiles of workers’ quality. Standard quantile
regression models (Koenker and Hallock, 2001) estimate the conditional quantile function
Q(scoreia|Xi) = α+ βTi, where β captures the change in conditional quantile caused by
the treatment Ti. For example, suppose that the estimate of β for the 10th percentile of
the distribution of standardized test scores is 0.5. This means that an applicant at the 10th
percentile of the distribution in the Ti = 1 group has a test score that is 0.5 SD higher than
an applicant at the 10th percentile of the distribution in the Ti = 0 group.
TABLE 1.E.1: Applicants’ skills: quantile regressions
DV: Index of Observable Qualities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quantile
10 30 50 70 90
Women only
Male Photo -0.072** -0.008 0.059** 0.047 0.058
(0.028) (0.031) (0.029) (0.037) (0.049)
High Exp Returns 0.002 -0.005 0.008 0.005 -0.000
(0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.036) (0.046)
Observations 2,062 2,062 2,062 2,062 2,062
R-squared 0.021 0.030 0.032 0.033 0.032
Men only
Male Photo 0.062 0.097 0.018 0.063 0.197**
(0.065) (0.059) (0.067) (0.065) (0.077)
High Exp Returns 0.023 0.120** 0.117* 0.065 0.058
(0.065) (0.059) (0.068) (0.063) (0.083)
Observations 440 440 440 440 440
R-squared 0.065 0.067 0.067 0.077 0.078
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. Quantile regressions. Estimations are for women in the top panel and for men in the bottom panel. The
omitted category is the treatment group that received the female photograph and the low returns information.
The regressor “Male Photo" is a dummy equal to one for the male photograph treatment. The regressor “High
Exp Returns" is a dummy equal to one for information of high returns to ability treatment. The outcome variable
is the index of desirable qualifications computed as the mean of the following standardized variables: receiving
a first grade, being from a top tier university, frequent past volunteering, high cognitive skills and score in
English pre-university tests. All the regressions control for the basic set of controls Xi made of the following
dummies: past application, access to early registration, non-white ethnicity.
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TABLE 1.E.2: On-the-job performance: quantile regressions
DV: First Semester Std. Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quantile
10 30 50 70 90
Women only
Male Photo 0.118 0.066 0.111* 0.105* 0.028
(0.149) (0.061) (0.067) (0.054) (0.060)
High Exp Returns -0.118 -0.027 -0.037 -0.011 -0.056
(0.133) (0.068) (0.072) (0.056) (0.054)
Observations 955 955 955 955 955
R-squared 0.120 0.097 0.093 0.113 0.085
Men only
Male Photo -0.029 0.040 0.044 -0.008 0.026
(0.397) (0.254) (0.136) (0.112) (0.200)
High Exp Returns 0.499 0.198 0.132 0.083 -0.053
(0.364) (0.209) (0.117) (0.108) (0.111)
Observations 215 215 215 215 215
R-squared 0.145 0.195 0.186 0.171 0.059
Exam FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls for Quality Y Y Y Y Y
Clustered s.e. in parentheses (ind level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. Quantile regression with panel data. Estimations are for women in the top panel and for men in the bottom
panel. The omitted category is the treatment group that received the female photograph and the low returns
information. The regressor “Male Photo" is a dummy equal to one for the male photograph treatment. The
regressor “High Exp Returns" is a dummy equal to one for information of high returns to ability treatment. The
outcome variable is the standardized score obtained in the five assessments required within the first semester
on the job. All the regressions control for the basic set of controls Xi made of the following dummies: past
application, access to early registration, non-white ethnicity, workplace region, being from a top tier university
and score in Maths pre-university tests. Standard errors are clustered at the worker level.
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1.F Appendix to theoretical framework
1.F.1 Empirical content of the theory assumptions
In this subsection I provide empirical evidence for the assumption of gender differences
in priors’ average and uncertainty. I plot the density of answers to the following question:
“On a scale from 0 (minimum) to 100 (maximum), what do you think is the performance
of a [WOMAN/MAN] in social work?" where 0 is for extremely bad, 50 for neither bad
nor good and 100 for extremely good performance. Figure 1.F.1 shows the distribution of
beliefs held by women (left) and men (right). Both genders think that men have on aver-
age a lower performance in social work, which supports the assumption θM < θW . The
variance of the distribution of beliefs about men is greater than the one of the distribution
of beliefs about women, which supports the assumption σ2M > σ
2
W .
FIGURE 1.F.1: Beliefs about performance in social work by gender
Note. Kernel densities of answers to the following question: “On a scale from 0 (minimum) to 100 (maximum),
what do you think is the performance of a [WOMAN/MAN] in social work?" The graph on the left-hand side
shows the distribution of women’s beliefs and the one on the right of men’s beliefs. Dashed lines are for beliefs
about men’s performance and solid lines for beliefs about women’s performance. Data are from the auxiliary
online surveys.
Table 1.F.1 reports the ten most common past occupations reported in the application
form by men and women. As most have had experience in occupations related to social
work, the assumption of known (or unbiased expectations of) ai seems appropriate.
TABLE 1.F.1: Most common past occupations for men and women
Men Women
Social and Community Service Managers Educational and Vocational Counselors
Child, Family, and School Social Workers Child, Family, and School Social Workers
Social and Human Service Assistants Social and Human Service Assistants
Tutors Tutors
Teacher Assistants Teacher Assistants
Waiters and Waitresses Waiters and Waitresses
Personal Care Aides Childcare Workers
Recreation Workers Personal Care Aides
Retail Salespersons Recreation Workers
Customer Service Representatives Retail Salespersons
Note. Most common past occupations reported in the application form by men and women and converted
to standardized SOC4 categories.
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1.F.2 Combining the effects of gender shares and expectations
The assumed additivity between utility from workplace gender composition and ex-
pected returns to ability implies that predictions for the four treatment groups follow
trivially from results 1 and 2. The following result summarizes these predictions.
Result 3. Interaction between gender shares and expectations
a. Application rates are highest in treatment (p = g, s = sH) and lowest in (p 6= g, s = sL)
b. Application rates are higher in treatment (p = g, s = sL) than (p 6= g, s = sH) iff
|dθg| < |dsg|
Figure 1.F.2 provides the graphical intuition for Result 3 for the case U j
′
(ai) < Uo
′
(ai).
FIGURE 1.F.2: Theory: gender shares and expectations interacted
EU o[vg, ai, w
o
g] + c
aig
EU j[p = g, sH ]
EU j[p = g, sL]
EU j[p 6= g, sL]
EU j[p 6= g, sH ]
Case : θL < θH < vg
aˆ
Note. The figure plots the application decision for a potential applicant of gender g. The solid black line
is the outside option. The two thin solid lines show the expected job utility when receiving information
of high (s = sH) or low (s = sL) returns to ability and a gender-mismatched photograph (p 6= g). The
two dashed blue lines show the expected job utility when receiving information of high (s = sH) or low
(s = sL) returns to ability and a gender-matched photograph (p = g). The thresholds of ability for the
marginal applicants are determined from the intersection of the expected job utility and expected outside
option.
1.F.3 Adding stereotypes to the model
I assumed so far that photographs have no effect on information interpretation. Yet, in
the experiment as well as in the real world, the frame or context where information is
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conveyed can affect learning. The photographs manipulation might interfere with peo-
ple’s updating of expected returns to ability on the job.114 Recent work on beliefs in
gendered domains (Bordalo et al., 2016, 2019; Coffman et al., 2019), as well as the litera-
ture on confidence by gender and task content (for a review see Bertrand, 2011), points
to an interaction between job difficulty and gender-specific expectations. Bordalo et al.
(2019) find that bringing gender comparisons top of mind affects people’s beliefs of own
ability across domains: women paired with men, relative to women paired with women,
become more optimistic about own performance as female advantage increases. My re-
sults are consistent with a model in which women’s estimation of own performance is
decreasing when paired with men in a challenging task, but increasing when paired with
women in the same task. One possibility is that the male photograph makes women re-
vise their gender advantage in the job. I follow this line of thought to propose a simple
learning mechanism through which gender shares might affect updating of returns to
ability on the job. Suppose that individual ability ai is the sum of a mean-zero individual
component, φi, and a gender comparison component astg = ag − a−g : ai = astg + φi. In a
female-dominated job, stereotypes imply astW > 0 > a
st
M.
By changing the gender composition in the job, photographs might affect beliefs on astg .
For women, own gender advantage is smaller when there is a higher male proportion
in the job (as inferred by seeing a male photograph).115 What’s bad news for women
is good news for men: seeing a male photograph could positively affect astM and reduce
their gender disadvantage. This modelling assumption is equivalent to assuming that
parameter aˆ is a function of sg. Assumption 3 formalizes this.
Assumption 3. Gender stereotypes
∀g ∈ {W, M} : E[aˆ|p = g] < E[aˆ|p 6= g]
Adding stereotypes to the model makes ambiguous the predictions on the interaction
between treatments. Let’s take an extreme case for the sake of explanation. In the male
photograph treatment aˆ is greater than in the female photograph treatment. If this differ-
ence is big enough, it can lead to a situation in which condition B (a∗i > aˆ) is satisfied in
the female photograph treatment and violated in the male photograph treatment. This
114There is rich experimental evidence on people’s “mental gaps" in information gathering and processing
(Handel and Schwartzstein, 2018), such as neglecting important information components (Schwartzstein,
2014) or overweighting salient features (Bordalo et al., 2013, 2017). Different pictures could differentially
catch people’s attention, making them more or less attentive to information (see Section 1.10). Or there
could be a small probability that potential applicants attribute the aggregate statistics to the gender group
portrayed in the picture. Such an effect - a sort of group attribution error (Fiske and Taylor, 1991) - can
arise from limited attention or rational uncertainty, if people are not sure if the statistics received refers to
everyone. This hypothesis can be formalized as a higher signal precision σ2s when p = g, with consequently
larger dθg. I don’t find evidence for this effect.
115Notice that, in a partial equilibrium framework in which men and women’s abilities are given, this
is inconsistent with the evidence shown in Figure 1.F.1. Both men and women think that men are worse
in social work than women. Thus a higher proportion of men in the job should imply a lower aggregate
performance and a bigger advantage for women that enter. However, in a general equilibrium framework,
a higher proportion of men in the job might signal that they are actually better than previously thought,
leading to the hypothesised effect.
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implies, in turn, that the difference in application rates between receiving information of
high or low returns is positive conditional on a female photograph and negative condi-
tional on a male photograph. Thus in this model application rates are not necessarily the
lowest in treatment (p 6= g, s = sL) but can the lowest in treatment (p 6= g, s = sH).
1.F.4 Proofs
Proof. Existence of threshold of ability a∗i
Define U j(ai) = U j(ai, aˆ, sg, αi, θg) and Uo(ai) = Uo(ai, c, vg, w¯). Consider a closed inter-
vals of ability ai: [a1, a2], with a1 and a2 bounded away from 0 and infinite. Assume that
U j(ai) and Uo(ai) satisfy the following conditions:
a0. They are both continuous in the interval [a1, a2]
a1. U j(a1) < Uo(a1)
a2. U j(a2) > Uo(a2)
Define the function H(ai) = U j(ai) − Uo(ai), which is continuous as well in [a1, a2].
Then:
H(a1) = U j(a1)−Uo(a1) < 0 from a1
H(a1) = U j(a2)−Uo(a2) > 0 from a2
Since H(.) is continuous, by the Intermediate Value Theorem (IVT) there must be a
value a∗i ∈ [a1, a2] such that H(a∗i ) = 0. Thus the two functions U j(ai) and Uo(ai) must
intersect in a∗i . In the application decision for the marginal applicant, if the minimum
value of a1 is zero, the IVT conditions imply that θg >
αisg−w¯−c
aˆ and θg > vg.
Proof. Result 1
We need to consider how the change in own gender proportion sg affects the marginal
applicant’s ability. Define G(ai, aˆ, sg, αi, θg, c, vg, w¯) = U j(ai)−Uo(ai), where U j(ai) and
Uo(ai) are as defined in the previous proof. Consider the vector x0 = (ai0, aˆ0, αi0, sg0, θg0, w¯0, c0, vg0)
such that G(x0) = 0. Assume that
∂G(x0)
∂ai
6= 0. By the Implicit Function Theorem (IFT):
∂ai
∂sg
= −
∂G(.)
∂sg
∂G(.)
∂ai
From the definition of G(.):
• ∂G(.)∂sg =
∂U j(.)
∂sg = αi. Thus sign
(
∂G(.)
∂sg
)
= sign(αi) > 0 under the assumptions of the
model.
• ∂G(.)∂ai =
∂U j(.)
∂ai
− ∂Uo(.)∂ai = θg − vg. The sign of this difference depends on the relative
slope of the on-the-job expected utility and the outside option.
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It follows that sign
(
∂ai
∂sg
)
= −sign (θg − vg). This implies that a decrease in perceived
own gender proportions sg will decrease (increase) the marginal applicant’s ability a∗ if
the best (worst) people select into the job. In both cases, there is an increase in the mass
of people applying to the job. The magnitude of the change in a∗ is independent of a∗
level, increasing in αi and decreasing in vg − θg.
Proof. Result 2
We need to consider how the change in expected returns to ability θg affects the marginal
applicant’s ability. Consider G(ai, aˆ, sg, αi, θg, c, vg, w¯) = U j(ai) − Uo(ai) as defined in
the previous proof. Consider the vector x0 = (ai0, aˆ0, αi0, sg0, θg0, w¯0, c0, vg0) such that
G(x0) = 0. Assume that
∂G(x0)
∂ai
6= 0. By the Implicit Function Theorem (IFT): ∂ai∂θg = −
∂G(.)
∂θg
∂G(.)
∂ai
.
From the definition of G(.):
• ∂G(.)∂θg =
∂U j(.)
∂θg
= ai − aˆ. Thus sign
(
∂G(.)
∂sg
)∣∣∣∣
a∗i
= sign(a∗i − aˆ). Solving for a∗i , this im-
plies the condition on the sign of B: a∗i > aˆ if w¯+ c− αisg + vg aˆ < 0 (or equivalently
B > 0).
• ∂G(.)∂ai =
∂U j(.)
∂ai
− ∂Uo(.)∂ai = θg − vg. The sign of this difference depends on the relative
slope of the on-the-job expected utility and the outside option.
It follows that there are four possible cases for sign
(
∂ai
∂θg
)
, given by the combination of
one level of a∗i - above or below aˆ - and the relationship between on-the-job and outside
option returns to ability. These cases are summarised in the Table below. A positive sign
of the derivative of ai with respect to θg means that we expect an increase in the number
of applications when on-the-job marginal returns increase. From the cross derivative of
ai wrt θg and ai, the magnitude of the change in a∗ is proportional to |θg − vg|.
θg − vg > 0 θg − vg < 0
a∗i > aˆ a
∗
i < aˆ a
∗
i > aˆ a
∗
i < aˆ
∂ai
∂θg
− + + −
Proof. Result 3: interaction between gender shares and expectations
To understand the total effect of receiving a signal s and a contemporaneous change in
perceived gender proportions, I compute the total differential ai|a∗i :
dai|a∗i =
∂ai
∂θg
dθg +
∂ai
∂sg
dsg
The proof entails the comparison of the total differential between each pair of the four
treatment groups. Comparing two emails with the same photograph (statistic) implies
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dsg = 0 (dθg = 0), thus results 1. and 2. apply. The crucial comparison is between treat-
ments with both different photographs and statistics: (g, θH) vs (−g, θL) and (−g, θH) vs
(g, θL). Let’s consider the first case (the same reasoning applies to the second).
Comparing (g, θH) vs (−g, θL)means that dsg > 0 and dθg > 0. If B > 0 and ∀sign(θg−
vg), sign( ∂ai∂θg ) = sign(
∂ai
∂sg ), thus the two changes reinforce each other. This will implies
that in absolute value the total change in ai, at the margin, is biggest between treatments
(g, θH) and (−g, θL). Thus the marginal applicant’s ability will be maximum in treatment
(g, θH) and minimum in treatment (−g, θL) when θg − vg < 0. If B < 0, the sign of this
comparison is instead ambiguous. If θg − vg < 0:
dai|a∗i =
∂ai
∂θg︸︷︷︸
−
dθg︸︷︷︸
+
+
∂ai
∂sg︸︷︷︸
+
dsg︸︷︷︸
+
The sign of the total differential depends on the relative strength of the change in
marginal returns to ability and the change in gender proportions. If |dθg| > |dsg|, then
the change in expected returns to ability prevails and marginal ability decreases, coun-
teracting the positive change generated by the photograph.
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1.G Dynamics
I provided evidence on the cumulative treatment effects over selection stages, bundling
together the effect on application submission and withdrawals across stages. This sec-
tion presents evidence on the dynamics of treatment effects across the four stages of the
selection process: stage (I), stage (II), interview (I) and interview (II). Figure 1.G.1 shows
the dynamics of individual decisions to remain in the process. For instance, it shows that
91% of men in the high returns treatment decided to show-up to interview I (conditional
on having succeeded in Stage 2). There are two take-aways. First, the information treat-
ment affect men’s decision making over time, not only in the very first stage. Secondly,
the impact of the information treatments on individual decisions is greatest - and in the
same direction - in the two most time-consuming stages: application submission in stage
I (which takes between four and six hours) and interview II (which is half day long). The
dynamics of treatment effects for women are concentrated in the first stage instead.
FIGURE 1.G.1: Dynamics: stayers over the hiring process (men only)
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Note. The figure shows the proportion of men who decided to go on to the next stage, for each
of the four stages in the selection process. The blue solid line is for the low expected returns
treatment and red dashed line for the high expected returns treatment. For instance, the graph
shows that 91% of men in the high expected returns treatment decided to show-up to Interview
I (conditional on having succeeded in Stage 2).
Does quality differ across stages of the hiring process? Figure 1.G.2 uses the index of
quality computed by averaging the following variables: having a first grade in univer-
sity, being from a top tier university, having volunteered frequently in the past, having
cognitive skills above the median and having obtained the maximum score in English
pre-university tests. This is the same set of variables used for the index reported in Fig-
ure 1.A.2 and in Table 1.E.1. To define cognitive skills, I use the employment history
reported by each applicant in the application form. Each applicant can list up to two
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previous employers, specifying the role covered, the level (e.g., junior, senior with or
without management responsibilities) and the main duties. I coded the most recent role
into standardized SOC4 categories and followed the methodology of Acemoglu and Au-
tor (2011) to match each occupation with the skills listed by O*Net. For each person, the
measures of cognitive and manual skills should thus be interpreted as the average level
of cognitive and manual skills acquired at work.
FIGURE 1.G.2: Dynamics: qualifications over the hiring process
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Dynamics of observable qualities
The figure shows men’s average proportion of desirable qualities in all the stages of the hiring process.
“Desirable qualities" are measure with an index between 0 and 1 that includes the following variables:
having a first grade in university, being from a top tier university, having studied a subject aligned with
the job, having volunteered frequently in the past, having cognitive skills above the median and having
manual skills above the median. Hollow symbols refer to the four hiring stages. Full symbols refer to
intermediate stages in which candidates can decide whether to persist in the process. Blue line is for the
high % information treatment and red for the low % information treatment.
Figure 1.G.2 shows the average proportion of “desirable" observable qualifications that
men have in each stage of the hiring process, by information treatment. Full symbols refer
to the four stages which involve screening by the employer, as in the previous Figure.
Hollow symbols refer to intermediate stages in which candidates can decide whether
to persist in the process. In these stages it’s only the applicants’ decision whether to
persist in the hiring process or withdraw. Figure 1.G.2 shows that the big difference in
quality between the two treatments appears after Interview 1, as a result of candidates’
decision to stay in the process. This suggests that providing information on high returns
to ability is not only effective to attract more applicants, but also to keep the best ones in
the selection pipeline.
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1.H Do gender shares matter for a wider pool of students?
I partly address external validity of the null result of the photograph manipulation through
a complementary field experiment with the same partner organization. The goal is to un-
derstand the extent to which gender shares affect men’s decision to apply for a female-
dominated job in a sample which is less selected on interest in the job.
Between September and November 2017 the partner organization visited 52 univer-
sities across the country conducting a variety of career events (e.g., stands at job fairs,
workshops, presentations). The main goals of these events are to promote the organi-
zation’s program and encourage applications. On average, each university was visited
slightly more than three times, for a maximum of six. Each university is assigned to a
Recruitment Officer (RO) who is in charge of organizing and conducting the events, col-
lecting email addresses of event participants and sending a follow-up email with further
information about the program.116 Mailing lists were collected in 75% of the total number
of events run by the organization.117
FIGURE 1.H.1: Experiment in universities: treatments
People who took part to career events and left their email address in a mailing list were
randomly assigned to three groups, which differed in the format of the follow-up email
received.118 The text content of these three emails was exactly the same, but they might
show i) no picture, ii) a picture of previous female workers, ii) or a picture of previous
male workers. The three email templates are shown in Figure 1.H.1. Assignment to
treatment was stratified by university, event and gender.
116RO’s performance evaluation does not depend on the number of email addresses collected at university
events.
117Out of the remaining 25%, ROs couldn’t collect participants’ email addresses for three main reasons: i)
time constraints, ii) the university refused to share participants’ data or iii) all the participants had already
signed-up. In two events the email lists were collected, but the RO just sent a standard follow-up email
template.
118Given that sign-up takes approximately 30 seconds, thus experimental subjects likely have different
levels of interest in the job, but at least a minimum level of attention to it.
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Each email template contains links to the organization’s website which are trackable
at the level of stratification and treatment. This allows me to know the number of par-
ticipants of gender g in event e in university u that clicked on any email link, whether
they are first time users and some metrics of their online behaviour for each treatment
group.119 Online behaviour is measured using standard metrics recorded by the Google
Analytics service installed on the organization website. The main outcome of this exper-
iment is whether people click on “Apply” on the organization’s website. Each event had
an average number of 30 sign-ups, for a total of 2877 unique participants (630 men).120 Ta-
ble 1.H.1 presents summary statistics of the sample in Experiment 1 and balance checks.
78% of participants are last year students or graduates, while the remaining proportion
are first or second year students; 21% of them are or were enrolled in a science or business
course. Overall, 29% of the event participants have heard about the organization before,
mostly through news and ads. Men represent 22% of the sample, for a total of 630. At
baseline, men are less likely to access the organization website as compared to women:
on average, only 2% of men click on any link as compared to 9% of women.
TABLE 1.H.1: Experiment in universities: balance and summary statistics
Overall Joint test Pairwise tests
N mean sd F stat p-value min p value max diff
Male 2877 0.22 0.42 1.397 0.248 *0.095 0.032
Last year 2500 0.58 0.49 0.120 0.887 0.662 -0.011
Graduates 2500 0.10 0.30 0.298 0.742 0.453 0.011
First/second year 2500 0.32 0.47 0.067 0.935 0.739 -0.008
Science or business 2334 0.21 0.41 1.230 0.292 0.168 0.028
Heard about the job 2334 0.29 0.45 0.863 0.422 0.245 0.027
- on campus 1221 0.21 0.41 1.411 0.244 0.125 0.043
- in news/ads 1221 0.55 0.50 1.492 0.225 *0.091 -0.058
- from friends 1221 0.07 0.26 0.090 0.914 0.680 0.008
- online 1221 0.17 0.37 0.317 0.729 0.454 -0.020
Note. “Last year" and “First/second year" are indicator variables for the year of enrolment in university. “Sci-
ence or business" is an indicator for studying a scientific or economics/business subject. “Heard about the job"
is equal to one if the person heard of the organization before attending the event. Columns 4 and 5 report the
F-statistic and p-value from a joint test of the significance of the set of treatment dummies in explaining each
row variable with robust standard errors. The last two Columns report the minimum p-value and maximum
difference from t-tests between pairs of treatment groups.
Results indicate that men are more likely to access the organization’s website as com-
pared to the control group across all events. The number of clicks almost doubles (Figure
1.H.2). Despite this first stage, behaviour does not translate into more applications. Ta-
ble 1.H.2 estimates the effect of each of the treatment emails on application for people of
119To be trackable, unique links at the university-event-gender-treatment level were created before the
randomization by adding an alpha numeric snippet to the website url.
120Mean participation covers substantial variation between event types: stands at career fairs had an av-
erage number of attendees around 44 compared to an average of 16 for presentations and panel events.
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gender group g, event e and university u using the following specification:
ygeu = c + β1MPicgeu + β2WPicgeu + X′euβ3 + δu + egeu
The regression includes university fixed effects δu and the vector of event controls Xeu
(type of event, month, number of participants, gender of RO). I use robust standard errors
as the randomization was at the individual level and add analytical weights by treatment
group size. Table 1.H.2 shows that the treatment per sé doesn’t increase applications,
which reinforces the external validity of the null effect of the male photograph.
FIGURE 1.H.2: Experiment in universities: results
Note: The bar chart shows the proportion of clicks by new users in the different treatment
groups of the experiment.
TABLE 1.H.2: Experiment in universities: effects on applications
DV: Event participant registered to apply
(1) (2)
VARIABLES M W
Women’s Pic -0.046 0.017
(0.038) (0.028)
Men’s Pic 0.008 0.007
(0.054) (0.029)
Scientific Subject -0.075** -0.107***
(0.029) (0.024)
Observations 337 1,259
R-squared 0.148 0.109
Mean Dep Var 0.082 0.17
Clustered standard errors in parentheses (uni level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS regressions for men and women separately. The dependent variable is equal to one of the
participant filled-in the online registration form necessary to apply for the job. The omitted category is
the group receiving emails with no workers’ photographs. “Women’s Pic" and “Men’s Pic" are indicator
variables for the two experimental treatments. The regression includes university fixed effects and event
controls Xeu for event type, month, number of participants and gender of RO. I add analytical weights by
treatment group size. The table limits the sample to last year students or graduates.
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1.I An additional exercise on overconfidence
In this section I further explore whether the effect of the information treatment can be
explained by overconfidence and potentially gender differences in it. I use the survey
questions defined at the end of Section 1.C.2 to construct a proxy of individual over-
precision in their priors on men and women’s performance in female jobs. I select the
most important observable predictors of this measure using Lasso regression and im-
pute the coefficients to my experimental sample. This provides a measure of “predicted
confidence" (overprecision) in others’ performance in social work and teaching.
Table 1.I.1 shows the treatment effect on men’s application likelihood depending on
their predicted confidence. The increase in application rates is driven by men with over-
precision below the median. As long as this is correlated with a higher likelihood of
under-placement of own ability with respect to others, it suggests that the effects are
actually driven by the least confident men.121 Moore and Healy (2008) show that lack
of precision on beliefs about others is positively correlated with overplacement in easy
tasks, but also positively correlated with under-placement in hard tasks. In other words,
unprecise estimates of others’ performance increase people’s tendency to under-place
one’s own performance in hard tasks. This seems the relevant case in my context. Re-
peating the same exercise on women shows that information of high returns to ability dis-
courages applications by women with below median confidence in men’s performance
in female-dominated jobs. This seems consistent with priors’ precision being correlated
with lower confidence also in own ability.122
TABLE 1.I.1: Treatment effects by predicted priors’ uncertainty
DV: Applied and never DO = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Confidence in women’s ability Confidence in men’s ability
< med > med < med > med
High exp. returns 0.108** 0.041 0.137*** 0.017
(0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.051)
Observations 394 398 386 406
R-squared 0.024 0.016 0.025 0.014
Mean Dep Var 0.53 0.56 0.48 0.62
Bootstrapped se in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS estimates for men only. Columns (1) and (2) split the sample at the median level of predicted
confidence in priors about women’s performance in social work and primary school teaching. Columns (3)
and (4) do the same for priors about men. The variables used to predict confidence are age, whether the
person studied in a top university, non-white ethnicity, whether the person studied a subject aligned with the
job, exposure to occupational gender segregation and gender. The omitted category is the group that received
information of low expected returns to ability.
121This table is also consistent with the hypothesis that information provision benefits the most men who
start off with greater uncertainty about returns in female-dominated jobs.
122The negative impact of the male photograph on women’s applications is identical across levels of pre-
dicted confidence in both men’s and women’s performance.
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2 Rule of Law and Female
Entrepreneurship
2.1 Introduction
When rule of law is weak, asymmetries of social power and physical strength stymie the
trust and trade that make cities productive. The shadow of violence looms behind aggres-
sive bargaining in many negotiations, and violence is disproportionately male (Wilson
and Herrnstein, 1985). Consequently, women may avoid transacting with men unless
they have the protection of courts and civil society. Around the world, women report
trusting others significantly less than men do, particularly in developing countries with
weaker legal institutions.1
In this paper, we ask whether limitations on the rule of law can explain why en-
trepreneurship remains a male-dominated activity in many countries and why female
entrepreneurs often cluster in industries filled with other women (OECD, 2012; Fairlie
et al., 2017; Singer et al., 2018; Campos et al., 2019).2 Clustering in industries, such as
apparel and food production, that contain female collaborators and customers, allows
female entrepreneurs to avoid interactions with men who may have a power advantage
in both legal and illegal conflict. This segregation may explain why women appear to
receive lower benefits from loans (de Mel et al., 2008, 2009) and business training (de Mel
et al, 2014; Bergeet al., 2015).3
In Section II of this paper, we present a model that extends Behrer, Glaeser, Ponzetto
and Shleifer’s (2019) result that when courts can be subverted, the strong trade only with
the strong and the weak trade only with the weak. In our model, women choose whether
to become entrepreneurs and whether to partner with men. The model embeds two as-
pects of inter-gender trading relationships. When courts are weak and facts are unclear,
then adjudicators favour the powerful and men are more likely to have power. Even
1A large literature documents a strong association between trust and economic growth (Knack and
Keefer 1997; Guiso et al., 2006; Algan and Cahuc, 2010). Trust is lower in developing countries, where
rule of law is weak. Trust is particularly low among women in weak rule-of-law countries, including Zam-
bia. For example, in Africa and South America, typically between ten and fifteen percent of responds say
that most people can be trusted, but that number falls on average by 6 percent among women (WVS). Trust
has also been shown to be especially low among the poor (Bachas et al., 2017).
2Worldwide the proportion of female ownership is below 50 percent and in half of the countries the
female proportion is below 20 percent (see Section III).
3At the same time, it seems consistent with recent evidence that women might benefit more than men
on training in non-cognitive skills (Attanasio et al., 2011; Acevedo et al., 2018).
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when courts are strong, if social norms favour male aggression, then men can extract a
greater share of the rents from bilateral commercial transactions.
For some parameter values, men actually prefer weak institutions that reduce overall
social surplus, because those institutions increase the male share of profits. For other
parameter values, male bargaining power and legal strength becomes a liability for men
as well as women, because women refuse to partner with men. Rule of law increases
the returns to female entrepreneurship, because anarchy privileges male aggression and
violence. The model predicts that female entrepreneurs will earn less and segregate into
predominantly female industries, unless institutions are strong and social norms favour
gender equity.
We test the implications of this model both with cross-national data and by focusing
on female entrepreneurs in Zambia. In Section III, we used the World Bank Enterprise
Survey, the World Justice Project, and the World Values Survey to test the predictions of
our model. We document that female entrepreneurship is rare in most countries, and
especially in those places where rule of law is weak. The World Justice Project data in-
dicates that courts particularly discriminate against women in many countries and that
rule of law is more strongly correlated with female entrepreneurship when courts are
deemed, by the World Justice Project, to be less discriminatory towards women.
We measure gender norms against women with long-standing discriminatory prac-
tices within families and limited protection of female physical integrity. Female en-
trepreneurship is rarer when these measures are high. As the model predicts, female
entrepreneurship is more common in societies that have both rule of law and gender
norms that favour women.
We also document that female entrepreneurs segregate into industries, such as hos-
pitality, food and apparel, where they cooperate primarily with other women. The self-
selection of female entrepreneurs into less profitable activities is pervasive in developing
world cities (Klapper and Parker, 2011; Campos et al., 2019). Again, as the model pre-
dicts, we find that there is more female entry into male dominated industries in countries
with better rule of law, less discrimination against women and especially in countries
that have both.
In Section IV, we turn to our Census of Entrepreneurs in Lusaka, Zambia. Zambia is
a country with both weak rule of law and discriminatory gender norms.4
We collect geocoded data on more than 2000 firms, which represents sixty percent of
all the manufacturers in Lusaka. Interviews suggest that economies of scale can generate
large returns to collaboration for these entrepreneurs. In our sample, twenty-seven per-
cent of the entrepreneurs in manufacturing are women, and women earn slightly more
than one-half of male earnings. In Lusaka, three-fourths of female entrepreneurs make
4According to the World Justice Project (link), Zambian rule of law is neither particularly good nor
particularly bad for sub-Saharan Africa. The country’s score on the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law
Index in below Ghana and South Africa, but above Zimbabwe and Nigeria, and is about the same as Russia
and Mexico.
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apparel and eighteen percent make food. Between one-half and three-fourths of the gen-
der earnings gap for Lusaka entrepreneurs can be explained, in an accounting sense, by
the massing of female entrepreneurs into two industries that are neither capital nor trust
intensive. While many factors contribute to the segregation of women in these industries,
our qualitative work shows that Lusaka’s female entrepreneurs themselves emphasized
the difficulties of trusting men.5
In Section V, we present our survey measures of trusting behaviour, such as work-
ing collaboratively to fill an order or jointly buying inputs or even giving advice. As the
model predicts, women are less likely to take actions that require trust. Perhaps most
strikingly, we find that women are much less likely to learn their trade from incumbent
workers. Instead, they turn more often to formal educational institutions. Alfred Mar-
shall (1890) emphasized that in dense clusters, “the mysteries of the trade become no
mystery but are, as it were, in the air," but it seems as if female entrepreneurs cannot
access these human capital spillovers in Lusaka, partially because they cannot trust the
men that surround them.
We then test whether Lusaka’s female entrepreneurs trust more when rule of law is
stronger. We focus on the two major local institutions that adjudicate commercial dis-
putes: Market Chiefs and Small Claims Courts (SCC). The Small Claims Court is a new
institution that enables individuals with small lawsuits to bypass Zambia’s overloaded
and cumbersome court system. We measure institutional strength by proximity to the
Small Claims Court and location within a market that is adjudicated by a chief.
Female-led businesses located inside a formal market or closer to the Small Claims
Court (SCC) cooperate more, even controlling for business density, industry and other
area and business characteristics. Locating within a market is also correlated with higher
sales for female-led businesses. While locating within a market is an endogenous deci-
sion, the Small Claims Court was established more recently and proximity to a court is
less salient than membership in a market. Proximity to the Small Claims Court results
may therefore provide a more plausible estimate of the causal impact of institutions on
the gender gap in entrepreneurial cooperation.
To address this endogeneity issue in Section 5, we present our population of en-
trepreneurs with an adapted version of the trust game (Berg et al, 1995), framed as an
opportunity to invest in another person’s business. We randomize pairs of players into
three groups: a control group that received no access to institutions, a treatment group
that had access to the Small Claims Court, and a second treatment group that had ac-
cess to the market chief. As the overwhelming majority of our respondent had either not
heard of the small claims court or thought that it was not useful for people like them, we
focus on the results with the market chiefs.
5Zambia’s female entrepreneurs both say that they trust others less, and indeed are less trusting in stan-
dard laboratory measures.
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In the control group, the game replicates our survey results and echoes the model.
We find a significant gender gap in both trust and trustworthiness: women send fewer
tokens and return fewer token than men in our game. Sending money in the trust game
is significantly positively correlated with our actual measures of cooperation by the par-
ticipants in their real lives.
In the game, we test whether rule of law has a disproportionate impact on women
by introducing a form of adjudication modelled on actual Zambian institutions. We al-
low some subjects to access a market chief, ensuring an anonymous, and therefore un-
biased judgement. Randomizing access to this unbiased known institution significantly
increases women’s trusting behaviour, increasing the surplus for both parties and earn-
ings for both women and men.
Section 2 presents our model. Section 3 uses international data to test the implica-
tions of our model and particularly the complementarity between rule of law and female
bargaining power. Section 4 describes our Zambian empirical setting and data. Sec-
tion 5 presents correlational evidence on the relationship between institutions, trusting
behaviour and the gender gap in entrepreneurship among small- scale entrepreneurs.
Section 6 presents the lab-in-the- field evidence on the impact of rule of law on trust and
business outcomes. Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Gender bias, contract enforcement and female entrepreneur-
ship
We now present a model where female entrepreneurs first choose whether or not to enter
into an industry, and then potentially to partner with men and produce. As in Behrer
et al. (2019), weak legal institutions intrinsically favour the socially powerful who are
able to pressure courts and judges when facts are unclear. The weak anticipate the courts
behaviour and consequently avoid dealing with the strong. If men have a comparative
advantage in coercing weak institutions, then women will not contract with men in weak
institutional environments, and they may avoid male-dominated industries altogether.
Stronger rule of law does enable women to better enforce contracts against men, but
even when rule of law is perfect, male bargaining power may still limit the returns to
female entrepreneurship.
In stage 0, a potential female entrepreneur “E” has the option to pay a fixed cost and
enter industry i, where the share of male incumbents equals mi. This fixed cost is paid at
time 0 and is immaterial to subsequent bargaining.
In stage 1, E is offered a business opportunity to make and sell a product of value pi.
E is also matched with a randomly chosen potential partner “P”. Neither E nor P can
make the product on their own at a cost less than pi. If the parties do not partner, the
opportunity disappears and there are no further payoffs to either player. If the parties do
partner, they create a contract that specifies a share of pi, denoted “s” that will be given
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to P if the contract is not breached. By assumption, courts will only enforce contracts in
which s lies between zero and one, because the court’s power is limited to splitting the
profits.
In stage 2, P chooses to work or shirk. P can fulfill the contract and pay a cost of
q < .5pi for effort and materials. He can breach the contract and pay only q− b, and we
assume that .5pi > b− q. This breach might take the form of P doing shoddy work that
must be fixed by E, or not working at all (in which case b = q), or of P stealing E’s inputs
(in which case b may be greater than q). E also pays a cost of q and works during this
period.6
In stage 3, E learns whether P breached or fulfilled the contract. If P fulfilled the
contract then no further work is needed. If P breached the contract, then E must pay a
remediation cost of b+∆. The value of b and ∆ are both known at the time of the contract
and ∆ > 0. If E remediates the harm, then she receives a payment of pi, and chooses how
much to pay P out of that sum. We assume that 2q + ∆ > pi > b + ∆, so that E will
remediate if work has begun, but that a partnership will not generate a positive social
surplus if shirking always occurs.
In stage 4, either P or E can sue the other in a court. As in Behrer et al. (2019), the rule
of law depends on the relative power of the litigants and the obviousness of the facts.
Courts always enforce indisputable facts, but when facts are disputable courts favour the
more powerful. We assume that courts pay a penalty for ignoring indisputable facts, such
as external embarrassment or judicial review, but ignoring disputable facts is costless.
The share of profits specified by the contract is always indisputable, but P’s shirking is
disputable with probability δ. We interpret the variable δ as capturing both elements of
this particular transaction and the institutional quality of the courts and society. When
institutions are stronger, a wider range of facts will be indisputable. We assume that P
learns whether his shirking will be disputable at the beginning of stage 2, and that E
learns whether the shirking is disputable at the beginning of stage 3. We do not allow
renegotiation at any point after stage 1.
If both litigants are women, then they are equally powerful and the contract will be
enforced fairly even if the facts are disputable. The court will force E to pay P the stipu-
lated share, but will subtract damages of b+∆ from the payment to cover the damages if
shirking has occurred. The court cannot force a payment from P to E, as we assume that
the court’s power is limited to reallocating the surplus. If P is male, then the contract will
be enforced fairly if shirking is an indisputable fact. If shirking is disputable, then court
will assign no damages and force E to pay P the contractually stipulated payment.
This legal bias is one source of inequality between men and women. The second bias
occurs at the point of bargaining in stage 1. If P is female, then the two agents split the
total expected surplus equally. If the partner is male, then he receives a share β of the
surplus, where β is determined by social norms about gender and male violence Male
6It is never optimal for E to shirk as she is the residual claimant of the product.
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bargaining power can be micro-founded by assuming that men and women alternate
making offers, and when a male offer is rebuffed, the man may harm the women in some
way.
When P is female, then a partnership occurs, there is no shirking and both agents
receive .5pi − q. Since courts will enforce contracts fairly when both parties have equal
power even when facts are disputable, P knows that she will receive no payment if she
shirks. Not shirking is incentive compatible as long as spi > b. If this constraint is satis-
fied, then the total surplus is pi − 2q. The assumption of equal bargaining power implies
that both partners receive one half of this amount, which implies that s = .5, and since
.5pi > b− q, the incentive compatibility constraint holds.
When P is male, then he will always shirk when there is an opportunity for disputable
shirking. Men will not shirk when shirking is indisputable as long as spi > b, and that
generates an incentive compatibility constraint. Proposition 1 describes the returns to
partnering with men (all propositions are proven in the Appendix):
Proposition 1. Proposition 1: If (pi−2q)∆ <
q
b − 1, then there is no contract if (pi−2q)∆ < δ.
If (pi−2q)∆ > δ, the contract specifies s = β − (2β−1)q+βδ∆+δbpi and provides expected welfare of
β(pi− 2q− δ∆) to P and (1− β)(pi− 2q− δ∆) to E. If (pi−2q)∆ > qb − 1, then there is no contract
if (pi−q−b)∆+b < δ. If
(pi−q−b)
∆+b > δ >
β(pi−2q)+q−b)
β∆+b , then the contract specifies s =
β
pi , providing
expected welfare of (1+ δ)b− q to P and pi − q− (1+ δ)b− δ∆ to E. If δ < β(pi−2q)+q−b)β∆+b , the
contract specifies s = β− (2β−1)q+βδ∆+δbpi , providing expected welfare of β(pi − 2q− δ∆) to P
and(1− β)(pi − 2q− δ∆) to E.
The proposition describes two cases that depend on whether (pi−2q)∆ is greater or less
than qb − 1. In both cases, when δ is sufficiently high, either because courts are sufficiently
weak or because shirking is intrinsically disputable, then no contract will occur. In both
cases, when δ is sufficiently low, then a contract splits the surplus based on the bargain-
ing power of men. In this region, female returns to the partnership are rising with overall
profits (pi), and falling with costs of production (q), costs of remediation (∆), male bar-
gaining power (β) and the weakness of the court system (δ). Female entrepreneurship
may need both a relatively egalitarian society and strong legal institutions to thrive in
male dominated industries.
When (pi−2q)∆ >
q
b − 1, and either the returns to partnership or the benefits of cheating
are high, then there is also a third possibility. The female entrepreneur may effectively
pay her male partner an efficiency wage to stop him from shirking when facts are indis-
putable. This possibility occurs for intermediate values of δ, and in that case, the returns
to female partnership with a male equal pi− q− (1+ δ)b− δ∆, which is rising with over-
all profits (pi), and falling with costs of production (q), costs of remediation (∆), and the
weakness of the court system (δ).
In this region, male returns are increasing with the weakness of the courts (δ) even
though that weakness decreases the overall surplus from the partnership. This perverse
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comparative static suggests that dominant groups, like men, may actually sometimes
prefer weak institutions because that weakness ensures that they will receive a larger
share of the surplus, despite the fact that institutional weakness diminishes the overall
surplus.
The male returns drop discontinuously from (1+ δ)b− q to zero at the point where δ
exceeds (pi−q−b)∆+b . At that point, female returns hit zero, and women decide not to partner
with men at all. Male strength becomes a disadvantage because women shun them. This
result may help explain why African-American men struggle more than women in the
labour market, if a legacy of prejudice means that customers and co-workers are more
afraid of African-American men than women.
Male strength may also hurt men if women do not enter the industry at all, and we
turn to that margin now. We assume that the fixed cost of entry equals θ times .5pi − q,
the highest returns from entrepreneurship, where θ < 1. This value of 1− θ captures the
effective “profit” margin associated with entrepreneurship.
Proposition 2. If δ > Max[pi−2q∆ ,
pi−q−b
∆+b ] then women do not partner with men, and enter if and
only if 1− θ > mi. If δ < Min[pi−2q∆ , β(pi−2q)+q−bβ∆+b ], then women always enter if 1− θ2(1−β) >
δ∆
pi−2q , but if 1− θ2(1−β) < δ∆pi−2q , women enter if and only if mi < m∗ = (pi−2q)(1−θ)(pi−2q)(2β−1)+2(1−β)δ∆ ,
where m∗ is rising with pi, falling with q, θ, δ,∆ and β.
Proposition 2 highlights that male bargaining power or weak institutions can both
lead women to avoid any male-dominated fields. If δ > Max[pi−2q∆ ,
pi−q−b
∆+b ], then if
women enter they will not trade with men. Consequently, their effective profit mar-
gin 1− θ must be high enough to cover the probability that they may earn nothing. If
1− θ is small and institutions are weak, then women will only enter fields that are almost
exclusively female.
When institutions are strong enough so that women will trade with men, then female
entry can still be limited by male bargaining power. If δ < Min[pi−2q∆ ,
β(pi−2q)+q−b
β∆+b ], then
women and men split the surplus. Even in this case, if β is high, women will not enter
fields with significant numbers of men, even if rule of law is perfect. If there is either a
lack of female bargaining power or weak rule of law, then women will only enter fields
where potential female partners are abundant.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the proposition’s implication that female entrepreneurship can
be limited by either weak rule or law or by biased gender norms. The two lines both
capture the maximum share of men in an industry that women will enter. The bottom
line shows the case where rule of law is weak and δ is high enough so that women will
not partner with men. In that case, the maximum share is 1− θ which we assume to be
.1. The top line is decreasing with β and it shows the case where δ is low enough so that
women will partner with men, and δ∆pi−2q is assumed to be .2. The threshold for entry is
reasonably high when δ and β is low, but if either δ or β are high, then women will not
enter into male-dominated fields.
Chapter 2. Rule of Law and Female Entrepreneurship 119
The Appendix also details the entry condition when pi−2q∆ >
q
b − 1 and pi−q−b∆+b > δ >
β(pi−2q)+q−b
β∆+b , so that women must effectively pay men efficiency wages to stop them from
breaching the contract even when breach is indisputable. The results are quite similar,
except that the threshold for female entry falls with the benefit from breach (b) since that
determines the efficiency wage, and is independent of male bargaining power.
In the empirical work that follows, we test whether the existence and success of female
entrepreneurship depends on rule of law, less biased social norms or both.
2.3 Cross-national evidence of female entrepreneurship and rule
of law
In this section, we first document three stylized facts about female entrepreneurs globally:
the rate of female entrepreneurship is often shockingly low, female entrepreneurs appear
to earn less than male entrepreneurs and are strongly segregated into a small number of
industries. Second, we introduce our measures of legal weakness and social bias against
women. Third, we test our model’s prediction that female entrepreneurship, and female
entrepreneurship in male dominated fields, depends on both rule of law and limited
social bias, and particularly on the co-existence of both.
2.3.1 Three stylized facts about female entrepreneurship worldwide
The relative paucity of female entrepreneurs is a well-known fact in the developed world.
In the U.K., France, Germany and U.S., more than two men select into entrepreneurship
for every nascent female entrepreneur according to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
(GEM) and the Kauffman Foundation (Singer et al., 2018; Fairlie et al., 2017).7 Gender
gaps in entrepreneurship as large are also found in the developing world, but things are
more heterogeneous and depend on the sector as well as geographical region. In 2016
the female-to-male ratio in entrepreneurial activity was around 0.7 in South Africa, 0.8
in Botswana and Burkina Faso and only around 0.4 in Tunisia or Egypt according to the
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (Kelley et al., 2017). The gender gap persists over the
7The GEM survey is collected across countries and, for each country, at least 2000 adult en-
trepreneurs/business managers are surveyed. The total number of surveyed people depends on "the pop-
ulation and the economic diversity of each country” and is supposed to be conducted on a representative
national sample of adults. It interviews nascent and established entrepreneurs in urban/rural areas and
excludes people who are considered to be out of the labour market (e.g., retirees). The method by which
they identify participants is dictated by the percentage coverage of the landline telephone network. Where
landline coverage is greater than 85 percent of all households, then the National Teams use a landline-based
survey outreach to generate a suitable list of participants to contact. For those countries where landline
telephone coverage is not as wide-spread, face-to-face interview techniques and/or mobile phones are used.
Specific information can be found here https://www.gemconsortium.org/wiki/1157.
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life-cycle of the firm and is as large for long-established firms, if not larger (Kelley et al.,
2017).8
We replicate these results using the 2006 to 2016 waves of the World Bank Enterprise
Survey. We limit our sample to businesses which are sole proprietorship or partnerships,
and define female entrepreneurship as the share of firms that have a (weak) majority of
female owners.9 Figure 2.2 shows that Romania and Moldova are the only two countries
in the sample with a clear majority of firms in the sample led by women (with a sample
size of only 14 and 42 firms respectively). In the more than one-half of the countries,
fewer than one-in-five enterprises have a majority female ownership.10 Not only is the
global level of female entrepreneurship low, the rates of female entrepreneurship appear
to differ significantly across countries.
The gender gap in entrepreneurship can be associated with either decreased returns
to female entrepreneurship or higher opportunity costs of women’s time, perhaps be-
cause of productivity in home production. If the gender gap reflected opportunity cost of
time, then the returns to entrepreneurship should be higher for women, but that does not
appear to be the case. The World Bank Enterprise Survey provides more reliable mea-
sures of revenues than profits, so we focus on the revenue differences between female
and male led firms. Across the entire sample, male firms average 0.6 log points higher
sales than female led firms (a reduction in the geometric mean of sales by 55 percent).
Female entrepreneurs may earn less because they specialize in industries with lower
returns or because there are more female entrepreneurs in poorer countries. In Figure
2.3, we show the distribution of earnings controlling for both industry (ISIC 3.1 code)
and country.11 The overall sales gender gap is 0.3 log points controlling for industry
and nation (a reduction in the geometric mean of sales by 36 percent). A Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test rejects the equality of these two distributions at the 99 percent level, and as
the figure shows, the distributions differ especially in their right-tail. Women seem to hit
a cash ceiling to their earnings.
Perhaps the most surprising fact about female entrepreneurship is that it is so concen-
trated in a small number of industries. The three industries with the greatest proportion
of female managers across countries are retail trade (ISIC 3.1 code 52), manufacturers of
food products and beverages (ISIC code 3.1 code 15) and hotels and restaurants (ISIC
8The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor classifies entrepreneurs in two broad categories: nascent en-
trepreneurs and owner-managers. A nascent entrepreneurs is someone who is involved in setting up a
business. This means that the entrepreneur has been active in the past 12 months and has not paid wages in
the last three month. Owner-managers are those entrepreneurs who have been working for longer and are
also divided into two subcategories: owner-manager of a new firm, and owner-manager of an established
firm. The former has started paying wages at most 3.5 years ago, whereas the latter has been paying wages
for more than 3.5 years.
9We exclude 5 percent of countries with less than 10 observations in this sample.
10The distribution looks very similar considering female-led businesses as firms with at least a female
owner.
11The industry fixed effects are based on the ISIC Code 3.1. This is based on the question “In the last com-
plete fiscal year, what were this establishment’s two main products (represented by the largest proportion of
annual sales)?”.
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code 3.1 code 55). While female owners only own thirteen percent of all manufacturing
firms in our global sample, they own twenty percent of enterprises in food and apparel
production. The cross-country average of the Herfindahl industrial concentration index
is 0.19 for female-led businesses, which is significantly greater than the 0.11 average HH
for male-led businesses (p=0).12
The industries chosen by women not only have a greater proportion of peers of the
same gender, but they also have more female customers and employees. For instance,
female-led firms employ more women in both production and non-production roles than
male-led firms. On average, forty-eight percent of the fulltime workforce in female-led
firms is made of women. This percentage is halved in male-led firms. Similarly, sixty
percent of female-owned firms have a female top-manager, as opposed to only six percent
of firms with a majority of male owners.
2.3.2 Measuring rule of law and gender norms
We now turn to our measures of gender norms and rule of law. We use two measures
of biased gender norms: the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) and the Global
Gender Gap Index (GGGI). The SIGI Index is created by the OECD Development Centre
and covers 180 countries. The World Economic Forum is responsible for the 144 country
Global Gender Gap Index.
The SIGI index constructs variables on four gender-related topics (discrimination in
the family, restricted physical integrity, restricted access to productive and financial re-
sources, and restricted civil liberties) based on qualitative and quantitative data on dis-
criminatory social institutions. SIGI relies on legal experts, government representatives,
and SIGI National focal points, but not individual-level surveys. We focus on the SIGI
index of discrimination in the family, which is based on laws on child marriage, house-
hold responsibilities, inheritance, and divorce. We also look at the SIGI Physical Integrity
Index, which includes laws on violence against women and reproductive autonomy, atti-
tudes towards and prevalence of female genital mutilation (FGM) and domestic violence,
missing women, and access to family planning.13
These measures should not directly relate to commercial contracts signed by women,
but they should capture social norms towards women and the social acceptability of male
violence against women, which are conceptually closest to our male bargaining power
variable: β. These measures are particularly removed from the commercial and public
spheres, and strongly correlated with long-standing cultural practices. We supplement
these measures with the proportion of respondents in a country in the World Values Sur-
vey who agree with the statement “it is justifiable for a man to beat his wife" as an added
measure of gender norms about violence.
12For each country, the HHI is computed as the sum over industries of squared shares of women (or men)
entrepreneurs.
13More information on the SIGI can be found here: https://www.genderindex.org/.
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The GGGI index measures the progress of countries towards gender parity across
four themes: Economic Participation and Opportunity, Educational Attainment, Health
and Survival, and Political Empowerment. We focus on the Educational Attainment in-
dex, which is the weighted average of four variables (all in ratios): female/male liter-
ary, female/male net primary enrolment, female/male net secondary enrolment, and
female/male gross tertiary enrolment. Again, our hope is that these variables capture
gender norms, but do not directly relate to the enforcement of contracts signed female
entrepreneurs. The four variables come from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics.14
For rule of law, we use data from the World Justice Project (WJP) and the World Bank’s
Governance Indicators.15 We use the World Bank’s rule of law index, which captures
“perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police,
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann et al., 2010).
We use the rank decile for each country. This measure should capture the extent to which
courts will enforce binding contracts signed by men and women, which is captured by
our variable δ.
To measure legal bias against women, we use the World Justice Project’s survey of
qualified respondents. This survey asks legal experts throughout the world to assess
the quality of the judicial system. One question asks “In your opinion, how likely are
the following criteria to put a person at a disadvantage before a civil or commercial trial
court?” where one of the “criteria” is being female. The World Justice Project produces
this measure as a score on a zero to one scale, where one represents less bias in the judicial
system. We also use the overall score of the World Justice Project’s survey of qualified
respondents on equal treatment of the genders by all legal institutions.16 The correlation
between this measure of bias against women and the World Bank’s measure of contract
enforcement is .73, suggesting that when overall rule of law is weaker, courts show more
bias against women, just as the model suggests.
2.3.3 Female entrepreneurship, gender norms and rule of law
We now turn to the relationship between gender norms, rule of law and female en-
trepreneurship. Figure 2.4 shows the cross-country relationship between female own-
ership, on the vertical axis, and the SIGI family discrimination measure. The correlation
14The weights are calculated by dividing 0.01 by the standard deviation for each indicator. More infor-
mation on the GGGI can be found here: https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-gender-gap-report-
2017.
15The Worldwide Governance Indicators report on six measures of governance (voice and accountabil-
ity, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law,
and control of corruption) for over 200 countries since 1996. The six indicators are created by summa-
rizing data from 30 different sources, that report views of citizens, experts, and private and NGO sec-
tors. The questions from each data source used to construct the rule of law index can be found here:
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc.
16This overall score is an average of the scores on equality of genders in courts, hospitals, government
hiring and police.
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coefficient is -0.62, which is significant at the one-percent level. The fitted line suggests
that as a country improves from the 90th percentile in this variable (0.81) to the 10th
percentile (0.22), the predicted level of female entrepreneurship increases from 7 to 25
percent. Social attitudes towards women are at least strongly correlated with low levels
of female entrepreneurship.
Female entrepreneurship is also correlated with variables that measure modern, com-
mercial institutions. The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators measure the
quality of contract enforcement at the national level for most of the countries in the
World Bank Enterprise Survey. This measure should capture the extent to which men
and women are able to sign binding agreements that enable them to work together.
Figure 2.5 shows the correlation between the World Bank index of quality of contract
enforcement and the rate of female entrepreneurship across countries. The correlation co-
efficient is 0.32, and the relationship is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The
fitted values suggest that as a country moves from the 10th percentile rank in the qual-
ity of contract enforcement to the 90th percentile, the share of female entrepreneurship
increases from 13 to 30 percent.
Table 2.C.1 shows that the univariate relationships between female entrepreneurship
and our other measures of gender norms and rule of law. The violence related SIGI Index
(termed the “physical integrity index”) has a -.5 correlation with female entrepreneurship
and a t-statistic of 3.8 in a bivariate regression with country level income.
The World Bank Global Indicators measure has a correlation of .32 and a t-statistic
of 1.94 in a bivariate regression. The World Justice Project measure of court bias against
women in a commercial or civil court has a correlation coefficient of .35 with the en-
trepreneurship measure and a t-statistic of 1.9 in the bivariate regression.
We now look at the complementarity between female bargaining power and fair and
effective political institutions that was predicted by our model. Our hypothesis is that
women will only enter into economic interactions with men, and most entrepreneurship
requires such interactions, when they are safe both from expropriation through male bar-
gaining power and from expropriation through the courts.
We continue to use the SIGI index of discrimination in the household, based on laws
on child marriage, household responsibilities and divorce. We also use the proportion of
respondents in a country in the World Values Survey who agree with the statement “it is
justifiable for a man to beat his wife".
For our measures of overall legal quality (δ), we return to the World Bank’s Gover-
nance Indicators measure of the quality of the rule of law at the national level years of
the World Bank Enterprise Survey. We also use the World Bank’s Doing Business Report
measure of the ease of contract enforcement, as an alternative measure of the accessibility
of the court system for contract disputes.
The first interaction that we examine is between rule of law and discrimination against
women in the family. Table 2.1 shows the basic interaction. Panel A shows that there is
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plenty of variation across countries in the patterns of rule of law and family discrimina-
tion. There are 47 countries in our sample with high rule of law and low discrimination
in the family, and 54 countries in our sample with low rule of law and high discrimi-
nation. There are also 58 countries which are off the diagonal, with either high rule of
law and high discrimination or low rule of law and low discrimination. Panel B shows
the female entrepreneurship patterns across the table. The entrepreneurship rate is 16
percent in the box with low rule of law and high discrimination, but moving to either
off-diagonal square increases the female entrepreneurship rate only modestly to 18 or 24
percent. Moving to the high rule of law, low discrimination panel effectively more than
doubles the female entrepreneurship rate to 36 percentage points.
Table 2.2 confirms this interaction in a regression setting. In regressions (1) and (2),
we look at the SIGI family discrimination figure. In regression (3) and (4), we use the
measure of violence against women. Regressions (2) and (4) add controls for per capita
income.
Regression (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) all show that Rule of law has little impact on female
entrepreneurship in countries where families discriminate against girls or where male
violence is acceptable. Regressions (1) and (2) show that where family discrimination is
low, female entrepreneurship is more common even when rule of law is low. We do not
find a similar independent effect of violence against women.
Our primary focus is on the interaction effects, which are positive in all four specifi-
cation, and significant in three of those specification. When rule of law is combined with
low levels of family discrimination or violence against women, then the impact on female
entrepreneurship is extremely large. Good legal institutions seem to increase female en-
trepreneurship only when they are merged with a culture that allows women to extract
rents from relationships with men.
Regressions (7) and (8) examine our second interaction that looks at the link between
rule of law and gender bias in the courts. In regression (7) of Table 2.2, we show the
impact of gender equality before the law in the World Justice Project, the World Bank
Rule of Law Figure and the interaction. Once again, the interaction is more powerful
than either variable on its own. Rule of law is actually negatively correlated with female
entrepreneurship, unless commercial courts are seen as being unbiased against women.
Regression (8) duplicates this result controlling for GDP.
Our model focused on the entry of women into male-dominated industries, and pre-
dicted that women would be willing to join female-dominated industries even when gen-
der norms are discriminatory or rule of law is weak. While we believe that this prediction
is supported by the segregation of women into a small number of industries, even these
industries are typically predominantly male. Consequently, our results on overall female
entrepreneurship can be interpreted as examining whether women enter into male dom-
inated fields.
Nonetheless, we now also ask whether these rule-of-law and gender bias variables
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also predict whether women enter into the industries that are much less likely to include
women worldwide. To do this, we recalculate female entrepreneurship rates only in
manufacturing, whose female proportion in the World Bank dataset is 13% against 17%
across industries. Regressions (3), (6) and (9) of Table 2.2 use the female entrepreneur-
ship rates in manufacturing as dependent variable. In regression (3), we look at the SIGI
family discrimination figure, the World Bank Rule of Law Figure and the interaction. In
regression (6), we use the measure of violence against women, the World Bank Rule of
Law Figure and the interaction. Regressions (9), we show the impact of gender equality
before the law in the World Justice Project, the World Bank Rule of Law Figure and the in-
teraction. Results are very similar between the aggregate and the manufacturing sample,
a fact consistent with our main hypothesis.
2.4 The Zambian context and the Census of manufacturers
In this section, we discuss the Zambian context and the Census of Manufacturers that is
the starting point for our work on female entrepreneurship in Lusaka. Zambia is a natural
setting to study weak institutions, gender discrimination and female entrepreneurship.
Zambia ranks 80th out of 136 countries in the SIGI index of discrimination within the
family and of 85th out of 109 countries in the SIGI index of physical integrity restrictions.
Sixty-eight percent World Values Survey respondents in Zambia say that it is justifiable
for men to beat their wives in some circumstances, which is the highest share in sub-
Saharan Africa.17 Just as in many Sub-Saharan African countries, entrepreneurship is a
particularly important activity for many households in urban Zambia. Despite weak rule
of law and gender discrimination, our Census still documents a sizable number of female
entrepreneurs.18
2.4.1 The Lusaka Census of manufacturers
Between May and September 2016, we collected the Lusaka Census of Urban Entrepreneurs
(“Census” from now on), which is a spatial mapping of all the firms in Lusaka. For each
establishment operating from a fixed location, across all industrial sectors, the Census in-
cludes geocoded location, industrial classification at the North-American Industry Clas-
sification System (NAICS) 4-digit level, number of employees and structural description
(e.g., standalone building, inside markets).19
17South Africa, Nigeria and Zimbabwe follow with 63, 54 and 51 percent respectively.
18In 2012, 40 percent of adults in Zambia were starting a new business according to the Global En-
trepreneurship Monitor (Xavier et al., 2012). Zambia has 1.02 million informal Micro, Small, and Medium
Enterprises (MSMEs)-one for every five members of Zambia’s total labour force (Shah, 2012).
19A business was considered to operate from a fixed location if 1) the business operated from a permanent
structure with concrete foundations, 2) the business maintained either stock or machinery on site overnight,
and 3) the permanent structure in question was not exclusively used for storage. Our analysis split Lusaka
into sub-regions called Census Supervisory Areas (CSAs), and our census covered all the businesses in 90
percent of all CSAs in Lusaka district. For security reasons, we excluded the 8 census statistical areas (CSA)
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These data describe the distribution, size and characteristics of economic activities
in a fast-urbanizing environment and supplements the Central Statistical Office’s 2012
Economic Census of the whole country. Our Lusaka Census includes a total of 48,163
establishments. As there were 16,063 businesses listed in Lusaka District in the 2012
Economic Census, our data suggests either 200 percent growth rate over 4 years or dif-
ferences in methodology or comprehensiveness. Our data includes far more small firms
than the 2012 Economic Census. Ninety percent of the firms in our Census have fewer
than 5 employees, six percent have been between 5 and 10 employees, and fewer than
one percent having 50 or more employees.20
Figure 2.6 shows the spatial distribution of businesses in the Census, which enables
us to construct measures of business density at a granular level.
Table 2.3 presents the distribution of businesses across industries at the NAICS 2-digit
level and the main characteristics associated with the businesses. The largest sectors
(by number of businesses) are retailing, accommodation and food industry, and other
services (the vast majority being hair dressers). Retailing firms also typically have fewer
employees.
We complemented the Census with a short survey of business owners with less than
20 employees belonging to manufacturing, mining, and construction, which we refer to
as the “Manufacturers Survey”. This survey had a total of 2,216 respondents, which ac-
counts for 58.3 percent of the total population in these sectors. The survey includes ques-
tions on business practices, sales and history, levels of trust, collaborative behaviour with
other businesses, and demographics.21We focus on manufacturing because it is tradition-
ally male, offers the possibility of exploiting economies of scale through partnerships and
has been a priority for the Zambian industrial and development strategy for decades.22
The manufacturers survey shows that Zambian manufacturing enterprises are smaller
than those in both neighbouring and developed countries (Hsieh and Klenow, 2010).
Women-led businesses represent twenty-six percent of the businesses in manufacturing,
construction and mining (N=3,723), which is unsurprising given that manufacturing is
often a male-dominated activity (Campos et al., 2014).23 Women’s firms have 0.38 fewer
full time employees and 0.7 fewer part time employees than male-led firms.
in the region surrounding Chibolya compound (Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula ward). We also excluded areas
of low population density in the following wards: Kabulonga, Lubwa, Lilayi, Munkolo, Mwebeshi, Kamu-
langa, Munali, Roma and Mpulungu.
20Data on the number of employees is not available for 17 percent of the firms, so these percentages are
about the 40,517 respondents to this question. In the 2012 Economic Census, the percentages were respec-
tively 71, 11 and 3 percent. Some larger businesses were unwilling to share their employee numbers with
our census takers. In total 84 percent of businesses disclosed their employment figures.
21If the owner was not available, the interview was conducted with the main manager.
22Recent research in Uganda and Ethiopia (Campos et al., 2014; Alibhai et al., 2016) show that women
could potentially have high returns in manufacturing, but both social norms and fixed set-up costs might be
barriers to female entry. We focus on a different source of gender gaps in our paper, in interaction with these
traditional explanations.
23But all in all, gender segregation is also apparent in highly developed economies, as shown in the
introduction. According to the Kauffman Index of Start-up Activity 59.4 percent of new entrepreneurs in the
U.S. were male in 2015 (Morelix et al., 2016).
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Women earn less than men. On average, women’s sales value in good weeks is
2,356 Kwacha (KW), as compared to 4,085KW for men, or 180 and 311 dollars in then
current exchange rates for women and men respectively (1 KW = 0.076 USD). In bad
weeks, women earn on average 599.9KW as compared to 1,313KW for men, or 45 and 100
dollars respectively. Figure 2.7 shows the kernel densities of logged-sales in good and
bad weeks by gender.24 The distributions are significantly different between men and
women and women earn less most of the times (p=0.00, Kolmogorov–Smirnov equality-
of-distributions test). Moreover, men have a higher variance in sales in good weeks than
women’s (p=0.00, variance ratio test), which is driven primarily by a thicker right-tail.
While the variance in sales during bad weeks is not different between genders (p=0.40,
variance ratio test), both the minimum and maximum value of sales are lower for women
than for men.
2.4.2 Gender, segregation and the earnings gap
Figure 2.8 shows that Lusakan women make different sectoral choices than men. Ninety-
three percent of women operate in apparel and food manufacturing, while women repre-
sent a minority in wood, metal manufacturing and printing. Women appear to select into
non-complex industries, despite having on average the same qualifications as men.25
In our survey of manufacturers, industry choice, not observable human capital, ex-
plains much of the gender gap in earnings. Male and female entrepreneurs have similar
levels of education, as shown in table 2.4. Women are more likely to have participated
in management or entrepreneurship training than men, as we discuss later, and the two
groups do not differ in terms of record keeping. The first two regressions in Table 2.5
show the raw gender gap and Columns (3) and (4) show that controlling for education
does not reduce the gender gap in sales. These results are unchanged when using or
including alternative proxies for skills, such as literacy, numeracy, social skills.26
Regressions (4) and (5) of Table 2.5 add controls for industry and regressions (6) and
(7) add household constraints, including marital status and work time. Selection into
24During piloting, we found that recalling exact sales digits or for periods longer than a week was chal-
lenging for most of the respondents. We thus asked the sales in the previous working day, the sales in a good
week and the sales in a bad week. If the person could not provide an exact number, we also asked for an
upper and lower bound. We then imputed the average of the bounds to the sales variables.
25We define non-complex industries as industries that have less than the mean number of skilled occupa-
tions associated with the corresponding NAICS 3 code, whereby the mean of number of skilled occupations
by NAICS code is computed using the Census data (following Minondo and Requena-Silvente, 2013). Our
index of complexity is correlated with owner’s education in the data.
26The definitions of these alternative proxies are as follows. For literacy, subjects were asked whether the
sentences “The light balloon floated in the bright sky” and “A comfortable pillow is soft and rocky” make
logical sense. For numeracy, subjects were presented with the following question: “Suppose you have K1,000
in a bank account with no bank fees. The bank pays interest of 10 percent each year. How much money will
you have after 2 years?” Subjects were then presented with a choice of either “Less than K1,200”, “K1,200
exactly”, or “More than K1,200”. For social skills, subjects stated how much they agreed, on a scale of 1-
5, with the statement “I know what other people are feeling just by looking at them”, as well as “Gaining
happiness requires taking it away from others” and questions on how often the subject talks with others
about social topics (e.g., sports) or personal topics (e.g., health).
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different industries explains between one-half and three-fourths of the gender gap in
sales and employment. The average level of sales and employees is the lowest in apparel
manufacturing - where most women operate - and the highest in food manufacturing.
The other sectors lie between these two. Controlling for sector, education, working time
and marital status makes the coefficient on the female dummy insignificant for the sales
gap in good weeks. This evidence is compatible with previous studies also finding that
women enjoy less profitability and lower sales growth even controlling for extensive ob-
servable characteristics (Klapper and Parker, 2011; Campos et al., 2014; Hardy and Kagy,
2018). Recent evidence by the World Bank similarly finds that one-quarter of the gender
gap in profits in the Democratic Republic of Congo can be explained by industry (Cam-
pos et al., 2019). As we have emphasized throughout this paper, one explanation for
female industrial segregation is that when gender bias is large and institutions are weak,
women cannot trust men.
2.4.3 Rule of law and legal institutions in Lusaka
Zambian rule of law is neither particularly good nor particularly bad for sub-Saharan
Africa, but it is in the bottom half of countries worldwide. The country’s score on the
World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index is below Ghana and South Africa, but above
Zimbabwe and Nigeria, and about the same as Russia and Mexico. Zambia’s overall
index of gender equality and gender equality in courts from the World Justice Project are
among the lowest in Africa.
Few entrepreneurs in our sample made any use of Zambia’s formal court system,
which are notoriously slow and cumbersome. Instead, many of them rely on local ad-
judicators, known as “Market Chiefs,” who exercise authority over transactions that oc-
cur within their own local market areas. There are approximately 80 formal markets in
Lusaka. These fall under two broad categories: council and cooperative.
Cooperation appears to be easier within the market, and somewhat surprisingly, rents
also appear to be lower, at least relative to space in well-travelled commercial thorough-
fares. The offsetting downside of markets is that they are sometimes harder for customers
to access and have shorter opening times.
The 30 council markets are regulated by Lusaka City Council and are led by a market
officer (henceforth referred to as a chief) who is appointed by the Council. The appointed
chief’s functions are guided by legislation and market unit guidelines. Many markets
also have a democratically elected chief, whose involvement in market affairs varies.
The cooperative markets usually have a market committee of 6-10 members, including a
democratically elected chair.
Figure 2.9 shows the spatial location of markets with squares. Markets generally have
their own system of rules. They set fines for prohibited behaviour, such as drinking or
insulting other marketeers on site, and rules of suspension for behaviour such as theft
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or disobedience of the market committee. Most importantly, the market chiefs resolve
disputes among marketeers and market customers.
One typical dispute was that a marketeer sold his plot within the market to two differ-
ent people, taking money from both. The marketeer did not have assets to seize, beyond
the plot, but the chief knew a lender had agreed to loan the marketeer some money. To
solve the dispute, the chief ensured this loan money was given to one of the buyers.
In another dispute, a customer complained that a marketeer had failed to fulfill his
promise to fix a television. The chief gave the marketeer a deadline of two days to meet
the customer’s request or pay a fine. As one chief said, “we want to handle disputes
internally and peacefully first,” and “only if this does not work do we go to the police.”
Markets are an essential part of Lusaka’s business environment: 30 percent of firms
across all industries in our Census and 59 percent (1324) of manufacturers are located in
formal markets.
To address the weaknesses of the formal court system, a Small Claims Court was
founded in 2008 by an act of Parliament and opened in 2009. No legal representation
is required, as the court is intended to hear minor cases, for example, relating to em-
ployment, borrowing and lending, insurance and fraud. The court only permits cases
involving amounts up to 20,000KW (around 1,962 USD), which represents 150 percent of
average sales in a good month.
To file a case with the Small Claims Court, a plaintiff must first produce a letter of
demand which opens the case and serves notice to the defendant. This letter of demand
brings with it a seal of the court and often by itself can be sufficient to recoup any con-
tested amount (at a cost of 5Kw, around 50 cents in USD). Many cases get settled between
the two parties at this initial stage. However, if the defendant refuses to pay the amount
stated in the letter of demand, a court hearing is scheduled where the defendant has an
opportunity to submit a written defense. Within a month of being served, the case is
heard and, depending on the outcome, the losing party has to pay according to a certain
schedule. If the plaintiff wins, the defendant has to pay back the money and also cover
the legal costs.
If the Small Claims Court makes a decision on a case and the defendant does not settle
the claim, a writ of execution is issued by the courts and bailiffs are engaged. The writ of
execution is put on the file together with a report from the bailiffs about the property they
seized, how much they realized at auction and whether the amount recovered covered
the full claim. The bailiffs are not allowed to seize personal items such as clothing and
the tools of trade of the individual. In practice, the plaintiff has to know the residence of
the defendant in order to give detailed directions to the bailiffs (a sketch map is usually
on file for these cases).27
27In cases where the amount realized from the seized property is not enough to cover the claim the court
will tell the plaintiff to keep a look out if the defendant buys new property and contact the bailiffs so that
they can seize the new property.
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The time frame to settle the claim is usually outlined in the judgement by the com-
missioner. Defendants can be asked to pay in instalments over a period of time or to pay
in 14 days; if they fail, bailiffs are engaged. In extreme cases where an individual is not
able to pay, the person can be imprisoned. This outcome is rare because the amounts the
court deals with are small and the defendant’s relatives usually pitch in to help prevent
the person being incarcerated.
The Small Claims Court currently has excess capacity, due to lack of awareness. In
our data, only 21% of respondents had heard of it, and of those, 56% did not believe they
had access. Market Chiefs are a far more common mechanism for resolving disputes.
Anecdotally, Senior Clerks at the Small Claims Court note that women sue mostly men,
especially their (former) employers. Figure 2.9 shows where the Small Claims Court is
located in our zoom-in of the Census Map.
2.5 Trust, gender and institutions in Zambia: observational evi-
dence
Partnerships in Lusaka resemble the world of incomplete contracts described by our
theory. Written contracts are used only in one out of five partnerships. Collaborations
are mostly triggered by time constraints (e.g., in fulfilling big orders), which limits en-
trepreneurs’ ability to search for partners. In seventy-five percent of cases, partnerships
form between entrepreneurs that are located close to each other. In this section, we first
examine whether female entrepreneurs are less trusting and form fewer partnerships
than their male counterparts. We then look at whether this gender gap is ameliorated
by physical proximity to the two local institutions: Market Chiefs and the Small Claims
Court.
2.5.1 Gender and trust
To examine whether women have a disadvantage in bargaining, we look at their trust lev-
els and interactions with other businesses. Throughout the paper, we use the following
survey measures of trust asked in the Manufacturers Survey and taken from the World
Values Survey (WVS) and General Social Survey (GSS):28
• Trust GSS: Do you think that most people can be trusted or you cannot be too care-
ful? (one-zero indicator variable)
• Trust Strangers: How much do you trust people you meet for the first time? (from
1 (not at all) to 4 (completely))
28We show validity checks of the survey measures of trust and trustworthiness using our experimental
data. We find that our survey measures of trust are correlated with experimental trust-worthiness, as shown
in previous research (Glaeser et al., 2000). Moreover, the survey cooperation measures are correlated with
the number of tokens sent by the investors.
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• Trust Neighbors: How much do you trust your neighbours? (from 1 (not at all) to 4
(completely))
• Trust in business: I am comfortable leaving my shop unattended during the day if
I need to do something for 30 minutes (5-points Likert scale) 29
These measures of trust can be interpreted in different, but related, ways. They can be
seen as the internal psychic cost of betrayal, or as the individual belief in others’ trust-
worthiness. That belief might reflect the reality that some people have a greater ability to
enforce trustworthy behaviour relaying on either low-cost tools such as social sanctions,
or high-cost tools, such as violence or courts. In the model, trustworthy behaviour re-
flects the existence of a high-cost enforcement tool (the court), but in reality, many forces
may shape individual’s answers to these questions. 30
We couple these general trust questions with questions about business behaviour that
involves trust, including the formation of business partnerships. We conducted extensive
piloting to identify the most common cooperative activities that small-scale manufactur-
ers engage in, across all industries. We then adapted the language used by our piloting
participants to create the following four questions:
• Sometimes two or more businesses participate in a common order from a client, or
one business subcontracts to other businesses part of an order. Have you ever done
this with another business like yours? (share order)
• Sometimes businesses make joint orders of materials from suppliers. Have you ever
done this with another business like yours? (joint buy)
• Sometimes businesses ask for advice (or give advice) to other firms doing their
same activity, for instance on topics like: the production process, the market con-
ditions, new technologies, business practices, suppliers. Have you ever done this
with another business like yours? (advice)
• Sometimes businesses borrow (or lend) machines, materials or other assets from
firms doing their same activity. Sometimes they hire (subcontract) employees who
come from other firms doing their same activity for a short period of time. Have
you ever done this with another business like yours? (lending)
In our analyses, we use both indicator variables that take on a value of one if an indi-
vidual ever engaged in a particular activity and also an index of cooperative behaviour
29The Trust Neighbors and Trust Strangers variables were converted into dummy variables by combining
low scores (1 and 2) and high scores (3 and 4). Low scores were given a value of 0, and high scores a value
of 1.
30This flexibility allows us to interpret individual trust as a proxy of individual investment in social
capital. As for any other form of capital, investing in social capital requires forming expectations on its
returns, which can be affected by several determinants such as other’s trustworthiness, risk aversion and
the ability to punish cheating (Glaeser et al, 2000; Ashraf et al, 2009; Butler et al, 2010).
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from their responses (averages of the four indicator variables).31We end this section by
also discussing our limited information on the transfer of knowledge across Lusakan en-
trepreneurs.
Panel A of Table 2.6 shows the mean differences in trust between men and women.
Women are less trusting across all three direct survey measures. Women are more likely
to disagree with the statement that they would be comfortable leaving their shop unat-
tended. Panel B of Table 2.6 shows that women are also less likely to engage in any of the
four cooperative behaviours that we measure.
Table 2.C.2 shows that low levels of trust are associated with lower frequency of co-
operation among entrepreneurs. These results support the view that the trust questions
are capturing something real about the trustworthiness of the environment. Table 2.C.3
shows that cooperative behaviour is also correlated with our three measures of sales.
While these correlations do not imply any causal relationship, they are compatible with
the view that entrepreneurial activity benefits from the ability to form partnerships with
others.
In the previous section, we documented that female entrepreneurs selected into less
profitable industries. Our model suggests that this self-selection occurs because women
choose industries with other women, because they are able to trust and partner with
those women, either as customers or collaborators.32 Figure 2.12 shows that women gen-
erally have fewer social interactions with other entrepreneurs in their industry, but that
tendency disappears in industries that are not male dominated. Women who work in the
disproportionately female industries have social interactions that are as frequent as men
in those industries.
Perhaps the most important form of cooperation occurs when one urbanite shares
knowledge with another. In these informal industries, many skills are often passed along
from one worker to another. Yet chains of knowledge also can require trust. In many
cases, a skilled worker who teaches a newcomer expects that student to serve as an ap-
prentice. For centuries, the relationship between mentor and apprentice has been open
to abuse. Apprentices, including Benjamin Franklin, run away to avoid promised ser-
vice. Mentors typically gain the power to punish their students either physically or by
harming their reputations, and that power also creates the potential for misuse, especially
between a man and a woman.
Figure 2.11 shows that male entrepreneurs are far more likely to have been taught
their trade by another entrepreneur or a family member. Female entrepreneurs are usu-
ally formally trained. Female entrepreneurs are also less likely to have taught others their
trade, but this result is not robust to other controls.
Table 2.7 shows these results using a linear probability model with controls for busi-
ness density and owner characteristics. Regression (1) shows that women are 19.1 percent
31Results are robust to alternative aggregations of these variables, such as a z-score.
32This latter explanation is in line with the results by Campos et al. (2014), who identify role model as
one of the most important reasons for women to select into industries.
Chapter 2. Rule of Law and Female Entrepreneurship 133
less likely to learn their trade from another owner. Regression (2) shows that they are 13.9
percent less likely to learn from another owner in the same industry. Regression (3) shows
that they are 15 percent less likely to learn from family and friends, which seems more
plausibly related to gender discrimination within the household than trust.
The last three regressions in the table show the relationship between the source of
the owner’s knowledge, sales and earnings. Regression (4) shows that in a good weak,
women have sales that are .6 log points lower than men, but this difference is largely
reduced if women have learned from another owner or family member. Regression (5)
repeats this regression for sales in a bad week and finds quite similar results. Regression
(6) repeats the regression using employment as the dependent variable. The pattern for
employment is similar but the interaction between owner gender and source of skill is
not significant. If human capital externalities rely on trust, then women may be unable to
access those externalities and benefit fully from working in a dense urban environment.
2.5.2 Institutions and female trust
In this Section, we ask whether institutions can mitigate the gender gap in collabora-
tion and earnings among Lusaka manufacturers. The model predicted that female en-
trepreneurship requires both female bargaining power and rule of law, and gender norms
appear to be quite biased in Zambia. Yet conditional upon entry, the model predicts that
women will be unequivocally more likely to partner with men when rule of law is higher,
independent of gender discrimination.
The two conditions for partnership in Proposition 1 are pi−q−b∆+b > δ and
pi−2q
∆ > δ,
depending on parameter values. Both conditions depend on the returns to partnership
and the returns and costs of cheating, but as long as these parameters are held constant,
the model strongly predicts that improvements in the quality of legal institutions will
make partnership between men and women more likely.
We use two measures of institutional strength: physical proximity to the Small Claims
Court and access to the justice offered by the chief of a formal market. We then compare
the outcomes of female and male entrepreneurs who are located within a market, or
close to the Small Claims Court, with their counterparts who are located either outside a
market or further away from the Small Claims Court.
A primary question is whether these measures of access actually capture δ. If market
chiefs or the Small Claims Court are thoroughly biased, then physical proximity to them
will not engender cooperation by women. The closest mapping between these measures
and our model occurs when women have no ability to enforce contracts against men
without these institutions (δ = 1), but that with these institutions δ rises to some higher
number.
Table 2.8 and 2.9 show the following regression where cooperative behaviour is re-
gressed on access to legal institutions and the interaction between these institutions and
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gender. We run regressions of the form:
coopis = β1Femalei + β2instProximityi + β3Femalei ∗ instProximityi + X′iδi + eis
where coopis is the outcome variable for business i in sector s.
The dependent variables in columns (1)-(4) are the indicator variables that capture co-
operative behaviour: whether the respondent said that they had lent/borrowed capital,
given/received advice, participated in a common order from a client, or placed a joint
order of materials with another business like their own. The dependent variable in col-
umn (5) is their mean. The set of controls Xi includes the following characteristics about
the area around the business: the logarithm of the total number of businesses within 100
meters of business i, the logarithm of the total number of businesses in the same industry
(NAICS3) within 100 meters around business i, and a dummy for whether the business
is within 100 meters of a market (“business density controls”). Our empirical strategy
compares the effect of institutional proximity for businesses of different genders that are
exposed to similar demand conditions and agglomeration effects.
Table 2.8 shows that being in a market disproportionately increases the probability of
sharing an order or giving advice for women. It also increases women’s average cooper-
ation.33 This is consistent with the hypothesis that strong market leaders might provide
support to women’s interactions with other businesses, overcoming their disadvantage
in bargaining power. Figure 2.10 shows that the increase in women’s average coopera-
tion in markets is not driven by markets where women’s manufacturers are the majority,
but also happens in markets where men’s manufacturers are the majoritarian group.
Table 2.9 shows the relationship between cooperation and the distance to the Small
Claims Court. Distance from the Small Claims Court disproportionately reduces cooper-
ation for women.34 Figure 2.13 shows the proportion of people of each gender cooperat-
ing with other businesses based on distance from the Small Claims Court. Cooperation is
stable for men, with the exception of the more distant areas. If women’s business location
is farther from the Small Claims Court, then cooperation diminishes. Both tables tell a
consistent story in which access to legal institutions disproportionately enables coopera-
tion by female entrepreneurs.
Tables 2.10 and 2.11 turn to sales, which is our primary measure of economic success.
Table 2.10 regresses three measures of sales on a dummy indicating the business-owner’s
33This relationship remains the same even when including business owner controls (such as whether the
owner keeps written records of purchases made, age of the business owner, owner’s marital status, among
others). It is also qualitatively the same when controlling for industry fixed effects, but the direct effect of
gender is attenuated. See table 2.C.4 of the appendix.
34This relationship remains the same even when including business owner controls (such as whether the
owner keeps written records of purchases made, age of the business owner, owner’s marital status, among
others). It is also qualitatively the same when controlling for industry fixed effects, but the direct effect of
gender is attenuated. See table 2.C.5 of the appendix.
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gender, a dummy on whether the business is located within a market, and their interac-
tion. All regressions include industry fixed-effects, business density controls and busi-
ness owner controls.35 Women sell less than men in all three specifications and in two of
the specifications the difference is significant.
The interaction term is significant, suggesting that female businesses particularly ben-
efit from locating within a market and having access to a market chief. Given the central
role of the Chief in dispute resolution, this result may reflect women’s increased ability
to trust when there is a strong enforcing institution such as the markets chief.
In Table 2.11, we perform exactly the same analysis as in Table 2.10, but now focusing
on the Small Claims Court.36 There seems to be no strong evidence on the Small Claims
Court significantly affecting businesses’ sales, neither for the female nor for the male-
owned businesses. Indicator variables for the distance to the Small Claims Court, and
their interaction with the gender indicator, are largely insignificant. One natural inter-
pretation of these results is that the Market Chief is a far better known and more effective
remediation mechanism than the Small Claims Court, which is largely unknown in our
sample.
Despite the robustness of these trends to different controls, unobservable character-
istics of entrepreneurs located into markets might be driving our results. A particular
worry is that the higher density of businesses in markets might mechanically increase
the opportunities - and thus the incentives - for cooperation. We address this issue in the
next section, where we present results from a lab-in-the-field experiment that shows the
causal effect of institutions on trust and business cooperation.
2.6 Trust, gender and institutions in Zambia: experimental evi-
dence
To provide causal evidence of the impact of institutions on trust and business coopera-
tion, we perform an embedded experiment with a sample of Lusaka entrepreneurs. These
experiments, an adapted version of the trust/investment game pioneered by Berg et al.
(1995), examine whether institutional support particularly impacts female players. We
run the games with actual entrepreneurs located inside or around formal markets and
involve actual local institutions: Market Chiefs and the Small Claims Court judges.
35Owner controls include whether the business owner keeps written business records of every purchase
and sale made, whether her/his business is registered individually, whether the business owners trust their
neighbours, how old the business is, how many days the business owner spends working in the business,
age of business owner and whether business owner is married or not.
36This relationship remains nearly the same when including industry fixed-effects and business owner
controls. See table 2.11 of the appendix.
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2.6.1 Experimental design
Using data from the Census, we randomly selected participants for the experiment, strat-
ifying by gender and whether the business is located within a market. In order to avoid
imposing on marketeers’ time and to increase control, we conducted the game within
people’s shops. Surveyors communicated with each other electronically to convey to a
player the choice of their partner in real time.
Using the Lusaka Census of Urban Entrepreneurs, we constructed lists of all en-
trepreneurs within each market as well as all entrepreneurs within 500 meters of the mar-
ket border. The sample selection procedure for the experiment was designed to oversam-
ple manufacturers and women in a selection of Lusaka’s 80 dense urban marketplaces.
We chose sixteen markets for study that contained the largest numbers of manufacturers.
For each market, we used the 2016 Census data to assemble a list of entrepreneurs located
inside the market and a list of entrepreneurs outside the market, but within 500 meters
of its borders.
We oversampled the manufacturing sector by placing all of the manufacturers at the
top of the list in random order and all other businesses at the bottom of the list in random
order. If a marketeer could not be located or refused to participate, we replaced the mar-
keteer with the next female on the list. As soon as all women had been exhausted, the
recruiters simply moved to the next marketeer on the list. The survey team visited busi-
nesses on the lists in this way until they had valid responses for 24 businesses inside each
market and 6 businesses outside each market. We recruited a total of 480 participants
across the 16 marketplaces.37
The experiment consists of a modified version of the trust game (Berg et al, 1995),
framed as an opportunity to invest in another person’s business opportunity. Player A
(the Investor) was given 10 tokens that could either be kept or invested in the business
of Player B (the Trustee). The Trustee received three times the number of invested tokens
and must decide how many to return to the Investor. The Trustee used the strategy
method: before receiving the Investor’s tokens, he or she completed a matrix indicating
how many tokens they would like to return for a given amount sent. The decision in their
matrix was followed even if they wanted to change it after the Investor’s offer.
Participants played the game for two rounds in total, but they switched roles between
the first and the second round. Players who started playing as an Investor (Trustee)
would play as a Trustee (Investor) in the second round. After the game was complete,
players could exchange tokens for real money. The sessions were on average 90 minutes
long. Investors earned on average 11.4KW (1 dollar at the time) and Trustees earned
6.6KW (0.60 dollars) per round. These amount to 3.6 percent and 2.1 percent of average
daily earnings.38 In addition, all players received a participation fee of 35KW (3.5 dollars)
37475 of the games responses were usable in the data analysis.
38In 7 percent of chief-treated games and 9 percent of court-treated games, the Investor asked for arbi-
tration. Average earnings for all games before arbitration were 11.3 tokens for the Investor and 6.7 for the
Trustee.
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as a token of appreciation for their time.
We cross-randomized two experimental conditions (table 2.12). The first condition
tests the effect of institutions on trust. We randomly assigned pairs of players to three
groups: a control group that receives no access to institutions, a first treatment group
that has access to the Small Claims Court and a second treatment group that has access
to the market chief. If the Investor is dissatisfied with the number of tokens received,
then the Investor may ask the experimenters to go on their behalf to the court or chief to
adjudicate. The invitation follows:
If you think that the number of tokens sent back by Player B is not fair, you
can ask us to call the chief (senior clerk at the Small Claims Court) on your
behalf, to decide how many tokens each of you should get. The chief (senior
clerk) will then decide how many tokens each of you should get. The chief’s
(senior clerk’s) ruling is based only on your choices and the choices of player
B, and we will tell you their decision accordingly. The chief (senior clerk) does
not know anything about you and the other player, only your choices. Player
B will know that you can complain to the chief (senior clerk). In the case that
you complain, the final division of tokens will be determined by the ruling of
the chief (Small Claims Court).
Player A can ask us to consult the chief (senior legal clerk at the Small
Claims Court) on his/her behalf, to decide how many tokens each of you
should get. The chief’s (senior clerk’s) ruling is based only on your choices
and the choices of player A, and we will tell you their decision accordingly.
The chief (senior clerk) does not know anything about you and the other
player, only your choices. In the case that player A complains, the final di-
vision of tokens will be determined by the ruling of the chief (Small Claims
Court).
The implementation of the complaint required us to ensure that participants trusted that
the experimenters would call the institution to complain, and that the Chief and the Small
Claims Court Senior Clerk would understand the game and act as if it were a real-life
dispute. We provide details on our solutions to these challenges in Appendix B.
In previous sections, we showed that cooperation levels are higher for businesses
located inside formal markets than outside formal markets. The second experimental
condition allows us to explore whether this result is driven by in-group vs out-group dy-
namics which could increase cooperation within markets independently of contract en-
forcement (Kranton et al., 2018). Pairs of players were randomly assigned to two groups.
For the first treatment group, both players were drawn from within the same market. For
the second treatment group, one participant was drawn from the market, while the other
from outside the market. For all groups, the players are told whether they are playing
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with a person from the same market or an outsider. The two experimental conditions
were cross-randomized, yielding five distinct experimental groups.
In order to assure understanding of the game, everyone had to correctly answer un-
derstanding checks about the rules of the games with the surveyors before proceeding.
We also implemented a Pre-Games Survey with questions about access to institutions
and exposure to crime. We asked entrepreneurs whether they had had disputes with
other business owners, how disputes had been resolved, and whether respondents had
heard of the Small Claims Court. We also presented business owners with a hypothetical
scenario in which one marketeer failed to pay back a loan to another. Business owners
were asked whether they thought that the market chief, Small Claims Court, and police
would be fair and/or slow in arbitrating the dispute.39
Table 2.C.6 shows mean differences by gender of these variables. Even though men
and women are equally likely to have had work-related disputes and to know about
institutions such as the Small Claims Court, men are significantly more likely to seek
out another person, group or institution for help in resolving the dispute. This suggests
women believe that institutions will not be effective for them. The fact that both women
and men are similarly prone to be victims of theft, but the thief is rarely caught when the
case involves female entrepreneurs, suggests why women may hold such a belief. Men
and women are equally pessimistic about the fairness of police or the chief on average,
but women are more likely than men to think that either the market chief or the police
are slow in dispute resolution. Women reported being in general less trusting, feeling
less comfortable when leaving their shops unattended. Overall, Table 2.C.6 indicates
that institutions may be more effective for men, which leads women to rely less on these
institutions and to have lower trust levels. Yet even biased institutions may be better for
women than a complete absence of rule of law.
The pre-games survey showed a significant difference between market chiefs and the
Small Claims Court. Market chiefs are a well-known institution to both men and women.
For instance, one participant said that, in his market, the marketeers “have resolved to
take all disputes to the market chairman”. Half of the games participants think that the
chief is “usually or always” fair in solving disputes.
The participants also note the flaws of Market Chiefs. One-fifth of men and one-
quarter of women think that the chief is “usually or always” slow in solving disputes.
Moreover, across markets, the chief’s perceived fairness decreases as the proportion of
female manufacturers increases. In the games, we improve upon this well-known insti-
tution by ensuring anonymity, which should eliminate any possibility of gender bias, and
by bringing claims to the Chief on the participants behalf.
The subjects’ awareness of the Small Claims Court’s existence was far more limited.
Eighty percent of our sample had not heard of the Small Claims Court before. Among the
39The pre-game survey might have primed participants to think about their past experiences with insti-
tutions before the play. This should not be an issue for the interpretation of the results as long as this effect
is the same across experimental conditions.
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20 percent who had heard of the Small Claims Court, half gave a negative answer to the
question “whether they thought that business owners like them had access to the SCC”.
Five women out of 25 (and 7 men out of 76) mention that the SCC has high costs and
“terribly” long procedures.40 This limited and faulty knowledge, which we discovered
only after setting the experiment in motion, led us to conclude that the Small Claims
Court was not understood as an institution and we therefore present our results on the
Small Claims Court only in Appendix tables.
We will interpret having access to the market chief - as compared to the control - as
an improvement to the local institutional quality.
2.6.2 Results on trust and trustworthiness
Table 15 shows our primary results. Regression (1) uses the amount sent in the trust game
as our experimental measure of trust. In this regression, we find that women without
access to the Market Chief trust much less than men. This trust gap is compatible with
all of the previous results in this paper showing the female entrepreneurs collaborate less
then man.
This trust difference is almost completely eliminated when we introduce the market.
As Figure 2.14 shows, men and women have a sizable gap in trust without the Market
Chief. With the market chief, this gap disappears. This result suggests that experimen-
tally generated differences in access to rule of law appears to encourage cooperation dis-
proportionately for women in a developing world setting.
Regression (2) examines trustworthiness using the average return ratio, as in Glaeser
et al., (2000). We divide the number of tokens the Trustee would return by the number
of tokens available (return ratio) for each possible amount of tokens received, and then
average over all return ratios. Somewhat surprisingly, women actually return less than
men. The mean level of trustworthiness does not increase when we introduce the Market
Chief, although Figure 2.14 shows that there is a mild reduction in the share of very low
return ratios with the Market Chief.
Why did the Market Chief increase trust, especially for women, but not trustworthi-
ness? This apparent puzzle reflects one major difference between our experiment and
reality. The Market Chief in the experiment has no ability to punish, just to change the
return ratio. Consequently, there was no real reason for Trustees to alter their behaviour,
since it was unclear what the Market Chief would do. However, the Investors could still
feel more protected, because even if the Trustee behaved badly, the Market Chief could
still protect their investment. Regressions (3) and (4) shows the final earnings. Regression
(3) shows that female and male Investors in the control group tend to receive the same
number of tokens at the end of the game. The chief raises the Investors’ total earnings,
40For instance, one female participant felt like the SCC “is a waste of time due to complicated procedures
and costs. Also most people are illiterate and don’t understand the services provided as well as what it’s
for”.
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with the effect being statistically the same for entrepreneurs of both genders. Regression
(4) shows that the chief has little impact on the earnings of the Trustees.41
2.7 Concluding remarks
The developing world’s rapid urbanization generates economic opportunities because
urban density allows for collaboration and trade that is just not possible on far-flung
farms. Yet the ability to interact positively is limited if one partner consistently fears ex-
propriation by the other. Consequently, rule of law complements urbanization, not just
because effective public order reduces activities that generate negative externalities, like
water pollution, but also because rule of law enables a wider range of positive interac-
tions.
The advantages of rule of law are particularly high when one set of actors has more
power in a state of anarchy than the other. If men are more prone to use violence than
women, then this will reduce women’s bargaining power without legal support, and may
cause inter-gender partnerships to break down or fail to form. In Lusaka, we believe that
that industrial segregation of female entrepreneurs partially reflects the advantages of
being able to trade within genders.
A central theme of this paper, and an implication of our cross-sectional and experi-
mental work, is that even gender-neutral applications of rule of law can have benefits
that accrue disproportionately to women. When rule of law is absent, the threat of vi-
olence looms over even seemingly innocuous market transactions. Men have displayed
a disproportionate propensity towards violence across almost every known human soci-
ety (Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985).Consequently, enforcing basic rule of law can make it
easier for women to transact with men.
A second theme is that female entrepreneurship can be blocked both by weak legal
institutions and by social norms that favour men and male bargaining power. Women
can either lose in ex ante bargaining or ex post expropriation. Women will only enter
entrepreneurial fields where much of the benefits require dealing with men, when they
are protected from both types of loss.
41See the Appendix for results of the game splitting the sample by all the different institutional treatments.
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2.9 Figures
FIGURE 2.1: Theoretical predictions
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Note. The two lines both capture the maximum share of men in an industry that women will enter. The
bottom line shows the case where rule of law is weak and δ is high enough so that women will not partner
with men. In that case, the maximum share is 1− θ which we assume to be .1. The top line is decreasing
with β and it shows the case where δ is low enough so that women will partner with men, and δ∆pi−2q is
assumed to be .2. The threshold for entry is reasonably high when δ and β is low, but if either δ or β are
high, then women will not enter into male-dominated fields.
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FIGURE 2.2: Female-owned firms across countries
Note. This Figure shows the proportion of female-led businesses across countries. Female-led firms are defined as firms
with a weak majority of female owners. We consider the most recent year of the World Bank Enterprise Survey for each
country (years from 2009 to 2016). We limit the sample to businesses which are sole proprietorship or partnerships. The
final sample excludes countries with less than 10 observations in those categories (5%). The number of countries in this
figure is 84.
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FIGURE 2.3: Business earnings by gender of the owner
Note. This Figure shows the gender-specific distributions of logsales in 2010 USD, after controlling for country and
industry fixed effect.We consider the most recent year of the World Bank Enterprise Survey for each country (years from
2009 to 2016). We limit the sample to businesses which are sole proprietorship or partnerships. The final sample excludes
countries with less than 10 observations in those categories (5%). Female-led businesses are defined as firms with a weak
majority of female owners. The number of countries in this figure is 82.
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FIGURE 2.4: Female business ownership and family discrimination
Note. This figure shows the correlation between a country’s percentage of female-owned businesses and the SIGI measure
of family discrimination. Female-led firms are defined as firms with a weak majority of female owners. We consider
the most recent year of the World Bank Enterprise Survey for each country (years from 2009 to 2016). We limit the
sample to businesses which are sole proprietorship or partnerships. The final sample excludes countries with less than
10 observations in those categories (5%). The variable for family discrimination is constructed as the weighted average of
the following subcomponents: laws on child marriage, household responsibilities, inheritance laws and divorce laws. We
use the SIGI 2019. The number of countries with both variables available is 75.
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FIGURE 2.5: Female business ownership and rule of law
Note. This Figure shows the correlation between a country’s quality of contract enforcement as measured by the World
Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (Rule of Law Rank Percentile) and its percentage of female-owned business from
the WBES. Female-owned firms are defined as firms with a weak majority of female owners. We consider the most recent
year of the World Bank Enterprise Survey for each country (years from 2009 to 2016). We limit the sample to businesses
which are sole proprietorship or partnerships. The final sample excludes countries with less than 10 observations in those
categories (5%). We use the 2017 Rule of Law Rank Percentile from the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators.
The number of countries with both variables available is 82.
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FIGURE 2.6: Census coverage
Note. This figure shows the spatial distribution of businesses in the Lusaka Census of Urban Entrepreneurs.
It covers 48,163 establishments in Lusaka. The blue squares show where markets exist.
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FIGURE 2.7: Sales in good and bad weeks by gender
Note. This figure shows the kernel density of logged sales in good and bad weeks by gender. The p-value
of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality of distributions test is 0.00. The p-value of the variance test ratio is
0.001 for sales in good weeks and 0.40 for sales in bad weeks. The sample comes from our Manufacturers
Survey in Lusaka (N=2,216).
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FIGURE 2.8: Distribution across industries by gender
Note. This figure shows the industries in which manufacturers from the Lusaka Census of Urban Entrepreneurs operate,
by gender. Industries are ordered by female shares.
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FIGURE 2.9: Small Claims Court location
Note. This figure shows a zoom-in of the spatial distribution of businesses in the Lusaka Census of Urban Entrepreneurs.
The blue squares show where markets exist and the arrow the Small Claims Court.
Chapter 2. Rule of Law and Female Entrepreneurship 152
FIGURE 2.10: Cooperation by gender and market location
Note. This figure shows the average cooperation of female and male-led businesses in markets with a large or a small
share of female businesses, or outside of markets. The sample comes from our Manufacturers Survey in Lusaka (N=2,216).
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FIGURE 2.11: Who did entrepreneurs learn their trade from?
Note. This figure shows the different ways in which entrepreneurs learnt their job, by gender.
Formal training was mainly interpreted as classroom training, usually delivered by governmental
associations or NGOs. The sample comes from our Manufacturers Survey in Lusaka (N=2,216).
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FIGURE 2.12: Talking about the business with other entrepreneurs
Note. This figure shows the proportion of men and women talking several times a week with other entrepreneurs about
the business. We asked "Consider other business owners in your sector in this neighbourhood. How many times do you
talk about topics related to the business?". The sample comes from our Manufacturers Survey in Lusaka (N=2,216).
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FIGURE 2.13: Cooperative activities by distance to SCC
Note. This figure shows the fraction of entrepreneurs who said they cooperated with a similar business
in the given activity by gender and distance from the SCC in 1-mile buckets. The sample comes from our
Manufacturers Survey in Lusaka (N=2,216).
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FIGURE 2.14: Number of tokens sent and average return ratio: control vs
chief
Note. This figure shows the number of tokens sent (left) and the average return ratio (right) by gender and treatment
group. The control group includes only businesses located inside markets. Data are from the experimental games.
FIGURE 2.15: Investor’s and Trustee’s final earnings: control vs chief
Note. This figure shows the final earnings of the Investor (left) and Trustee (right) by gender and institutional treatment
group. The control group includes only businesses located inside markets. Data are from the experimental games.
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2.10 Tables
TABLE 2.1: Countries by rule of law and discrimination in the family
Panel A: Number of countries
Discrimination in family
Rule of law
Low High
High 47 26
29.56% 16.35%
Low 32 54
20.13% 33.96%
Panel B: Female ownership
Discrimination in family
Rule of Law
Low High
High 36% 18%
sd [0.13] [0.12]
N 13 11
Low 24% 16%
sd [0.13] [0.10]
N 13 36
Note. Panel A of this table shows the proportion of firms with female ownership in each combination of
countries, categorized using “discrimination of the family” from the SIGI above or below median (on the
columns) and the WB rule of law rank decile (on the rows) above or below median. Panel B shows the
categorization of countries in our data using “discrimination of the family” from the SIGI above or below
median (on the columns) and the WB rule of law rank decile (on the rows) above or below median.
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TABLE 2.2: Interaction between rule of law and female bargaining power
Female ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
RoL>med 0.017 0.033 0.027 0.020 0.017 -0.002 -0.146*** -0.152*** -0.183***
(0.039) (0.042) (0.042) (0.066) (0.067) (0.065) (0.025) (0.030) (0.033)
Discr<med 0.071* 0.086** 0.114**
(0.039) (0.040) (0.045)
Discr<med x RoL>med 0.113* 0.117* 0.115*
(0.063) (0.063) (0.064)
Violence<med -0.050 -0.051 -0.047
(0.053) (0.057) (0.073)
Violence<medx RoL>med 0.176* 0.165 0.161
(0.100) (0.109) (0.115)
Gend Eq>med 0.115** 0.106** 0.115**
(0.051) (0.053) (0.050)
Gend Eq>med x RoL>med 0.122* 0.110* 0.125**
(0.062) (0.060) (0.055)
Log gdp pp (2011) -0.015 -0.017 0.011 0.015 0.017 0.020
(0.013) (0.014) (0.019) (0.022) (0.017) (0.019)
Observations 73 73 73 36 36 36 52 52 52
R-squared 0.313 0.323 0.345 0.160 0.165 0.149 0.203 0.218 0.221
Sector All All Manuf All All Manuf All All Manuf
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. The regressions in this table test the theoretical prediction of complementarity between female bargain-
ing power and fair and effective political institutions. Columns (1), (2) and (3) test the interaction between
family discrimination (proxied by the SIGI index) and the World Bank rule of law rank percentile. The variable
"RoL>med" is equal to one for countries with rule of law above the sample median and the variable "Discr<med"
is equal to one for countries with discrimination in the family below the sample median. In regression (4), (5)
and (6), we use the measure of violence against women from the WVS. The variable "Violence<med" is equal
to one for countries with violence against women below median. Regressions (2), (3) and (5), (6) and (8), (9)
add controls for log of per capita income in 2011. Columns (7), (8) and (9) test whether rule of law is more
important when combined with less bias against women, which we proxy using the overall WJP score on
equal treatment of the genders by legal institutions. The variable "Gend Eq>med" is equal to one for WJP score
of gender equality above the sample median. Columns (3), (6) and (9) limit the sample of entrepreneurs in the
WBES to manufacturing.
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TABLE 2.3: Descriptive statistics for entire Census
Mean Observations
Number of Employees 2.27 40,517
Industry (Naics2)
Retailing industry 0.51 48,163
Manufacturing industry 0.08 48,163
Accomodation/food services industry 0.14 48,163
Other Services 0.13 48,163
All Other Industries 0.13 48,163
Number of Employees by Industry
Number Emp. Retail ind. 1.12 20,472
Number Emp. Manufacturing industry 3.86 3,625
Number Emp. accom/food services ind 2.34 5,854
Number Emp. other services ind 1.20 5,541
Number Emp. other ind 7.05 4,873
Business is part of a chain 0.04 48,670
Business has standalone structure (bricks) 0.11 48,670
Business in building with multiple businesses 0.71 48,670
Business has standalone structure (cardboard) 0.03 48,670
Business is in residential house 0.15 48,670
Note. This table presents industry composition for the 2016 Lusaka Census of Urban Entrepreneurs. All
entries have been rounded to two decimal places. Observations may be dropped because of missing
values.
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TABLE 2.4: Education and firm size by gender
Male Mean Fem Mean Diff Male N Fem N
Panel A: Firm Size
No. full-time emp. 1.05 0.68 -0.38*** 1579 635
(0.06) (0.07) (0.10)
No. part-time emp. 0.99 0.29 -0.69*** 1571 633
(0.08) (0.04) (0.13)
No. apprentices/unpaid 0.68 0.35 -0.33 1575 634
(0.13) (0.04) (0.21)
No. family members 0.49 0.30 -0.19*** 1546 602
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Panel B: Education
Training (mgmt/Entrep) 0.21 0.28 0.06*** 1570 631
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
University 0.04 0.03 -0.01 1566 629
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Diploma 0.16 0.19 0.03* 1566 629
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Completed Secondary 0.23 0.20 -0.03 1566 629
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
No Formal Education 0.02 0.01 -0.01* 1566 629
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Note. Panel A compares firm size by gender for completed intervews in the Manufacturers Survey. Panel B compares
employment and education by gender for completed interviews in the Manufacturers Survey. All entries have been
rounded to two decimal places. Sales variables contain outliers. Stars denote statistical significance of the two-sided t-test
by gender. *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1.
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TABLE 2.5: Gender sales gap for all manufacturers
Logged Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Week Week Week Week
Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad
Female -0.587*** -0.669*** -0.596*** -0.673*** -0.135** -0.294*** -0.0832 -0.230***
(0.0584) (0.0709) (0.0577) (0.0712) (0.0569) (0.0698) (0.0631) (0.0765)
Apparel -1.037*** -0.899*** -0.952*** -0.833***
(0.0610) (0.0742) (0.0594) (0.0746)
Food 0.304*** 0.765*** 0.195** 0.632***
(0.0832) (0.0928) (0.0852) (0.0956)
Hours Worked 0.0495*** 0.0671***
(0.0166) (0.0198)
Days Worked 0.0599* 0.0827**
(0.0312) (0.0374)
Married 0.157*** 0.135**
(0.0568) (0.0675)
Observations 2068 1848 2054 1836 2068 1848 2047 1830
Adjusted R2 0.043 0.045 0.109 0.085 0.217 0.232 0.257 0.252
Mean Dep Var 7.1 5.89 7.09 5.89 7.1 5.89 7.1 5.88
Education Cnt N N Y Y N N Y Y
SD DV 1.28 1.44 1.28 1.43 1.28 1.44 1.27 1.43
F-test Educ = 0 0 0 0 0
P-val Food = Apparel 0 0 0 0
Robust SE in parentheses.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
Note. This table shows drivers of logged sales in a good or bad week for entrepreneurs of all industries in the
2016 Manufacturers Survey. The dependent variables are the log of the answers given when asked the sales
in a good week and the sales in a bad week. If the person could not provide an exact number, we also asked
for an upper and lower bound. We then imputed the average of the bounds to the sales variables. We regress
on indicator variables indicating different levels of educational achievement: the omitted category is “illiter-
ate or literate, no formal education”, the other categories are “Primary Incomplete”, “Primary”, “Secondary
Incomplete”, “Secondary”, “Diploma”, “University”. For industry, the omitted category is “other”.
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TABLE 2.6: Trust and cooperation in Zambia by gender
Male Mean Fem Mean Diff Male N Fem N
Panel A: Trust
Trust Strangers 0.29 0.20 -0.09*** 1590 644
(0.45) (0.40) (0.02)
Trust Neighbors 0.54 0.43 -0.11*** 1589 640
(0.50) (0.50) (0.02)
Trust GSS 1.10 1.04 -0.07*** 1585 645
(0.31) (0.19) (0.01)
Feel safe with shop unattended 2.81 2.49 -0.32** 692 253
(1.71) (1.59) (0.12)
Panel B: Cooperation
Joint Buy 0.35 0.27 -0.08*** 1579 637
(0.48) (0.44) (0.02)
Lent 0.55 0.44 -0.11*** 1579 637
(0.50) (0.50) (0.02)
Advice 0.76 0.71 -0.05** 1579 637
(0.43) (0.45) (0.02)
Share Order 0.58 0.54 -0.04* 1579 637
(0.49) (0.50) (0.02)
Coop Average 0.56 0.49 -0.07*** 1579 637
(0.33) (0.34) (0.02)
Note. Panel A shows mean differences in trust between women and men, and Panel B shows mean differences in coop-
eration between women and men. The variables “Trust Strangers” and “Trust Neighbors” are measured on a scale from
1-4, and have been converted into dummy variables by combining low scores (1 and 2) and high scores (3 and 4). Low
scores were given a value of 0, and high scores a value of 1. The “Feel safe leaving shop unattented” variable is measured
in a scale from 1-5. Higher scores indicate that people disagree with the statement, and do not feel safe leaving their shop
unattended. The variable “Trust GSS” is a dummy measuring whether most people can be trusted or not: a value of 1
indicates that “most people can be trusted”, and a value of 0 indicates that “you cannot be too careful in dealing with
people”. The variables “Joint Buy”, “Lent”, “Advice” and “Share Order” are dummies that indicate whether a person
ever engaged in the relevant activity. The variable “Coop Average” is an index of cooperative behaviour, calculated as a
simple average of the four dummies “Joint Buy”, “Lent”, “Advice” and “Share Order”. The sample for both panels stems
from our Manufacturers Survey in Lusaka (N=2,216).
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TABLE 2.7: Learning history and sales
Learnt from Logged Sales Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Owner Owner Family Good Bad Full
in same sector or friends Week Week time
Female -0.192*** -0.139*** -0.152*** -0.638*** -0.736*** -0.507***
(0.0215) (0.0192) (0.0232) (0.0943) (0.114) (0.166)
Informal learning 0.0601 0.0860 -0.0988
(0.0788) (0.0943) (0.151)
Female×Informal learning 0.364*** 0.343** 0.325
(0.124) (0.157) (0.202)
Observations 2080 2080 2080 1961 1751 2078
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.031 0.073 0.160 0.131 0.170
Mean Dep Var .3 .22 .36 7.08 5.86 .91
SD Dep Var .46 .41 .48 1.27 1.43 2.23
Business Density Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Owner Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effects N N N N N N
Robust SE in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Note. The variables “Owner”, “Owner in same sector”, “Family or Friends” are dummies that indicate whether an
entrepreneur learnt the job from each category. “Informal learning" is a dummy for whether the owner learnt the business
from any of the previous three categories. Business Density Controls include a dummy variable for whether the business
is located within 100 meters of a market, the total number of businesses within 100 meters, and the number of business
from the same sector within 100 meters. Business Owner Controls includes owner’s age, business age, how many days
the business owner spends working in the business, educational dummies and whether business owner is married or not.
In columns (4) and (5), the dependent variables are the log of the answers given when asked the sales in a good week and
the sales in a bad week. If the person could not provide an exact number, we also asked for an upper and lower bound.
We then imputed the average of the bounds to the sales variables. In Column (6), the dependent variable is the number
of full-time employees. The sample comes from our Manufacturers Survey in Lusaka (N=2,216).
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TABLE 2.8: The market effect on cooperation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share Order Lent Advice Joint Buy Coop Average
Female -0.0956** -0.156*** -0.0918** -0.111*** -0.114***
(0.0378) (0.0379) (0.0397) (0.0381) (0.0283)
In market 0.102*** 0.131*** 0.0437* 0.0563* 0.0832***
(0.0269) (0.0484) (0.0252) (0.0327) (0.0283)
Female × In market 0.0922* 0.0750 0.0696* 0.0492 0.0715*
(0.0507) (0.0504) (0.0377) (0.0680) (0.0401)
Observations 2216 2216 2216 2216 2216
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.032 0.008 0.011 0.034
Business Density Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Business Owner Controls N N N N N
Industry FE N N N N N
P-values
In + Fem.×In = 0 0 0 .002 .05 0
Fem. + Fem. × In market = 0 .923 .036 .313 .164 .146
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Note. The variables “Joint Buy”, “Lent”, “Advice” and “Share” are dummies that indicate whether a person
ever engaged in the relevant activity. The variable “Coop Average” is an index of cooperative behaviour, cal-
culated as a simple average of the four dummies “Joint Buy”, “Lent”, “Advice” and “Share”. Business Density
Controls include a dummy variable for whether the business is located within 100 meters of a market, the total
number of businesses within 100 meters, and the number of business from the same sector within 100 meters.
Business Owner Controls includes whether the business owner keeps written business records of every pur-
chase and sale made, whether her/his business is registered individually, whether the business owners trust
their neighbours, how old the business is, how many days the business owner spends working in the busi-
ness, age of business owner and whether business owner is married or not. Standard errors are clustered at
the 1 squared-km area level. The sample comes from our Manufacturers Survey in Lusaka (N=2,216).
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TABLE 2.9: Effect of distance to SCC on cooperation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share Order Lent Joint Buy Advice Coop Average
Female 0.104 -0.0574 0.0204 0.139*** 0.0514
(0.0635) (0.0407) (0.0714) (0.0319) (0.0348)
2-4 miles from SCC -0.0115 -0.00324 -0.0115 -0.0354 -0.0154
(0.0415) (0.0344) (0.0621) (0.0342) (0.0289)
Female × 2-4 miles from SCC -0.0852 0.0227 -0.0532 -0.137*** -0.0633
(0.0761) (0.0488) (0.0766) (0.0386) (0.0414)
>4 miles from SCC -0.0236 0.0987** 0.000515 0.0298 0.0263
(0.0356) (0.0385) (0.0630) (0.0325) (0.0285)
Female × >4 miles from SCC -0.208*** -0.0896 -0.148* -0.241*** -0.172***
(0.0704) (0.0586) (0.0789) (0.0414) (0.0431)
Observations 2216 2216 2216 2216 2216
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.014 0.007 0.009 0.015
Business Density Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Business Owner Controls N N N N N
Industry FE N N N N N
P-values
2-4mi + Fem. × 2-4mi = 0 .132 .582 .124 0 .004
>4mi + Fem. × >4mi = 0 0 .856 0 0 0
Fem. + Fem. × 2-4mi = 0 .612 .409 .148 .969 .664
Fem. + Fem. × >4mi = 0 .001 .001 0 0 0
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Note. The variables “Joint Buy”, “Lent”, “Advice” and “Share” are dummies that indicate whether a person
ever engaged in the relevant activity. The variable “Coop Average” is an index of cooperative behaviour, cal-
culated as a simple average of the four dummies “Joint Buy”, “Lent”, “Advice” and “Share”. Business Density
Controls include a dummy variable for whether the business is located within 100 meters of a market, the total
number of businesses within 100 meters, and the number of business from the same sector within 100 meters.
Business Owner Controls includes whether the business owner keeps written business records of every pur-
chase and sale made, whether her/his business is registered individually, whether the business owners trust
their neighbours, how old the business is, how many days the business owner spends working in the busi-
ness, age of business owner and whether business owner is married or not. Standard errors are clustered at
the 1 squared-km area level. The sample comes from our Manufacturers Survey in Lusaka (N=2,216).
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TABLE 2.10: Effect of being in market on sales
(1) (2) (3)
Log Sales
Good Week Bad Week Yesterday
Female -0.282*** -0.542*** -0.161
(0.0943) (0.115) (0.111)
In market -0.114 -0.113 -0.235***
(0.0707) (0.0721) (0.0874)
Female × In market 0.200** 0.335*** 0.245*
(0.0917) (0.117) (0.134)
Observations 1911 1691 1364
Adjusted R2 0.335 0.297 0.326
Business Density Controls Y Y Y
Business Owner Controls Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y
P-values
In + Fem.×In = 0 .271 .062 .925
Fem. + Fem. × In market = 0 .233 .013 .345
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Note. The dependent variables are the log of the answers given when asked the sales in the previous working day, the
sales in a good week and the sales in a bad week. If the person could not provide an exact number, we also asked for an
upper and lower bound. We then imputed the average of the bounds to the sales variables. Business Density Controls
include a dummy variable for whether the business is located within 100 meters of a market, the total number of businesses
within 100 meters, and the number of business from the same sector within 100 meters. Business Owner Controls includes
whether the business owner keeps written business records of every purchase and sale made, whether her/his business
is registered individually, whether the business owners trust their neighbours, how old the business is, how many days
the business owner spends working in the business, age of business owner and whether business owner is married or not.
The regressions also include industry fixed-effects, a dummy on the owner’s gender, a dummy on whether the business
is located inside a market, and the interaction between the two of them. Standard errors are clustered at the 1 squared-km
area level. The sample comes from our Manufacturers Survey in Lusaka (N=2,216).
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TABLE 2.11: Effect of distance to SCC on sales
(1) (2) (3)
Log Sales
Good Week Bad Week Yesterday
Female -0.288*** -0.480*** 0.102
(0.0550) (0.0914) (0.186)
2-4 miles from SCC -0.0558 -0.0420 -0.00167
(0.157) (0.156) (0.0936)
Female × 2-4 miles from SCC 0.179* 0.286** -0.0380
(0.0942) (0.117) (0.198)
>4 miles from SCC -0.253 -0.141 -0.196**
(0.161) (0.164) (0.0892)
Female × >4 miles from SCC 0.125 0.0876 -0.141
(0.0864) (0.113) (0.197)
Observations 1911 1691 1364
Adjusted R2 0.338 0.297 0.327
Business Density Controls Y Y Y
Business Owner Controls Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y
P-values
2-4mi + Fem. × 2-4mi = 0 .37 .269 .8
>4mi + Fem. × >4mi = 0 .314 .817 .037
Fem. + Fem. × 2-4mi = 0 .252 .017 .52
Fem. + Fem. × >4mi = 0 .025 0 .698
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Note. The dependent variables are the log of the answers given when asked the sales in the previous
working day, the sales in a good week and the sales in a bad week. If the person could not provide an
exact number, we also asked for an upper and lower bound. We then imputed the average of the bounds
to the sales variables. Business Density Controls include a dummy variable for whether the business is
located within 100 meters of a market, the total number of businesses within 100 meters, and the number
of business from the same sector within 100 meters. Business Owner Controls includes whether the busi-
ness owner keeps written business records of every purchase and sale made, whether her/his business is
registered individually, whether the business owners trust their neighbours, how old the business is, how
many days the business owner spends working in the business, age of business owner and whether busi-
ness owner is married or not. The regressions also include industry fixed-effects, a dummy on the owner’s
gender, dummies on the business’ distance to the Small Claims Court, and their interaction. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the 1 squared-km area level. The sample comes from our Manufacturers Survey in
Lusaka (N=2,216).
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TABLE 2.12: Experimental treatments
Institutional Access Treatment
Control Chief SCC
Inside/Inside 95 96 96
Outside/Inside 94 0 96
Note. Numbers indicate the number of rounds in each treatment cell. Each player played two rounds
(once as Investor and once as Trustee), with two distinct entrepreneurs. Three out of the 480 rounds that
occurred were not used for data quality reasons.
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TABLE 2.13: Games’ behaviour and earnings: control vs chief
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tokens Average Investor’s Trustee’s
Investor Sent Return Ratio Earnings Earnings
Female -1.243*** 0.000115 -0.210 0.355
(0.430) (0.0263) (0.400) (1.202)
Chief -0.0851 0.0247 0.505 -0.373
(0.382) (0.0200) (0.317) (0.668)
Female × Chief 1.610** -0.0524 0.743 1.055
(0.682) (0.0417) (0.694) (1.552)
Observations 189 190 189 190
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.000 0.029 -0.000
Mean 4.09 .42 10.86 6.76
SD 2.412 .135 2.244 4.519
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Note. The dependent variable in Column (1) is the number of tokens sent by the Investor and in Column
(2) is the average return ratio by the Trustee. The dependent variables in Columns (3) and (4) are the
Investor’s and Trustee’s earnings, respectively. All regressions include a dummy for the round played
and exclude the control group in the “outsider” condition and the Small Claims Court treatment. The
sample comes from our lab-in-the-field games conducted in Lusaka in 2017.
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2.A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
A male P will always shirk when shirking is disputable. When shirking is indis-
putable, he will not shirk as long as spi > b. We refer to this as the IC contract and it
must be satisfied for a contract to occur, since the woman will never partner when there
is always shirking.
If the IC constraint is satisfied, then in any contract between a female E and a male P,
the man will in expectation receive in expectation spi− q + δ b, and so s must also satisfy
s > q−δbpi . The woman will receive (1 − s)pi − q − δ(b + ∆), and so her participation
requires that s < 1− q+δ(b+∆)pi .
The total expected surplus is pi − 2q− δ∆, and that must be positive (or δ < pi−q∆ ) for
a partnership to occur. We refer to this as the individual rationality of IR constraint.
If the IC constraint is slack, then men and women share the surplus according to the
bargaining rule so that men receive β(pi− 2q− δ∆) and women receive (1− β)(pi− 2q−
δ∆), which implies that s = β− (2β−1)q+βδ∆+δbpi , which satisfies 1− q+δ(b+∆)pi > s > q−δbpi as
long as δ < pi−q∆ .
This value of s will satisfy the IC constraint if and only if βpi − (2β− 1) q − βδ∆ −
δ b > b or β(pi−2q)+q−bβ∆+b > δ. If that condition fails to hold, then E must effectively pay P
efficiency wages to eliminate shirking in the indisputable case. In that case, s = bpi , and
the male receives (1 + δ)b − q > β(pi − 2q − δ∆) and the woman receives pi − b − q −
δ(b + ∆) < (1− β)(pi − 2q− δ∆). When pi < q + (1+ δ) b + δ∆ or pi−q−b∆+b < δ, then the
woman earns zero profits and the partnership will not occur.
If pi − 2q < ∆ q−bb then pi−2q∆ < βpi−(2β−1)q−bβ∆+b and if the contract satisfies the IR con-
straint it automatically satisfies the IC constraint as well. Consequently, if pi−2q∆ > δ the
contract specifies s = β− (2β−1)q+βδ∆+δbpi , giving expected welfare of β(pi − 2q− δ∆) to P
and (1− β)(pi − 2q− δ∆) to E. If pi−2q∆ < δ then there is no contract.
If pi − 2q > ∆ q−bb , which will always hold when q < b, then we havepi−2q∆ > pi−q−b∆+b >
β(pi−2q)+q−b
β∆+b . If
β(pi−2q)+q−b
β∆+b > δ, then the contract specifies s = β − (2β−1)q+βδ∆+δbpi , giv-
ing expected welfare of β(pi − 2q− δ∆) to P and (1− β)(pi − 2q− δ∆) to E. If pi−q−b∆+b >
δ > β(pi−2q)+q−bβ∆+b , then the contract specifies s =
pi
b and the expected male payout is
(1+ δ) b− q and the expected female payout is pi− b(1+ δ)− q− δ∆ . If pi−q−b∆+b < δ, then
there is no contract.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Women enter if and only if expected returns, denoted R, are greater than θ(.5pi − q).
There are three cases to consider. If pi−2q∆ <
q
b − 1, and pi−2q∆ < δ, or pi−2q∆ > qb − 1
and pi−q−b∆+b < δ then women do not partner with men. As
pi−q−b
∆+b >
pi−2q
∆ if and only if
pi−2q
∆ >
q
b − 1, these conditions are satisfied whenever δ > Max
[
pi−2q
∆ ,
pi−q−b
∆+b
]
. In that
case, women enter if and only if 1− θ > mi.
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If pi−2q∆ <
q
b − 1, and pi−2q∆ > δ, or pi−2q∆ > qb − 1 and β(pi−2q)+q−bβ∆+b > δ, then women re-
ceive (1− β) (pi − 2q− δ∆) when they partner with a men. As β(pi−2q)+q−bβ∆+b < pi−2q∆ if and
only if pi−2q∆ >
q
b − 1, these conditions are satisfied whenever δ < Min
[
pi−2q
∆ ,
β(pi−2q)+q−b
β∆+b
]
.
In that case female returns from entry equal (0.5pi − q) (1−mi)+mi(1− β)(pi− 2q− δ∆).
If 1− θ2(1−β) > δ∆pi−2q , then women enter for all values of mi. If
(
1− θ2(1−β)
)
(pi − 2q) < δ∆,
then women enter if and only if mi < m∗ =
(pi−2q)(1−θ)
(pi−2q)(2β−1)+2(1−β)δ∆ . The value of m
∗ is rising
with pi, falling with q, θ, δ, ∆ and β.
If pi−2q∆ >
q
b − 1 and pi−q−b∆+b > δ > β(pi−2q)+q−bβ∆+b , then the expected female payout from
partnering with a man is pi − b(1+ δ)− q− δ∆, and women enter if and only if
(0.5pi − q) (1−mi) + mi (pi − b (1+ δ)− q− δ∆) > θ(0.5pi − q). In that case, women
always enter if 1− 0.5θ > b(1+δ)+δ∆pi−2q . If (1− 0.5θ) (pi − 2q) < b (1+ δ) + δ∆, then women
enter if and only if mi < m∗∗ <
(pi−2q)(1−θ)
2b(1+δ)+2δ∆−pi . The value of m
∗∗ is rising with pi, falling
with q, b, θ, δ, and ∆.
2.B Games procedures
Six surveyors and two recruiters were hired to conduct the games and were managed by
a research assistant. Typically two days were spent in each market. We created two lists
of randomly-ordered businesses for each market; one list for businesses located inside
the market and one for businesses located outside the market. Manufacturers, being of
primary interest, were placed at the top of each list. The two recruiters met early and were
given the randomized list of entrepreneurs; they then set up appointments with potential
participants, following the order of the list. If a marketeer could not be located or refused
to participate, the following skip pattern was implemented: the marketeer was replaced
by the next female on the list and as soon as all women had been exhausted, the recruiters
simply moved to the next marketeer on the list. In markets where the response rate was
low, or we failed to find many businesses or an above average amount of businesses were
closed, we thus also surveyed and played the games with non-manufacturers. It is also
important to note that all entrepreneurs on the outside list were screened extensively to
ensure that they truly did not belong to the market.
In general, the first day at a market, the games were played with inside-inside pairs,
wherein both players worked within the market. The corresponding three treatments
arms for these pairs were control, SCC and chief. Generally, the second day at a market,
the games were played with inside-outside pairs, wherein one player was a marketeer
and the other an entrepreneur located outside of the market. The corresponding two
treatment arms for these pairs were control and SCC. Surveys were conducted first, and
then the games. However, if there were delays in reaching a participant or if a player
refused to play the games after having completed the survey, the order was switched.
The order in which each treatment arm was conducted was randomized in each market
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to limit selection bias due to logistical factors (E.g. Time of day, eagerness of participants,
etc.).
We ran the games on groups of six entrepreneurs at time, with one surveyor assigned
to one entrepreneur. For each market, a switch matrix was constructed to inform sur-
veyors whether their assigned entrepreneur was to be Player A (Investor) or Player B
(Trustee) first, and who the entrepreneur was to play in each round. For logistical rea-
sons, surveyors whose respondents were located outside of the market always started the
games with the respondent being the Trustee, therefore all outsiders played the games in
the same order, first as Trustees then as Investors. Once finishing a survey with a respon-
dent, a surveyor sent a text to their corresponding surveyor to inform that they were
about to start the instructions for the games in the following format: “surveyornum-
initials-CensusID-AB/BA-start (e.g. 4-D-6230-AB-start)”. The instructions for the games
were given to the respondent in written as well as oral form in the respondent’s preferred
language, and surveyors asked the respondent check questions to ensure that they fully
understood the pay-out rules, who they were playing against, and the possibilities for
complaint when relevant. Once both surveyors in a pair had received the “ready” text
message from their partner surveyor for that round and had ensured that the participant
understood the rules, they started with the game.
The surveyor of the Investor sent the surveyor of the corresponding Trustee the num-
ber of tokens his player had chosen to send in the following format “SurveyorNum-
Surname-Game-Player-TokensSent (e.g. 4-AD-R1-A3)”. The surveyor of the Trustee then
responded with the number of tokens the Trustee had decided to send back in the follow-
ing format “SurveyorNum-Surname-Game-Player-TokensReturned (e.g. 2-PB-R1-B2)”.
The surveyors were instructed to always use neutral language to inform the respondents
of the amount that had been sent (or sent back) to them.
In the case of the SCC and chief treatments, the Investor, upon being told how many
tokens the Trustee had sent back, was asked whether they wanted to complain to the
SCC (chief) or not. The surveyor then messaged the corresponding surveyor whether
or not the Investor intended to complain (format: A-Comp OR A-NoComp). If the In-
vestor complained, the surveyor also messaged the recruiter in the following format:
“SurveyorNum-Surname-ANumGiven-BNumReturned-TotNum-Co E.g. 4-AD-A3-B2-
Tot9-Comp”. In the case of the SCC treatment, the recruitment officer already had a
completed matrix of decisions from the SCC (obtained from the SCC before the start of
the games field work). The recruitment officer examined the matrix and sent the SCC’s
decision to the surveyor of the Investor in the following format: “ANumTokensReceived-
BNumTokensReceived. E.g. A6-B3”. In the case of the chief treatment, the recruiter
would ask the market’s chief in real-time how s/he wanted to settle the complaint and
sent their response in the same format to the surveyor of the Investor. The chief was given
information (both oral and written) prior to the games commencing, which explained the
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game and made clear her/his role as an arbitrator during the games. Similar to the re-
spondents, they were asked questions to check whether they had fully understood the
games and their role in the games. If/ when a complaint reached the chief, the recruiter
who was assigned to her/him would announce the complaint and ask for her/his de-
cision in the following way: “There has been a complaint from a player. In this game,
player A (the Investor) sent XX number of tokens to B (the Trustee), which means B re-
ceived XX number of tokens. B sent back XX tokens. A has complained to you. Do you
wish to redistribute the tokens? If so, how?”
It is important to note, that the players were never told who they were playing against,
however, they knew whether the player was located inside or outside the market. Fur-
thermore, after playing the first round as Investor or Trustee, they played the second
round as Trustee (Investor respectively) against a new player, so that no two players
played each other twice. It was explicitly made clear to them that they would be ran-
domly assigned to a new partner after the first round and they were reminded whether
this player was inside or outside the market and if they (or the opposing player) could
complain to the chief or SCC or neither.
As some of the markets were quite small, and six surveyors, two recruiters and one
research assistant naturally stuck out, it is possible that participants had heard of the
games we were conducting before we reached them. Thus, we cannot fully exclude the
possibility that some players may have played with more information to begin with i.e.
on how the SCC or chief had decided in other cases in the market, though, this is more
likely to be true for the second day in a specific market as the games conducted in a
specific day followed back-to-back, thus there was not much time for entrepreneurs to
gossip in-between. Furthermore, the field team sought to minimize the attention drawn
to themselves by merely sending the two recruiters into the depths of the markets to
find participants, whilst the surveyors would generally just directly be taken from one
entrepreneur to the other. Data consistency checks were conducted at the end of each
field day.
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2.C Additional tables and robustness checks
TABLE 2.C.1: Cross-country correlations with female ownership
Variables
Correlation T-stat T-stat N
coefficient univar reg bivar reg
Panel A - discrimination, norms and rule of law
Discrimination in the family (SIGI-19) -0.62 -7.7 -8.01 75
Restricted physical integrity (SIGI-19) -0.5 -4.41 -3.87 64
Men better in business than women (WVS04-14) -0.64 -5.16 -3.98 36
Justifiable for men to beat wives (WVS04-14) -0.29 -1.69 -1.22 36
Health and safety rank (GGG-16) -0.48 -4.74 -4.37 69
Rule of law percentile rank (WB WGI-17) 0.32 3.28 1.94 82
Rule of Law Score (WJP-17) 0.27 2.21 0.67 50
Female disadvantage with police (GPP-17) -0.31 -2.05 -1.26 53
Gender equality in courts (WJP experts) 0.35 2.93 1.9 52
Gender equality score (WJP experts) 0.3 2.29 1.19 52
Panel B - democracy, religion and education
Average Polity and Democracy Index (1960-2000) 0.26 2.59 0.86 83
Democracy Index (EIU-18) 0.35 3.67 2.31 76
Female school enrollment, tertiary (UN-15) 0.25 2.16 0.79 56
Female school enrollment, secondary (UN-15) 0.52 5.94 4.02 56
Educational Attainment rank (GGG16) -0.5 -5.86 -5.09 69
Percentage of Muslim citizens (UN-00) -0.69 -10.68 -10.39 84
Panel C - ease of doing business
Ease of doing business score global (DB10-14) 0.29 2.96 1.2 56
Score-Enforcing contracts (DB04-15) 0.38 3.44 2.74 61
Score-Registering property (DB05-15) 0.33 2.89 2.18 61
Note. This Table shows the correlation between empirical measures of the model parameters and female ownership
across countries. Column 1 reports the raw correlation coefficient. Column 2 reports the t-stat of a univariate regression
of female entrepreneurship on the given row variable. Column 3 reports the t-stat of a bivariate regression of female
entrepreneurship on the given row variable and log GDP per capita in 2011. The last column reports the number of
observations, which may vary depending on the surveys’ coverage and years. Acronym in brackets show the source of
the variable and the years of collection used.
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TABLE 2.C.2: Correlations between trust and cooperation
Trust Trust Trust Joint Lent Advice Share Coop
ST NB GSS Buy Order Avg
Trust Stranger 1
Trust Neighbor 0.313*** 1
Trust GSS 0.129*** 0.119*** 1
Joint Buy 0.0516* 0.0577** 0.00748 1
Lent 0.0773*** 0.123*** 0.0151 0.259*** 1
Advice 0.0596** 0.0978*** -0.0123 0.258*** 0.356*** 1
Share Order 0.0618** 0.0819*** -0.0394 0.349*** 0.328*** 0.347*** 1
Coop Average 0.0901*** 0.129*** -0.0104 0.665*** 0.708*** 0.683*** 0.734*** 1
Complexity 0.0214 -0.00476 0.0435* 0.103*** 0.0685** 0.0209 -0.0330 0.0569**
N 2216
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note. This table shows correlations between the trust variables and cooperation variables. The variables “Trust Strangers”
and “Trust Neighbors” are measured on a scale from 1-4, and have been converted into dummy variables by combining
low scores (1 and 2) and high scores (3 and 4). Low scores were given a value of 0, and high scores a value of 1. The variable
“Trust GSS” is a dummy measuring whether most people can be trusted or not: a value of 1 indicates that “most people
can be trusted”, and a value of 0 indicates that “you cannot be too careful in dealing with people”. The variables “Joint
Buy”, “Lent”, “Advice” and “Share” are dummies that indicate whether a person ever engaged in the relevant activity.
The variable “Coop Average” is an index of cooperative behaviour, calculated as a simple average of the four dummies
“Joint Buy”, “Lent”, “Advice” and “Share”. The sample comes from our Manufacturers Survey in Lusaka (N=2,216).
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TABLE 2.C.3: Correlations between sales and trust or cooperative be-
haviour
Logged sales
Good Week Bad Week Yesterday
Complexity .3927*** .3806*** .4030***
Trust NB .0128 -.0027 -.0201
Trust ST .0415* .0376 .0459*
Trust GSS .0405 .0439* .0140
Coop Average .0840*** .0189 .0755***
Lent .0286 -.0275 .0224
Advice .0508** .0110 .0441*
Share Order .0587*** -.0007 .0315
Joint Buy .0973*** .0734*** .1178***
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note. This table shows correlations between sales and trust or cooperative behaviour. The dependent
variables are the log of the answers given when asked the sales in the previous working day, the sales
in a good week and the sales in a bad week. If the person could not provide an exact number, we also
asked for an upper and lower bound. We then imputed the average of the bounds to the sales variables.
The variables “Trust Strangers” and “Trust Neighbors” are measured on a scale from 1-4, and have been
converted into dummy variables by combining low scores (1 and 2) and high scores (3 and 4). Low scores
were given a value of 0, and high scores a value of 1. The variable “Trust GSS” is a dummy measuring
whether most people can be trusted or not: a value of 1 indicates that “most people can be trusted”,
and a value of 0 indicates that “you cannot be too careful in dealing with people”. The variables “Joint
Buy”, “Lent”, “Advice” and “Share” are dummies that indicate whether a person ever engaged in the
relevant activity. The variable “Coop Average” is an index of cooperative behaviour, calculated as a
simple average of the four dummies “Joint Buy”, “Lent”, “Advice” and “Share”. The sample comes from
our Manufacturers Survey in Lusaka (N=2,216).
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TABLE 2.C.4: The market effect on cooperation with industry fixed-effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share Order Lent Advice Joint Buy Coop Average
Female -0.0453 -0.0314 -0.0488 -0.0367 -0.0406
(0.0494) (0.0426) (0.0481) (0.0463) (0.0369)
In market 0.0569* 0.104*** 0.0351 0.0820** 0.0694***
(0.0311) (0.0363) (0.0281) (0.0311) (0.0250)
Female×In market 0.0877 0.0905* 0.0895** 0.0538 0.0804*
(0.0569) (0.0456) (0.0401) (0.0659) (0.0421)
Observations 2077 2077 2077 2077 2077
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.090 0.028 0.037 0.088
Business Density Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Business Owner Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y
P-values
In+Fem.× In=0 .007 0 .001 .034 0
Fem. + Fem. × In market = 0 .232 .055 .122 .612 .082
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note. The dependent variables are our measures of cooperation. The variables “Joint Buy”, “Lent”, “Advice”
and “Share” are dummies that indicate whether a person in our Manufacturers Survey sample ever engaged
in the relevant activity. The variable “Coop Average” is an index of cooperative behaviour, calculated as a
simple average of the four dummies “Joint Buy”, “Lent”, “Advice” and “Share”. Business Density Controls
include a dummy variable for whether the business is located within 100 meters of a market, the total number
of businesses within 100 meters, and the number of business from the same sector within 100 meters. Busi-
ness Owner Controls includes whether the business owner keeps written business records of every purchase
and sale made, whether her/his business is registered individually, whether the business owners trust their
neighbours, how old the business is, how many days the business owner spends working in the business,
age of business owner and whether business owner is married or not. The regressions also include industry
fixed-effects, a dummy on the owner’s gender, a dummy on whether the business is located inside a market,
and the interaction between the two of them. Standard errors are clustered at the 1 squared-km area level.
The sample comes from our Manufacturers Survey in Lusaka (N=2,216).
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TABLE 2.C.5: Effect of distance to SCC on cooperation with industry fixed-
effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share Order Lent Joint Buy Advice Coop Average
Female 0.188*** 0.0218 0.120*** 0.186*** 0.129***
(0.0485) (0.0471) (0.0433) (0.0258) (0.0287)
2-4 miles from SCC 0.0298 0.0172 0.0136 -0.0311 0.00739
(0.0396) (0.0383) (0.0510) (0.0399) (0.0351)
Female × 2-4 miles from SCC -0.144** 0.000277 -0.0938* -0.146*** -0.0960**
(0.0583) (0.0621) (0.0512) (0.0419) (0.0381)
>4 miles from SCC 0.00991 0.0515 -0.0372 0.0333 0.0144
(0.0335) (0.0343) (0.0423) (0.0363) (0.0292)
Female × >4 miles from SCC -0.230*** -0.00737 -0.165*** -0.233*** -0.159***
(0.0521) (0.0644) (0.0546) (0.0338) (0.0356)
Observations 2077 2077 2077 2077 2077
Adjusted R2 0.057 0.076 0.035 0.028 0.074
Business Density Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Business Owner Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y
P-value
2-4mi + Fem. × 2-4mi = 0 .014 .642 .031 0 .001
>4mi + Fem. × >4mi = 0 0 .355 0 0 0
Fem. + Fem. × 2-4mi = 0 .345 .585 .231 .337 .253
Fem. + Fem. × >4mi = 0 .148 .763 .196 .186 .269
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note. The dependent variables are our measures of cooperation. The variables “Joint Buy”, “Lent”, “Advice”
and “Share” are dummies that indicate whether a person in our Manufacturers Survey sample ever engaged
in the relevant activity. The variable “Coop Average” is an index of cooperative behaviour, calculated as a
simple average of the four dummies “Joint Buy”, “Lent”, “Advice” and “Share”. Business Density Controls
include a dummy variable for whether the business is located within 100 meters of a market, the total number
of businesses within 100 meters, and the number of business from the same sector within 100 meters. Busi-
ness Owner Controls includes whether the business owner keeps written business records of every purchase
and sale made, whether her/his business is registered individually, whether the business owners trust their
neighbours, how old the business is, how many days the business owner spends working in the business, age
of business owner and whether business owner is married or not. The regressions also include industry fixed-
effects, a dummy on the owner’s gender, dummies on the business’ distance to the Small Claims Court, and
their interaction. Standard errors are clustered at the 1 squared-km area level. The sample comes from our
Manufacturers Survey in Lusaka (N=2,216).
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TABLE 2.C.6: Women and help from institutions
Male Mean Fem Mean Diff Male N Fem N
Panel A: Knowledges and Opinions
Heard of SCC 0.22 0.20 -0.02 347 128
(0.41) (0.40) (0.04)
Would Leave Shop 0.44 0.32 -0.12** 347 127
(0.50) (0.47) (0.05)
Opposition Abused 0.37 0.41 0.04 339 125
(0.48) (0.49) (0.05)
Panel B: Work Disputes
Any Dispute 0.67 0.60 -0.07 348 129
(0.47) (0.49) (0.05)
Disp. Workplace 0.19 0.12 -0.08* 348 129
(0.39) (0.32) (0.04)
Disp. Bus. Agree 0.32 0.26 -0.06 348 128
(0.47) (0.44) (0.05)
Disp. Over Debt 0.52 0.40 -0.12** 347 129
(0.50) (0.49) (0.05)
Disp. Over Goods 0.34 0.25 -0.09* 347 129
(0.47) (0.43) (0.05)
Panel C: Theft, Assault, Harassment
Victim of Theft 0.40 0.37 -0.03 348 129
(0.49) (0.49) (0.05)
Thief Caught 0.22 0.06 -0.16** 140 48
(0.42) (0.24) (0.06)
Victim of Assault 0.05 0.03 -0.02 348 129
(0.22) (0.17) (0.02)
Assailant Caught 0.22 0.00 -0.22 18 3
(0.43) (0.00) (0.25)
Police Harass 0.05 0.00 -0.05** 348 129
(0.22) (0.00) (0.02)
Note. This table shows mean differences in the access and use of institutions between women and men. All
the variables are dummy variables. The variable “Heard of SCC” is 1 if the person has heard of the SCC,
and 0 otherwise. The variable “Would Leave Shop” is 1 if the person would feel comfortable leaving the
shop unattended for 30 minutes, and 0 otherwise. The variable “Opposition Abused” is 1 if the person feels
that members of the (political) opposition frequently receive verbal or physical abuse, and 0 otherwise. The
work dispute variables are equal to 1 if the person has experienced the mentioned type of work-disputed,
and 0 otherwise. The variables “Victim of theft” and “Victim of assault” equal 1 if the person has been a
victim of these crimes, and 0 otherwise. The variables “Thief caught” and “Perpetrator caught” equal 1 if
the crime perpetrator has been captured, and 0 otherwise. The variable “Police Harass” is 1 if the person has
suffered from police harassment in the last 12 months, and 0 otherwise. The sample stems from the survey
we conducted with business owners before the lab-in-the-field games.
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TABLE 2.C.7: Tokens investor sends by institutional treatment
Tokens Investor sent
(1) (2) (3)
Female -1.243*** -1.030*** -1.236***
(0.430) (0.331) (0.433)
Chief -0.0851
(0.382)
SCC 0.252
(0.281)
In/out -0.0527
(0.416)
Chief × Female 1.610**
(0.682)
SCC × Female 0.281
(0.452)
In/out × Female 0.462
(0.662)
Constant 4.198*** 4.101*** 4.267***
(0.361) (0.238) (0.364)
Observations 189 379 187
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.030 0.031
Mean 4.087 4.076 4.087
SD 2.412 2.346 2.412
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note. The dependent variable is the number of tokens sent by the Investor. All regressions
include a dummy on the Investor’s gender, and each column includes a dummy for the
different treatment arm (in/out, SCC, and Chief), together with the interaction of that treat-
ment arm and the Investor’s gender. The sample comes from our lab-in-the-field games
conducted in Lusaka in 2017.
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TABLE 2.C.8: Average return ratio by institutional treatment
Average Return Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Female 0.000115 -0.0427** 0.00144
(0.0263) (0.0200) (0.0265)
Chief 0.0247
(0.0200)
SCC 0.0340**
(0.0163)
In/out 0.0218
(0.0222)
Chief × Female -0.0524
(0.0417)
SCC × Female 0.0284
(0.0260)
In/out × Female -0.0787**
(0.0376)
Constant 0.416*** 0.418*** 0.403***
(0.0208) (0.0143) (0.0209)
Observations 190 380 188
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.046 0.053
Mean .423 .435 .423
SD .135 .131 .135
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note. The dependent variable is the Trustee’s average return ratio. All regressions include
a dummy on the Trustee’s gender, and each column includes a dummy for the different
treatment arm (in/out, SCC, and Chief), together with the interaction of that treatment arm
and the Trustee’s gender. The sample comes from our lab-in-the-field games conducted in
Lusaka in 2017.
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TABLE 2.C.9: Investor’s earnings
Investor’s Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 10.67*** 10.67*** 10.73*** 10.74***
(0.253) (0.254) (0.214) (0.243)
Female -0.0680 -0.152
(0.355) (0.381)
Chief 0.566* 0.566* 0.620** 0.607**
(0.292) (0.292) (0.251) (0.271)
SCC 1.107*** 1.108*** 0.914*** 0.888***
(0.282) (0.282) (0.221) (0.292)
In/out 0.208 0.208 0.0577 0.0317
(0.284) (0.284) (0.221) (0.301)
Female × Chief 0.550 0.634
(0.657) (0.668)
Female × SCC -0.588 -0.412
(0.429) (0.478)
Female × In/out -0.256 -0.105
(0.418) (0.578)
Female × SCC × In/out -0.306
(0.612)
SCC × In/out 0.0516
(0.442)
Observations 475 475 477 477
Adjusted R2 0.043 0.041 0.034 0.032
Mean 10.855 10.855 10.863 10.863
SD 2.244 2.244 2.097 2.097
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note. The dependent variable is the Investor’s final earnings. Regressors include the treatment arms
(in/out, SCC, and Chief). Columns 1 and 2 additionally include a dummy variable indicating the In-
vestor’s gender, and the interaction terms of this variable with the treatment arms. The sample comes
from our lab-in-the-field games conducted in Lusaka in 2017.
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TABLE 2.C.10: Trustee’s earnings
Trustee’s Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 6.892*** 6.903*** 6.805*** 7.066***
(0.538) (0.538) (0.488) (0.562)
Female -0.119 0.517
(0.976) (1.176)
Chief -0.202 -0.204 0.114 -0.147
(0.596) (0.596) (0.536) (0.598)
SCC -0.393 -0.394 -0.305 -0.824
(0.512) (0.512) (0.432) (0.582)
In/out 0.389 0.390 0.360 -0.164
(0.512) (0.512) (0.432) (0.677)
Female × Chief 1.400 0.771
(1.390) (1.537)
Female × SCC 0.239 -1.093
(0.971) (1.338)
Female × In/out -0.143 -1.262
(0.987) (1.464)
Female × SCC × In/out 2.292
(1.657)
SCC × In/out 1.039
(0.864)
Observations 476 476 477 477
Adjusted R2 -0.007 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001
Mean 6.757 6.757 6.821 6.821
SD 4.519 4.519 4.736 4.736
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note. The dependent variable is the Trustee’s final earnings. Regressors include the treatment arms
(in/out, SCC, and Chief). Columns 1 and 2 additionally include a dummy variable indicating the
Investor’s gender, and the interaction terms of this variable with the treatment arms. The sample
comes from our lab-in-the-field games conducted in Lusaka in 2017.
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3 Value Dissonance at Work
3.1 Introduction
Culture is one of the drivers of organizational performance. And yet, there is still little
agreement on what culture means or what is the best empirical way to measure it. On the
one hand, culture has been seen as a given set of beliefs and tacit communication codes
that shape employees’ and leaders’ actions within an organization. Being a unique (and
unspoken) code of communication among members of an organization (Cremer, 1993),
this view suggests an empirical strategy based on cross firm comparison of differences
in culture and associated performance (O’Reilly and Chatman, 1996; Garrett et al., 2014;
Guiso et al., 2015; Erhard et al., 2009). On the other hand, studies in psychology, cogni-
tive sciences and sociology focus on the constitutive aspects of culture (DiMaggio, 1997;
Besley and Persson, 2018). These are cognitive categories, values and schema necessary
for parties to think, interact and cooperate. These accounts lead to an empirical strat-
egy that takes individuals as units of analysis and their interactions - within teams or
networks - as objects of interest for performance evaluations.
Empirical papers in economics and finance have mainly adopted the former approach.
This paper adopts the latter and studies the primitives of corporate culture, individual
values. We move from a view of culture as a unique "latent variable" (DiMaggio, 1997)
and put the complexity and multidimensionality of this concept at the core of our ap-
proach. By doing so, we are able to provide a variety of stylized facts on the way in
which the sharing of different values is related to performance within an organization.
By observing both employees and their direct managers, we are also able to look at the
way in which organizational structures and leaders shape value sharing in the first place.
This speaks to the even more difficult question of where culture comes from (Gibbons
and Kaplan, 2015).
We use a proprietary dataset that maps the individual values of employees in one
of the largest global banks in the world. We measure individual values using questions
from the World Value Survey that ask respondents to rank the most important qualities
for their children. Respondents have to choose five out of eleven values such as deter-
mination, imagination, faith, unselfishness. These questions have been validated in a
number of recent papers as good proxies for the intergenerational transmission of values
(see, for instance, Doepke et al., 2019).
As values are hard to observe, even in repeated interactions, perceptions of others’
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values might be as important in driving behaviour as actual values. We ask respondents
to list the values they think their colleagues or the bank would consider most important
to transmit to children. This enables us to measure perceived misalignment between their
own and colleagues’ or the bank’s values. We find that perceptions of misalignment are
as important as actual misalignment in explaining performance at the individual level
and at the team level.
Although the data come from only one firm, the sample contains geographical, hier-
archical and socio-demographic variation. We first describe how values vary across these
dimensions. Members of ethnic minorities tend to select different values than white or
Asian groups, putting more weight on faith and hard-work than others. Gender dif-
ferences are small, as well as differences between parents and non-parents. In terms
of organizational roles, we find the biggest differences between people at different career
bands. People at the top of the hierarchy are significantly more likely to rank imagination
and determination highly, but also less likely to rank obedience, responsibility, indepen-
dence and thrift among their main values compared to lower bands. These differences
by hierarchical position suggest that achieving value sharing might be challenging not
only horizontally, between employees, but also vertically, between employees and their
managers.
We explore this by looking at the extent to which misalignment in values explains
performance at both the individual and team level, either between employees or with
their managers. We find that misalignment in values between an individual and his/her
colleagues is negatively correlated with performance. However, on the sub-sample of
employees whose manager is also a respondent, we see that vertical misalignment with
the manager is more important than horizontal differences with colleagues. The crucial
role of management in influencing culture has been studied in previous work. Lead-
ers can set incentives for team members, such as rewards and punishments for norms’
deviation. Other authors also stressed the key role of managers in leveraging the tacit
knowledge held by employees through socialization of newcomers in the organization
(Besley and Persson, 2018). “Informal management" through coordination, influence and
leadership has also been put forward as a tool that relies on relational contracts among
the members of an organization (Gibbons and Henderson, 2012; Gibbons and Kaplan,
2015). Our results are consistent with this latter view of what managers do. We find
that values misalignment is higher in teams where communication and coordination are
worse, as well as teams where the manager is overloaded with work and disagrees with
senior leaders on the bank’s strategy.
One way in which culture can increase performance is by allowing relationships to
substitute for formal agreements through relational contracts (Chassang, 2010; Gil and
Zanarone, 2016). However, the break of culture can make this harder. We see that actual
as well as perceived value misalignment is correlated with lower trust in leaders, man-
agers and colleagues. This correlation is interesting in both directions of causality. On
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the one hand, limited trust might bring little experimentation on the values held by col-
leagues and managers, perpetuating wrong perceptions about diversity (Boisjoly et al.,
2006; Beugelsdijk et al., 2019; Minni, 2019). On the other hand, value misalignment can
affect agents’ beliefs about others’ trustworthiness, hindering incentives for cooperation
(Halac, 2012; Macchiavello and Morjaria, 2015).
We next ask whether it matters what values people have and share. To reduce the
dimensionality of the problem, we use latent class analysis and categorize bankers in
two main types: “obedient", for those who value qualities such as obedience and faith,
and “extroverts", who tend to believe in values such as imagination, self-expression and
determination. Obedient types tend to have a lower performance, especially in terms of
potential for career progression. Teams with a greater proportion of extrovert types do
better, but this is mainly driven by the fact that these types occupy higher career bands.
This suggests that sharing some specific values is more important than sharing per se’
for organizational performance.
Lastly, we provide evidence on how bankers differ from common citizens by compar-
ing their answers with World Value Survey respondents. Bankers tend to differ from av-
erage citizens on a variety of values, scoring lower on faith, thrift and obedience. "Obedi-
ent" types are closer to the average citizen, but this tends not to be rewarded by the bank.
Interestingly, we find that the distance between bankers’ and citizens’ values decreases
in those countries that were more severely hit by the financial crisis. This is suggestive
evidence that aggregate industry shocks are important forces in shaping organizational
culture (Besley and Persson, 2018) either through policies that try to change the values
held by employees or through a change in the composition of people hired and kept by
the organization.
This paper is related to two main streams of literature: corporate culture and pref-
erences for beliefs consonance. Many papers provide theoretical models to explain the
value of organizational culture. Kreps (1990) seminal model of corporate culture de-
scribes how the sharing of similar values facilitates coordination on a given organiza-
tional equilibrium. Lazear (1995) formalizes the process by which culture gets internal-
ized by employees. Hodgson (1996) puts at the core of his work the interconnectedness
between individuals and culture. Not only individuals create culture, but culture in turn
molds their preferences and modes of thinking. This inspires our analysis of value dis-
sonance at the individual level. For a review of these theoretical accounts, see Hermalin
(2001). Our paper is closely related to the recent model by Besley and Persson (2018)
in looking at culture and performance within the firm. They show that multiple cultures
may exist for the same fundamentals, such as technology and market conditions, with un-
clear ranking in local performance. We also related to the work by Van den Steen (2010),
who asks where culture comes from and makes explicit why the direction of causality
between culture and performance is unclear.
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Empirical work on corporate culture has been also growing (see Gibbons and Hender-
son, 2012; Gibbons and Kaplan, 2015). Anderson (1988) was an early empirical attempt to
show that organizations may benefit for value congruence. He shows that organizations
tend to perform better when employees have aligned values. In the same vein, Guiso
et al. (2015) study integrity and find that it’s positively correlated with financial perfor-
mance and attractiveness of job offerings, while it is negatively correlated with the degree
of unionization. In the paper, they measure integrity in terms of how workers perceive
that top managers uphold this as a value. Similarly to us, their measure of culture is
based on individual perceptions. We complement this work by looking at a variety of
values and measuring both actual differences as well as perceptions between employees.
Thakor (2016) focuses on culture in banking and posits that its value for firms can be
compared with the one of financial capital. Culture in the banking sector reassure regula-
tors of limited risk-taking and the absence of unethical behaviour, but it can also provide
independent value to investors. Gartenberg et al. (2019) focus on one component of cul-
ture: employees’ sharing of the same organizational purpose. In companies with strong
purpose employees share a sense of the meaning and impact of their work. They find
that on average purpose is not related to financial performance, but this masks hetero-
geneity between the types of purpose-driven organizations. Firms that are characterized
by high camaraderie between workers do not perform as well as firms where managers
have high clarity.
Our analysis of the relationship between value sharing and the strength of the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis relates to the work by Sørensen (2002), who explores how culture responds
to internal and external change. He finds that firms with strong cultures excel when
encountering difficulties in volatile environments. Lins et al. (2017) examine the perfor-
mance of firms engaged in Corporate Social Responsibility activities between 2008 and
2009. They show that firm specific social capital can act as insurance that pays off in mo-
ments of crisis.1 We complement this study by looking at whether culture varies in places
exposed to varying severity of the financial crisis.
This work also relates to the growing literature on preferences for belief consonance
(for a review see Golman et al., 2016). Such a preference implies that people suffer a direct
utility cost from knowing that others’ beliefs are different from their own. There might
be different microfoundations for such a taste. A common one in the literature is that
conflicting beliefs threaten one’s identity and reduce perceived shared identity within
a group (Kahan 2010). A closely related stream of research in economics is indeed the
one on identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005; Benabou and Tirole 2011). Taste for belief
consonance has been shown to affect relationship formation (Huber and Malhotra, 2013;
Mitchell et al. 2014), what media people choose (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2008, 2011) and
potentially even what place they live in (Molloy et al., 2011). A few studies also looked
1The model by Dessein and Santos (2006) provides a framework to think about optimal firm adaptation
to a changing environment.
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at the effect of beliefs consonance in cooperatives, workers’ associations and employees’
ownership enterprises (Craig and Pencavel, 1992; Bhuyan, 2007). We contribute to this
work by showing the consequences of actual and/or perceived beliefs dissonance in a
company where workers do not necessarily sort on the basis of shared values.
3.2 Framework
Contract incompleteness is a pervasive force of the real world. It does not only affect
the boundaries of the firm (Grossman and Hart, 1986), but also its internal organization
through centralization or delegation decisions (Aghion et al., 2013). When contracts are
costly or unfeasible, culture can play a crucial role in facilitating coordination, both in the
short term and in repeated interactions. In this paper, we take the internal organizational
structure as given and ask whether there is a positive relationship between culture and
performance, both at the individual and team level.
Our first hypothesis is that, at the individual level, people whose values are further
away from the average of their colleagues perform worse. In a repeated game, lower in-
dividual performance can be the consequence of the punishment suffered by a person for
deviating from the team equilibrium. As the likelihood of a deviation is decreasing in the
intertemporal discount factor, empirically we should expect the negative relationship be-
tween value misalignment and performance to be stronger for people who are less likely
to stay in the firm. Deviations from the team equilibrium are not the only way to ratio-
nalize a negative relationship between value misalignment and individual performance.
Suppose that agents face a psychological cost of not following their personal values in
order to conform with the organizational culture (for instance, coming from preferences
for beliefs consonance. See Golman et al., 2016). Such a cost might directly hinder indi-
vidual performance, for instance by limiting cognitive functioning or bandwidth at work
(Mani et al., 2013; Shah et al., 2015). In this case, the relationship between misalignment
and performance would emerge even in the absence of individual deviations from a team
equilibrium.
At the team level, culture can be positively correlated with performance if it allows
members to coordinate on socially-maximizing equilibria. Consider a simple coordina-
tion game, such as the "battle-of-the-sexes". The game has two Nash equilibria, but stan-
dard economic theory is silent about which equilibrium we should expect to see realized
(Hermalin, 2001). Culture, defined as value sharing, helps players decide or form pre-
dictions on what outcome should be achieved. Consider the following simple example.
Suppose that the game is played by two team members and the two possible actions
are having a pre-scheduled conference call with a client or going out for dinner (Table
below). The payoffs are such that R = S ≥ s = r.
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Call Dinner
Call s, R 0,0
Dinner 0,0 S, r
Both players prefer having the call/dinner together and doing one of these two ac-
tions alone will give them a zero utility. If both employees know that there is a culture
of responsibility at the firm, they will easily coordinate on the first action. However, if
one is responsible and the other is not, they both risk losing by choosing different ac-
tions. Perceptions can also hinder the team outcome. If the “responsible" column player
mistakenly thinks that the other is not responsible, s/he would probably choose to go for
dinner and at least get r. If this perception is wrong, both players will end up with zero,
thus a lower aggregate and individual outcome. This simple case illustrates our second
empirical prediction: we should expect a lower performance in teams with greater value
misalignment among members.
In the given example, it’s easy to imagine that having the client’s call is a more de-
sirable organizational outcome than going out for dinner. This implies that the sharing
of those particular values which favour this outcome - such as responsibility - should
be better for organizational performance. But reality is more complex. Suppose we re-
place the action of “having dinner" with “bringing a colleague to the emergency room".
What is the dominant equilibrium for the firm in this example is less clear, with conse-
quent uncertainty on the desirable value for employees. This is the typical situation in
the “culture-as-convention" view (Hermalin, 2001); it doesn’t matter whether both play-
ers coordinate in one or the other equilibrium, as long as they’re coordinated. However,
if the environment is such that one equilibrium is Pareto-dominant, a convention on the
dominated equilibrium will leave money on the table. We are going to explore this is-
sue empirically, by checking whether the positive correlation between performance and
values is driven only by a few values and - if so - which ones.
3.3 Institutional context
We study values in an industry where culture has recently been under intense scrutiny:
banking. The 2008 financial crisis uncovered a widespread dysfunctional culture in the
sector, which regulators have since been trying to modify (Thakor, 2015). In the words of
Mark Carney, the Bank of England governor (2017):
"Multiple factors contributed to a tide of ethical drift. Market standards
were poorly understood, often ignored and lacked teeth. Too many partic-
ipants neither felt responsible for the system nor recognised the full impact
of their actions. Bad behaviour went unchecked, proliferated and eventually
became the norm."2
2Remarks at the Banking Standards Board Panel “Worthy of trust? Law, ethics and culture in banking”
by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, 21 March 2017
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A common narrative of the financial crisis is that coordination on a bad equilibrium,
which reduced welfare for society, could be sustained through inflated individual mon-
etary incentives and value systems detached from society. Andrew Haldane, from the
Bank of England, effectively expresses this view (2012):
"The crisis was the story of a system with in-built incentives for self-harm.
Avoiding those self-destructive tendencies means changing the incentives and
culture of finance, root and branch."3
A survey by Deloitte in 2013 found that 65% of interviewed senior leaders believed
there were significant cultural problems in the industry. Interestingly, they also thought
that the problems were less extensive in their own banks than in others.
Since 2008, huge investments have been made to try and change the culture in bank-
ing. For instance, in 2015 the U.K. banking sector created the Banking Standards Board
(BSB), a body meant to promote good practice among banks and building societies. In
the Netherlands, bank leaders must now swear an oath to put the customers’ interests
first.4 In the U.S., Goldman Sachs reacted to a 550 USD millions fine by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) by launching a fundamental review of its practices and cul-
ture, published in 2011. The review consists of 39 recommendations and includes com-
pulsory courses on ethics for senior managers (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013).
Some authors posit that a strong banking culture can be considered a complement to
financial capital on the bank’s balance sheets (Thakor, 2016).
We believe that a snapshot of bankers’ values ten years after the crisis, and their dis-
tance with respect to common citizens, can add insights to these and other investments
in changing the banking culture.
3.4 Data
The data we use in this paper come from a partnership with one of the world’s largest
banks. In May 2017, we collected data on employees’ values and their perceptions of
values held by the bank and their colleagues. We chose our main questions from the
World Value Survey (WVS from hereon). Here are the questions we asked:
1. Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which
do you consider to be especially important? (rank the top 5)
2. Imagine [BANK NAME] had a family. What qualities do you think that [BANK
NAME] would consider especially important for its children to learn at home? (se-
lect the top 3)
3Speech to Occupy Economics “Socially useful banking” by A. G. Haldane, Executive Director, Financial
Stability, Bank of England, 29 October 2012.
4See the article by Zaring (2017) on the New York Times at this link.
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3. Now thinking about your colleagues where you work, what qualities do you think
that they would consider especially important for children to learn at home? (select
the top 3)
For each of these questions, respondents had to choose among the following eleven
values: Independence, Hard work, Feeling of responsibility, Imagination, Tolerance and
respect for other people, Thrift and saving money/things, Determination and persever-
ance, Religious faith, Unselfishness, Obedience, Self-expression.
Our measures have been shown to correlate with the intergenerational transmission
of values in a few recent papers. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) use them to study
the link between religion and preference for thriftiness, as measured in the WVS. In a
study on the relationship between trust and regulation, Aghion et al (2010) use the WVS
measures of desired children’s values as proxies for family civic education. In a similar
vein, Bauer et al (2014) use these variables to study the role of children’s socialization in
other-regarding preferences. More recently, Doepke and Zilibotti (2017) and Doepke et
al. (2019) use these measures as proxies for different parenting styles (e.g., authoritarian,
relaxed) and show that they are correlated with a variety of country-level macroeconomic
conditions such as income inequality, the return to education, and redistributive policies.
We believe that these questions can be a good proxy for individual values in our context
and should be relatively free from social desirability bias (Fischer, 1993). Despite being
part of a survey sent by the employer, there is no clear answer which respondents could
select to project a favourable image of themselves.
The questions were added to the organization’s annual Census sent to all the em-
ployees over the world. The typical survey response rate is 40 percent, which leads to
95,138 respondents for the full survey. The survey collects information on employees’
engagement with the bank’s strategic priorities as well as general sentiments about the
workplace. Our questions on individual values were randomly displayed to 40 percent
of the basis to reduce average survey duration. The total number of respondents to our
values questions is 38,827 across 55 countries. The percentage of randomly selected re-
spondents across countries varies from 26% to 67%. Table 3.1 shows summary statistics
of the sample of survey respondents, divided by whether they were selected to reply to
the values questions or not.
Our core question is whether value sharing between employees enables better per-
formance. In the absence of an exogenous variation that can be used to identify causal
impacts, we present some stylized facts on the correlation between our measures of val-
ues and proxies for performance. To build these proxies, we merged the survey data with
personnel records and use three annual measures of individual performance. The first is
the supervisors’ assessment of employees’ performance relative to expectations for that
role. For most of our sample, this measure is based on financial performance indicators
of the profitability and growth of employees’ client portfolios. The second measure is
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the supervisors’ assessment of whether the employee has “good behaviours” such as in-
tegrity, cooperation and connection with the customer. Relationships with customers are
particularly important for the 39% of our sample who are in client facing roles. Both the
behaviour and financial performance measures are those used to determine the annual
bonuses. Our third measure is the supervisors’ assessment of the potential for vertical
progression within the bank in the near future. The three measures are on a scale be-
tween 1 (min) and 4 (max). Throughout the paper we standardize these measures to be
mean zero and with unit standard deviation.
3.5 Values across the organization
The top panel of Figure 3.1 provides an overview of bankers’ values. In aggregate, the top
five values are responsibility, tolerance, independence, determination and hard work, all
mentioned by more than 50% of respondents. The bottom three values are faith, obedi-
ence and thrift, mentioned by less than 20%. Following Doepke, Sorrenti and Zilibotti’s
(2019) classification of parenting styles, bankers’ seem to rank relaxed values such as inde-
pendence and imagination more highly (in 4th and 6th position respectively) as compared
to intensive values such as hard-work and obedience (in the 5th and 10th position respec-
tively). This is true even when we compare bankers with the general population from the
WVS (Figure 3.1 bottom panel). Bank employees are significantly less likely to mention
faith, thrift and obedience than the general population, but more likely to mention imag-
ination, self-expression and determination. The figure looks extremely similar if we limit
WVS respondents to those with an educational level comparable to bankers (i.e. those
who have completed high school or above). Within country comparisons reveal a similar
difference between bankers and WVS respondents: obedience, thrift, faith and unselfish-
ness are among the values mentioned less often by bankers than common citizens. Figure
3.A.1 shows the comparison across continents.
3.5.1 Values by demographics and organizational role
Table 3.1 shows that the bank workforce is quite heterogeneous in terms of gender, eth-
nicity and age. These are all characteristics which might correlate with different stated
values. In Figure 3.2, we show differences in the most important values listed by these
different demographic groups.
In the top figure, each bar gives the percentage point difference in the proportion of
people who mentioned a given value between members and non-members of an ethnic
minority.5 Differences tend to be small, within 10 p.p. in absolute value, but they are
spread over a wide range of values. The biggest difference is observed in faith; a member
5Members of a minority are defined as people who answer "yes" to the question: "Do you consider that
you belong to an ethnic minority?". Most people of Black, Latino or Mixed ethnicity answer "yes" to this
question, while only 2% of White people and 30% of Asian people say "yes".
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of a minority is 10 p.p. more likely to mention this value among their top five than some-
one who isn’t a member of a minority. This difference represents a twofold increase over
the aggregate proportion of 10% of workers who choose faith among their top ranked val-
ues. Even smaller differences are observed in the bottom panel by parenting status. This
fact gives reassurance on the validity of these measures, where answers do not greatly
differ depending on parenthood. The graph in the middle shows differences by gender.
They tend to be concentrated in a few values: imagination and hard-work, which women
are less likely to mention, and responsibility, tolerance and independence, which women
are significantly more likely to mention.
The main takeaway of this figure is that diversity based on observables also brings
diversity in values. This could be a resource as well as a challenge for building organi-
zational culture. Nevertheless, the way in which such diversity translates into culture
ultimately depends on team composition, horizontally, and on the roles covered by dif-
ferent groups, vertically. This suggests looking at whether there are differences in values
between people who occupy different organizational roles.
Figure 3.3 shows that there are small differences in value rankings by tenure or cus-
tomer facing vs back office employees. There is almost no difference in stated values
between people with five to nine years of tenure and those who have been at the bank
for four years or less. The former group tend to be less likely to mention hard work and
more likely to mention tolerance, faith and responsibility among their top values, but dif-
ferences are all smaller than 2.5 p.p.. Senior employees with more than ten years of work
in the bank are more likely to mention determination, unselfishness and tolerance, but
less likely to mention obedience, self-expression and imagination than junior employees
of any tenure.
In contrast, the central panel of Figure 3.3 shows that there are substantial differences
in stated values depending on the hierarchical position held. We classified employees
in three career bands: top (0.8%), middle (35%) and bottom (64%). The central panel
of Figure 3.3 shows differences in the proportion who mentioned each value between
the top (in blue) and the middle (in red) with the bottom band. People at the top of
the hierarchy are significantly more likely to rank imagination and determination highly
as compared to both the middle and bottom bands. Both of these are values correlated
with high aspirations and ambitions. The top band is less likely to rank obedience, re-
sponsibility, independence and thrift among their main values than both the middle and
bottom bands. These differences by hierarchical position suggest that achieving the shar-
ing of common values might be challenging not only horizontally, between employees,
but also vertically between employees and their managers. The implications for perfor-
mance might be very different in these two cases, especially as the manager has actual
power to award promotions and bonuses. Results in the next Section will confirm that
vertical differences seem to matter to a greater extent than horizontal ones.
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3.6 Value misalignment
3.6.1 Measures
We measure the value of culture by exploiting variation in the (dis)similarity in values
listed by employees in our survey questions. We share the drawbacks of a self-reported
measure with many studies in corporate culture (Guiso et al., 2015; Graham et al., 2019).
Differently from most of the studies in this area, we ask about personal values which are
not directly related to the workplace. This is both an advantage and disadvantage of our
strategy. On the one hand, it limits demand bias. On the other, these values might be less
relevant drivers of behaviour in the workplace.
Questions 2 and 3 of Section 3.4 provide direct measures of perceived value misalign-
ment with colleagues and the bank. We construct measures of actual value misalignment
with colleagues by comparing individual answers to question 1 with the answer given
by their colleagues. This proxy is available for the smaller sample of teams that contains
multiple responses to the survey. The distinction between perceived and actual value
misalignment has important implications for organizations interested in cultural change.
Perceptions can be changed through better coordination and communication, while ac-
tual differences can potentially only be tackled through different selection into the firm.6
Multiple observations within a team also enable us to construct team-level measures such
as average actual and perceived misalignment between team members and/or the man-
ager, and between team members and the bank.
A complication in constructing indexes of value misalignment in our data is that we
only asked respondents for partial rankings. We overcome this by using mathemati-
cal methods that compute the average distance between top-k lists, defined as rankings
where only the top k members of an ordering are observed. We use two main methods:
Absolute Spearman ρ, which is an adaptation of Spearman’s footrule, and Kendall τ. The
following paragraphs provide a brief description of each of them. We are going to use the
Absolute Spearman ρ index throughout the paper. For robustness, we repeat the main
tables using the Kendall τ index and include them in the Appendix.7
Absolute Spearman ρ
For each pair of people in a team, we subtract person 1’s ranking of a given value from
person 2’s ranking. We do this for all eleven values and sum up the absolute value of
each difference to get the distance. Every value which is not ranked among the top k is
given rank k + 1:
6For a provoking view on culture-based recruitment, see McCord (2018).
7We use both methods to construct either actual or perceived misalignment. To construct perceived
misalignment we need to further adapt these measures. Respondents were indeed asked to report only
the top three values for their colleagues and the bank, without specifying how to rank them. We compare
the individual’s top three values with the ones reported for their colleagues or the bank applying the rules
specified in this Section.
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ρabs(R1, R2) = ∑
{i=1}∈N
|r1(i)− r2(i)|
where i is a value, rj(i) is the ranking for person j ∈ {1, 2} and N is the set of eleven
values.
Kendall τ
For each pair of people in a team, we calculate the distance between their rankings of
each possible pair of values and sum them up over all pairs. Let N = {1, ....n} be the
set of value pairs and R1, R2 be the two top k rankings on N. The Kendall τ distance is
defined as:
dKendall(R1, R2) = ∑
{i,j}∈N
Ki,j(R1, R2)
where:
• Ki,j(R1, R2) = 0 if i and j appear in the same order in R1 and R2
• Ki,j(R1, R2) = 1 if i and j appear in the opposite order in R1 and R2
• Ki,j(R1, R2) = 12 if both i and j appear in position k + 1 in a ranking (i.e. not in the
top k positions) and in positions ahead of k + 1 in the other ranking
For example, take a given pair of values: independence (i) and obedience (j). If both
people rank independence and obedience among their top five values, distance will be
zero or one depending on whether the values are ranked in the same or different order.
Now consider the case in which one person ranks both independence and obedience,
but the other ranks only one. If the unranked value in the second list is the same as the
lower ranked value in the first, distance is zero. If the unranked value in the second list
is the same as the higher ranked value in the first, distance is one. If one person ranks
independence, but not obedience, and the other ranks obedience, but not independence,
the distance is always one. Finally, if one person ranks independence and/or obedience,
but the other ranks neither, distance is a half. The penalty is less than one because we
don’t know how the person who doesn’t rank either value would order them.
3.6.2 Value misalignment and performance
We measure the relationship between value misalignment and performance using the
following specification:
yic = α+ βMisalignmentic + X′icδ+ λc + eic
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where Misalignmentic is one of the Absolute Spearman ρ indexes of actual or per-
ceived misalignment described in the previous section for person i (or team) in country
c. yic is a standardized measure of financial, behavioural or potential performance, λc are
country fixed effects and Xi includes controls for job role, gender, tenure, customer facing
role, ethnicity, top career band and assignment number.8
Table 3.2 shows the main stylized fact of the paper. Greater value misalignment is
correlated with lower individual and team performance. The dependent variable is fi-
nancial performance in Columns (1) and (2), behavioural performance in (3) and (4) and
potential for progression in (5) and (6). At the individual level, the effect size is small but
precisely estimated: a standard deviation increase in the absolute Spearman ρ index is
correlated with 2.6% of a standard deviation decrease in either financial or behavioural
performance. Panel B of Table 3.2 shows a similar story at the team level, but the rela-
tionship between actual value differences and performance has a smaller magnitude of
around one quarter of the effect for individuals. Appendix Table 3.A.6 checks for robust-
ness using the Kendall τ index of misalignment.
The score for potential rating is an exception. Columns (5) and (6) show that perceived
misalignment with the bank has a positive relationship with the manager’s assessment of
the potential for vertical career progression. This is consistent with the evidence of large
gaps in top values between hierarchical levels. If values drive behaviour, misalignment
with the bank might be correlated with rare actions which are deemed to be required
among the leadership.9 One caveat is that the "potential" score is available for only half
of the sample.10
Somewhat surprisingly, the magnitude of the correlations of Table 3.2 is similar for
perceived and actual misalignment, despite their raw correlation being only around 0.10.
This suggests that different processes might mediate the relationship between perfor-
mance and perceptions, on the one hand, and actual differences in values, on the other.
Figure 3.5 checks whether the negative correlation in performance is driven by a few
particular values. Misalignment seems to be equally bad for performance across all the
listed values. None of the coefficients of a regression of financial or behavioural perfor-
mance on the eleven value misalignment indexes is positive and significant. The only
coefficient which is positive and non-negligible in magnitude is the one on determina-
tion, which we saw was mentioned disproportionately by higher career bands (Figure
3).
Table 3.3 explores whether the negative relationship between actual misalignment
8Assignment is equal to zero if the role covered by the person is the first in the bank, one if it’s the second
role held in the bank etc.
9Estimations are robust to the inclusion of a full set of controls for career bands.
10Limiting the sample to only the portion with potential rating does not affect the sign and magnitude of
the negative relationship between financial or behavioural performance and misalignment.
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and performance is driven by horizontal differences between colleagues or vertical dif-
ferences with managers. This exercise can be performed only on the sample of respon-
dents whose manager also replied to the values questions, implying a reduced sample
size. In Columns (1) to (3), the dependent variable is financial performance, in (4) to (6)
it is behavioural performance and in (7) to (9) it is potential for progression. Columns
(1), (4) and (7) repeat the specification of Table 3.2 in this smaller sample for benchmark-
ing. Columns (2) and (4) suggest that the negative correlation between actual misalign-
ment and performance is driven by differences in values with managers and not with
colleagues. Nevertheless, Columns (3) and (6) show that the negative correlation be-
tween perceived misalignment with colleagues or the bank and performance is not only
driven by actual differences with the manager.
One mechanism through which value misalignment can be negatively correlated with
performance is by limiting trust and thus the scope for relational contracting (Chassang,
2010; Gil and Zanarone, 2016). Table 3.4 looks at this channel and correlates misalign-
ment indexes with self-reported trust in colleagues, managers, and leaders (Columns (1)
to (3)). Perceived misalignment in both the bank and colleagues is highly correlated with
all the self-reported measures of trust. Actual misalignment with colleagues is negatively
correlated with both trust in colleagues, leaders and feelings of being trusted. This corre-
lation is interesting in both directions of causality. On the one hand, limited trust might
bring little experimentation on the values held by colleagues and managers, perpetu-
ating wrong perceptions about diversity (Boisjoly et al., 2006; Beugelsdijk et al., 2019).
On the other hand, value misalignment can affect agents’ beliefs about others’ trustwor-
thiness, hindering incentives for cooperation (Halac, 2012; Macchiavello and Morjaria,
2015). Appendix Table 3.A.7 repeats the regressions on trust using the Kendall τ index of
value misalignment.
3.6.3 Where does misalignment come from?
The previous Section hints at the crucial role of manager-employee relationships for or-
ganizational performance. In this Section we dig deeper into the role of leaders in fos-
tering or depleting culture. A rich literature in economics (Bandiera et al., 2019; Gib-
bons and Henderson, 2012; Hermalin, 2012; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003) and manage-
ment (Mintzberg, 1973; Starr-Glass, 2019) studies the role of leaders for organizational
performance. In relation to corporate culture, leaders can help agents’ coordination by
facilitating communication flows (Dewan and Myatt, 2008) and setting good examples in
an informal way (Gibbons and Kaplan, 2015). Alternatively, they might set a mission for
the supervised team (Wendt et al., 2009; Bolton et al., 2012).
If we take team composition as fixed, leaders might affect value alignment by in-
fluencing the extent to which employees get to know each others’ values, for instance
through different designs of processes and delegation. In this case, we should expect
perceptions of alignment to be correlated with different managers’ characteristics more
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than actual misalignment, which should be orthogonal to managers’ choices. This is the
relevant case in our setting; direct managers have limited power in affecting team com-
position, which is decided at higher levels of leadership.
If we allow team composition to vary endogenously with the manager’s appointment,
value alignment can be affected by employees’ selection as well. In this case, perceptions
and actual misalignment could both be related to the manager. In both cases, we expect
managers’ attitudes to matter in the formation of team-level culture.
Table 3.5 correlates measures of misalignment in values at the team level with man-
agers’ attitudes towards colleagues, the organization and their own role. In Columns (1)
to (3) the dependent variables are managers’ opinion of their productivity: whether they
think there is not enough time to do things properly, whether they feel that conditions
in the job do not allow them to be as productive as possible and whether they are proud
of their work. In Columns (4) to (6) the dependent variables are managers’ confidence
in the future, disagreement with leaders and confidence in colleagues. In Column (7) the
dependent variable is managers’ perceived misalignment in values with the bank.
Table 3.5 shows three main results. First, managers’ attitudes towards colleagues, the
organization and their own role are correlated with perceptions of value misalignment in
their teams. However, managers’ attitudes are not related to actual alignment between
employees, suggesting that the assumption of exogenous team composition is appropri-
ate. Secondly, managers’ attitudes are correlated with perceptions of the bank’s overall
values, but not of colleagues’ values. This suggests that managers might play a key role
in spreading aggregate culture locally to their teams, as highlighted in Besley and Pers-
son (2018). Third, the correlation between managers’ attitudes and value misalignment is
small in magnitude. For instance, managers’ disagreements with bank leaders increases
team-level misalignment with the bank by 1% of a standard deviation. Nevertheless, such
a small difference might have bigger implications in terms of actual team behaviour.
What do managers do in teams with better culture? Managers might socialize team
members into their own views directly or indirectly through the team organization de-
sign. In a long term equilibrium we should expect organizational culture to help man-
agers reduce coordination and communication costs needed to motivate team members.
However, in a dynamic view, managers might need to invest time and effort to create a
stable team culture. Table 3.6 shows that better communication and coordination strate-
gies are indeed positively correlated with team culture. Our communication index is
constructed by averaging employees’ agreements to statements such as "Where I work,
issues of right and wrong are discussed in team meetings" or " Where I work, everyone
has the chance to say what they think about issues". Our coordination index averages
variables such as the frequency of team meetings and check-in with managers, whether
the manager gives feedback on employees’ behaviour or the bank’s strategy. Both the
creation of forums of discussion as well as the absence of negative consequences for ex-
pressing personal opinions seems to matter for reducing perceived misalignment among
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employees.
3.7 Does it matter what values people have and share?
Are certain values rewarded disproportionately by the bank? Are these values driving
the relationship between value misalignment and performance? Figures 3.4 and 3.5 re-
port the coefficients of the following individual-level specification:
yic = α+
11
∑
j=1
β jValueicj + X′icδ+ λc + eic
where Valueicj is an indicator variable for whether person i in country c mentioned
a certain value j among her top five in Figure 3.4. Valueicj is the Absolute Spearman ρ
index of misalignment in value j in Figure 3.5. yic is the standardized measure of financial
or behavioural performance, λc are country fixed effects and Xic includes controls as
previously defined. In Figure 3.4, the omitted category is mentioning "responsibility",
which is the most common value mentioned across the bank.
Figure 3.4 shows that there is no single value which is disproportionately rewarded by
managers’ assessments. Determination and tolerance are the only values with a positive
point estimate, but they are both not significant at the 95% confidence level. Compared
to responsibility, most values tend to have a negative correlation with performance. The
biggest negative differences are in faith, unselfishness, thrift, obedience and imagination,
especially in relation to financial performance. Importantly, these are also the values on
which bankers differ the most with society at large (see Figure 3.1). Evidence in Figure
3.5 confirms this view using the misalignment index in each value.
Both omitted variables and reverse causality might impact these estimates. The lat-
ter problem seems to be unlikely in this context, as it’s unclear how performance might
affect people’s likelihood of reporting one particular value out of the ones listed. How-
ever, unobservable individual characteristics might be correlated with both values and
performance, driving the relationship shown in Figure 3.4.
To make progress on this aspect and reduce the dimensionality of the problem, we use
latent class analysis (LCA) to categorize respondents into types. Latent Class Analysis
is a type of structural equation modelling used to find groups of cases in multivariate
categorical data. These groups are called "latent classes". In our context, LCA helps to
find classes of employees who share similar values and whose values are independent,
conditional on class belonging. Such a categorization allows us to measure value sharing
as the proportion of employees of a certain type within a team.
Table 3.7 shows the proportion of people who mentioned each of the eleven values
in each of the two identified latent classes. Values are ranked from the top to the bottom
of the table in order of absolute difference between employee type one and two. The
top values mentioned by type one are imagination, self expression, independence and
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determination. We will label this type as “extrovert". In contrast, type two employees
are more likely to mention values such as obedience, faith, thrift and hard-work. We will
label them “obedient" types. Notice that this set of values implies that the "obedient"
type is closer to common citizens as compared to the average banker (as shown in Fig-
ure 3.1). Appendix Table 3.A.3 shows some differences in demographic characteristics
between the two types. Overall such differences are small in magnitude, but interest-
ing. For instance, members of ethnic minorities are 8% of the extrovert group and 11%
of the obedient group. People in customer facing roles are more frequent among the
obedient types (40% vs 37%) and top career bands are instead more frequent among the
extroverts. The last rows in Table 3.A.3 show that there are significant differences in per-
formance ratings between the two groups. We confirm this in a regression framework,
where we can control for the various differences in socio-demographic variables between
the two groups of people. Table 3.8 shows that extrovert employees have a significantly
higher performance than obedient types in all the measures considered. This translates
into higher team performance when extrovert people are the majority. The first row of
Table 3.9 shows that teams with a more diverse composition tend to perform worse than
homogeneous teams when either extroverts or obedients are the majority. However, this
relationship is entirely driven by teams with more than 60% of extrovert employees, as
shown in the last two rows of the Table. This evidence does not simply mean that having
more high-achievers in a team increases team performance. It also implies that a diverse
team is not better than a team full of low achievers. Value sharing thus seems to bring
some advantages in terms of performance even when the shared values are not the best
ones.
In the regressions of Table 3.9 we control for the team proportion of people from the
top career band. If we add controls for the proportion of people in the middle or bot-
tom career bands, the coefficients on the proportion of extroverts become smaller and
non-significant, with the exception of Columns (5) and (6) on potential rating. This in-
terestingly suggests that the relationship between extrovert values and performance is
mediated by different proportions of these values across hierarchies.
There are two main takeaways from this exercise. First, while value sharing is pos-
itively correlated with performance, banking seems to be rewarding some values more
than others, especially in terms of career progression. Secondly, the most rewarded val-
ues are also the ones with the largest distance from common citizens. Unfortunately,
we cannot say whether people who are more similar to WVS respondents are simply
worse bankers, whether their values are not appreciated by the bank or whether the co-
ordination achieved by these values brings only modest outcomes. However, this is an
intriguing piece of evidence for thinking about the sector a decade after the last financial
crisis. Are bankers able to have clients’ and societal interests at the top of their minds de-
spite their cultural distance with the average citizen? In the last section, we conclude by
looking at cross-country differences in misalignment within the bank and distance with
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WVS respondents.
3.8 Industry shocks and organizational values
We merged our data with data on the change in unemployment rates between 2007 and
2009, used by previous work as a measure of severity of the financial crisis (Stevenson
and Wolfers, 2011). For each country, we then compute the average distance in values
between bankers and common citizens. We first compute the difference between the
proportion of bankers and the proportion of WVS respondents that mentioned a certain
value among their top five. We then average these differences across the eleven values.
Figure 3.6 shows that there is a negative relationship between change in unemployment
between 2007 and 2009 and distance between bankers and WVS respondents. This seems
against the common narrative of the crisis generated by bankers who are detached from
society. However, employment in banking is not randomly assigned. What Figure 3.6
tells us is that those bankers who decided to stay in the sector after 2007 - or were recently
hired - have values which are more similar to common citizens in those countries which
were more heavily affected by the crisis. There might be different explanations for this
pattern. The experience of the crisis might have changed the types of individuals who
sort into the sector, decided to stay or who are hired by the bank.
Figure 3.7 shows the average distance between bankers’ and WVS values by terciles
of change in unemployment rates between 2007 and 2009 and by tenure at the bank. We
can see that, in both the second and third tercile of unemployment changes, the increased
similarity between bankers and common citizens is driven by cohorts who started work-
ing in the bank after 2000. A mix of selected stayers and new hires might be driving the
relationship of Figure 3.6. In the first tercile, both people with the highest and lowest
tenure have values which are further away from the WVS.
This is suggestive evidence that aggregate industry shocks are important forces in
shaping organizational culture (Besley and Persson, 2018). Shocks can trigger abrupt
policies that try to change the values held by employees (see Section 3.3) or require a
change in the composition of people hired and kept by an organization. Despite the
fast pace in which these policies can happen, changing organizational culture inevitably
takes time. The financial crisis might have encouraged banks to either review internal
values or hire new types of people more similar to common citizens. However, a decade
might not be enough to fully converge on a new culture. Figure 3.8 indeed shows that
misalignment between employees within the bank is increasing in the severity of the
financial crisis. This is a subtle way in which aggregate shocks can have medium to long
term consequences on organizational performance.
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3.9 Concluding remarks
As high-skilled workers increase their time at work, the workplace becomes the main
site where individual values shape behaviour and relationships. Dissonance between
personal values and the ones held by colleagues and/or the organization can negatively
affect individual as well as organizational outcomes. Understanding when such disso-
nance emerges and its implications for organizational performance has important impli-
cations for employees’ motivation, selection and organizational design.
In this paper we provided evidence that the sharing of individual values matters for
employee and team performance within a multinational firm. Both perceptions and ac-
tual value alignment matter. As highlighted in previous work, we find that managers
have a crucial role in shaping employees’ perceptions of shared values through both per-
sonal attitudes and team practices. Organizational initiatives which foster team cohesion
and increase familiarity between managers and employees might be beneficial in reduc-
ing perceived value misalignment, but it’s unclear whether their benefits would be high
enough to exceed their costs.
Management is an internal force which shapes individual culture. We also find evi-
dence that external forces, such as aggregate industry shocks, can increase the challenge
of achieving a uniform organizational culture and have long-term consequences through
their impact on employees’ value sharing. Alternatively, employees’ value sharing could
be a shock-mitigating force that provides insurance on team productivity in bad times
(Aghion et al., 2017). Such an interplay between industry-wide economic conditions and
organizational values is an exciting venue for follow-up research. Another important
next step in this work is to move towards an identification of the causal effect of value
misalignment on employees’ performance.
This paper studied the micro-foundations of corporate culture at a certain point in
time and within a given organizational structure. This offers only a limited perspective
on the dynamics of organizational change. Organizations constantly evolve as a result
of both internal and external pressures for change. The aggregation of values in larger
collectivities and their evolution over time as the composition of workers change are
exciting topics left for future research.
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3.11 Figures
FIGURE 3.1: Bankers’ values: overview and comparison with WVS
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Comparison Bankers and WVS respondents
Note. The top figure shows the proportion of bankers who mentioned each of the given values among
their top five. The bottom figure shows the percentage points difference in the proportion of people who
mentioned a given value in the bank and in the WVS. Proportions are first computed country by country
and averaged to get the illustrated overall difference.
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FIGURE 3.2: Bankers’ values by demographics
-.1
-.0
5
0
.0
5
.1
Di
ff 
in 
pr
op
or
tio
ns
 m
en
tio
nin
g 
va
lue
 in
 to
p 
5
Re
spo
nsi
bili
ty
Ind
epe
nde
nce
Un
sel
fish
nes
s
Se
lf e
xpr
ess
ion
Ima
gin
atio
n
Tol
era
nce
Ob
edi
enc
e
Th
rift
De
ter
min
atio
n
Ha
rd 
wo
rk
Fa
ith
Minority vs non minority 95% CI
Do you consider that you belong to an ethnic minority?
Values by minority
-.1
-.0
5
0
.0
5
.1
Di
ff 
in 
pr
op
or
tio
ns
 m
en
tio
nin
g 
va
lue
 in
 to
p 
5
Ima
gin
atio
n
Ha
rd 
wo
rk
Un
sel
fish
nes
s
Ob
edi
enc
e
De
ter
min
atio
n
Fa
ith
Th
rift
Se
lf e
xpr
ess
ion
Re
spo
nsi
bili
ty
Tol
era
nce
Ind
epe
nde
nce
Women vs men 95% CI
Values by gender
-.1
-.0
5
0
.0
5
.1
Di
ff 
in 
pr
op
or
tio
ns
 m
en
tio
nin
g 
va
lue
 in
 to
p 
5
Ha
rd 
wo
rk
Re
spo
nsi
bili
ty
Ind
epe
nde
nce
Un
sel
fish
nes
s
Se
lf e
xpr
ess
ion Th
rift
Ob
edi
enc
e
Tol
era
nce
Ima
gin
atio
n
Fa
ith
De
ter
min
atio
n
Parents vs non-parents 95% CI
Values by being a parent
Note. The figures show differences in the proportions of people who mentioned a certain value by de-
mographics. In the top figure, each bar gives the percentage points difference in the proportion of people
who mentioned a given value between members and non-members of an ethnic minority. Members of a
minority are defined as people who answer "yes" to the question: "Do you consider that you belong to
an ethnic minority?". Most of people of Black, Latino or Mixed ethnicity answer "yes" to this question,
while only 2% of White people and 30% of Asian people say "yes". The figure in the middle shows the
percentage points difference in the proportion of people who mentioned a given value by gender. The
bottom figure repeats the same exercise by parental status.
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FIGURE 3.3: Bankers’ values by organizational role
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Values by customer facing role
Note. The figures show differences in the proportions of people who mentioned a certain value by orga-
nizational role. In the top figure, each red bar gives the percentage points difference in the proportion of
people who mentioned a given value between people with more than ten years of tenure and people with
less than four years of tenure. Each blue bar gives the percentage points difference in the proportion of
people who mentioned a given value between people with five to nine years of tenure and people with
less than four years. The figure in the middle repeats this exercise by career band, classifying employees
in three career bands. The bottom figure shows differences between employees in client facing roles and
in back office.
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FIGURE 3.4: Which values are correlated with performance?
Note. The figure reports the coefficients of two separate OLS regressions of financial and behavioural
performance on a set of ten indicator variables, one for each value that has been mentioned among the
top five by a respondent. The omitted category is for the value “responsibility", which was mentioned by
more than 85% of respondents. Horizontal bars show 90% confidence intervals.
FIGURE 3.5: Is misalignment in some values correlated with performance?
Note. The figure reports the coefficients of two separate OLS regressions of financial and behavioural per-
formance on a set of eleven indexes of misalignment, one for each value. For instance, the coefficient on
“imagination" is the marginal effect of an increase in the ranking distance of “imagination" between a re-
spondent and his/her colleagues on the respondent’s performance. Horizontal bars show 90% confidence
intervals.
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FIGURE 3.6: Bankers’ distance with common citizens and the 2008 finan-
cial crisis
Note. Changes in unemployment, on the x-axis, are from Stevenson and Wolfers (2011). The y-axis reports
the average distance between bankers and WVS respondents across the eleven values. The bubbles are
proportional to the sample in each country and labelled with the country’s region. The regression is
estimated at the country level.
FIGURE 3.7: Bankers’ distance with common citizens by tenure
Note. The bar chart shows average distance between bankers and WVS respondents by tenure and terciles
of changes in unemployment rate during the 2008 financial crisis (from Stevenson and Wolfers, 2011).
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FIGURE 3.8: Value misalignment and the 2008 financial crisis
Note. Changes in unemployment, on the x-axis, are from Stevenson and Wolfers (2011). The y-axis reports
perceived misalignment with colleagues in the top scatterplot and actual misalignment with colleagues
in the bottom figure. The bubbles are proportional to the sample in each country and labelled with the
country’s region. The regression is estimated at the country level.
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3.12 Tables
TABLE 3.1: Summary statistics
Values sample Others Diff
Mean SD N Mean SD N p-val
Gender .495 .5 38730 .501 .5 56143 .06
Asian .692 .462 25350 .659 .474 32386 0
White .274 .446 25350 .304 .46 32386 0
Black or Mixed .035 .183 25350 .036 .187 32386 .23
Member of minority .094 .292 30873 .096 .295 38939 .28
Age: 20-30 .254 .435 38750 .257 .437 56187 .33
30-40 .388 .487 38750 .372 .483 56187 0
40-50 .223 .416 38750 .226 .418 56187 .24
50+ .135 .342 38750 .145 .352 56187 0
Tenure: <1 .168 .374 38827 .17 .375 56311 .46
1-4 .298 .457 38827 .301 .459 56311 .23
5-9 .215 .411 38827 .208 .406 56311 .01
10-20 .214 .41 38827 .208 .406 56311 .04
20+ .106 .307 38827 .113 .316 56311 0
Customer facing role .389 .487 38827 .387 .487 56311 .63
Assignment number .143 .511 38107 .148 .526 55203 .22
Line manager .293 .455 38827 .285 .452 56311 .01
Top career band .008 .09 38827 .008 .087 56311 .46
Performance rating (std) .005 .997 29037 -.004 1.002 41556 .26
Behaviour rating (std) .001 1.002 27245 -.001 .999 38841 .85
Potential rating (std) .005 1.003 17163 -.003 .998 25193 .44
Note. The table shows summary statistics for the sample of respondents to the questions on values (“Values
sample") and for non-respondents (“Others"). “Assignment number" is equal to the total number of roles held
by the employee in the bank. “Line manager" is an indicator variable for having line management responsi-
bilities (self-reported). “Top career band" is an indicator variable for being in the top three hierarchical levels.
“Performance", “Behaviour" and “Potential" ratings are the standardized measures of performance collected by
HR.
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TABLE 3.2: Value misalignment, individual and team performance
DV: Performance score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Financial Behaviour Potential
Panel A. Individual level
Actual misalignment -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.013
(0.010) (0.009) (0.014)
Perceived misalignment -0.024*** 0.003 0.003
w/ colleagues (0.005) (0.006) (0.014)
Perceived misalignment -0.013 -0.026** 0.016
w/ bank (0.011) (0.010) (0.014)
Observations 16,890 16,890 16,890 16,890 8,424 8,424
R-squared 0.058 0.059 0.033 0.033 0.064 0.064
Panel B. Team level
Actual misalignment -0.006* -0.007** -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Perceived misalignment -0.012 0.007 -0.007
w/ colleagues (0.011) (0.012) (0.018)
Perceived misalignment 0.002 -0.028** 0.027*
w/ bank (0.008) (0.013) (0.016)
Observations 8,741 8,741 8,741 8,741 5,442 5,442
R-squared 0.055 0.054 0.051 0.051 0.067 0.067
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the standardized measure of financial performance
in Columns (1) and (2), behavioural performance in Columns (3) and (4) and potential for progression
in Columns (5) and (6). Panel A uses data at the individual level. Actual misalignment for individu-
als is defined as the Absolute Spearman ρ index of misalignment with their team colleagues and manager.
Perceived misalignment is the distance (in terms of Absolute Spearman ρ) between the values that respon-
dents choose for themselves and the ones they choose for their colleagues or the bank. Panel B aggregates
data at the team level. Actual and perceived team misalignment are obtained by averaging across individ-
uals (without double-counting pairs of employees). Controls include job role, gender, tenure, customer
facing role, ethnicity, top career band and assignment number.
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TABLE 3.3: Value misalignment with manager and individual performance
DV: Individual performance score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Financial Behaviour Potential
Actual misgnment -0.027* -0.030* 0.030
w/ coll + mng (0.016) (0.017) (0.026)
Actual misgnment -0.025** -0.023** -0.028*-0.026* 0.009 0.007
w/ manager (0.010) (0.010) (0.015)(0.015) (0.021)(0.021)
Actual misgnment -0.010 -0.007 -0.006 -0.003 0.019 0.016
w/ colleagues (0.016) (0.016) (0.013)(0.013) (0.023)(0.024)
Perceived misgnment -0.043***
w/ colleagues (0.012)
Perceived misgnment -0.030 0.034
w/ bank (0.018) (0.030)
Observations 4,428 4,428 4,428 4,428 4,428 4,428 2,084 2,084 2,084
R-squared 0.076 0.076 0.078 0.040 0.040 0.041 0.098 0.098 0.099
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Mean DV 0.03 0.03 0.03 0 0 0 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the standardized measure of financial performance in Columns
(1) to (3), behavioural performance in Columns (4) to (6) and potential for progression in Columns (7) to (9). The ta-
ble uses data at the individual level. The sample size is determined by the number of people whose manager is also
a respondent to the values questions. Actual misalignment for individuals is defined as the Absolute Spearman ρ
index of misalignment with their team colleagues and manager in the first row, with the manager only in the second
row and with colleagues only in the third row. Perceived misalignment is the distance (in terms of Absolute Spear-
man ρ) between the values that respondents choose for themselves and the ones they choose for their colleagues or
the bank. Controls include job role, gender, tenure, customer facing role, ethnicity, top career band and assignment
number.
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TABLE 3.4: Value misalignment and trust
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Trust in coll Trust in mng Trust leaders Feel trusted
Actual misgnment -0.014* -0.000 -0.009** -0.017***
w/ coll + mng (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Perceived misgnment -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.015 -0.020***
w/ colleagues (0.009) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007)
Perceived misgnment -0.060*** -0.053*** -0.107*** -0.079***
w/ bank (0.014) (0.012) (0.022) (0.016)
Observations 23,657 23,657 23,657 23,657
R-squared 0.045 0.048 0.131 0.082
Controls Y Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS regressions. The dependent variables are different measures for trust in others. In Columns (1),
(2) and (3) the dependent variable is a self-reported measure of trust in colleagues, the manager and senior
leaders. The variable is measured on a scale from 1 (min) to 5 (max). The dependent variable in Column
(4) is a measure of the extent to which the respondent agrees with the statement "Senior leadership in
my function trust me to do what’s right" on a scale from 1 (min) to 5 (max). The table uses data at the
individual level. Actual misalignment for individuals is defined as the Absolute Spearman ρ index of
misalignment with their team colleagues and manager. Perceived misalignment is the distance (in terms
of Absolute Spearman ρ) between the values that respondents choose for themselves and the ones they
choose for their colleagues or the bank. Controls include job role, gender, tenure, customer facing role,
ethnicity, top career band and assignment number.
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TABLE 3.5: Managers’ attitudes and team culture
DV: Managers’ attitudes and team misalignment with bank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Not Not Not Not Disagree Not Misaligned
enough enough proud confident w/ confident w/
time product of work in future leaders in colleagues bank
Perceived misgnment 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004 -0.002
w/ colleagues (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012)
Perceived misgnment 0.009 0.001 0.008* 0.014** 0.010* -0.005 0.025**
w/ bank (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.012)
Observations 5,282 5,282 5,282 5,282 5,282 5,282 1,734
R-squared 0.111 0.157 0.120 0.117 0.126 0.064 0.155
Actual misgnment -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.002
w/ colleagues (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 5,363 5,363 5,363 5,363 5,363 5,363 1,756
R-squared 0.113 0.159 0.118 0.114 0.122 0.063 0.150
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS regressions. The dependent variables are measures of managers’ attitudes towards their work and the
bank. In Columns (1) to (3) the dependent variables are managers’ opinion of their productivity: whether they think
there is not enough time to do things properly, whether they feel that conditions in the job do not allow them to be
as productive as possible and whether they are proud of their work. In Columns (4) to (6) the dependent variables
are managers’ confidence in the future, disagreement with leaders and confidence in colleagues. In Column (7) the
dependent variable is managers’ own perceived misalignment in values with the bank. Original variables are coded
in a five steps Likert scale. The dependent variables are indicator variables for the two highest scores in the scales.
Independent variables are at the team level (each team has only one manager). Actual misalignment for individuals
is defined as the Absolute Spearman ρ index of misalignment with their team colleagues and manager. Perceived
misalignment is the distance (in terms of Absolute Spearman ρ) between the values that respondents choose for
themselves and the ones they choose for their colleagues or the bank. Actual and perceived team misalignment are
obtained by averaging across individuals (without double-counting pairs of employees). Controls include job role,
gender, tenure, customer facing role, ethnicity, top career band and assignment number.
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TABLE 3.6: Misalignment and team communication/coordination
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Communication Index Coordination Index
Actual misalignment -0.006 0.004
w/ coll + mng (0.008) (0.004)
Perceived misalignment -0.026*** -0.015***
w/ collagues (0.006) (0.004)
Perceived misalignment -0.038*** -0.007
w/ bank (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 9,107 9,107
R-squared 0.151 0.333
Controls Y Y
Country FE Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS regressions. The communication index is the average of answers to the following questions:
“How frequently do you have team meetings?", “How often do you check-in with your manager to dis-
cuss your development?", “Have you participated in informal team meetings in the last 3 months?", “Do
you discuss how your work contributes to the strategy of the bank with the manager?" “Does your man-
ager give you feedback to improve?". The coordination index is the number of times that a person agrees
with the following statements: “I feel able to speak up when I see behaviour which I consider to be
wrong",“Where I work, issues of right and wrong are discussed in team meetings", “Where I work, col-
leagues take responsibility for their actions", “Where I work, everyone has the chance to say what they
think about issues", “Where I work, people can state their opinion without the fear of negative conse-
quences". Both indexes are constructed at the individual level and then averaged at the team level. Actual
misalignment for individuals is defined as the Absolute Spearman ρ index of misalignment with their
team colleagues and manager. Perceived misalignment is the distance (in terms of Absolute Spearman ρ)
between the values that respondents choose for themselves and the ones they choose for their colleagues
or the bank. Actual and perceived team misalignment are obtained by averaging across individuals (with-
out double-counting pairs of employees). Controls include job role, gender, tenure, customer facing role,
ethnicity, top career band and assignment number.
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TABLE 3.7: Introducing extrovert and obedient employees
Extrovert (1) Obedient (2)
Margin SE Margin SE Diff (2) - (1)
Imagination 0.501 0.008 0.209 0.009 -0.292
Self expression 0.477 0.008 0.208 0.009 -0.269
Independence 0.762 0.005 0.587 0.008 -0.175
Determination 0.607 0.006 0.507 0.008 -0.100
Tolerance 0.806 0.005 0.740 0.006 -0.066
Responsibility 0.843 0.004 0.834 0.005 -0.010
Unselfishness 0.315 0.005 0.365 0.007 0.049
Hard work 0.506 0.007 0.645 0.008 0.140
Thrift 0.089 0.006 0.292 0.007 0.204
Faith 0.031 0.004 0.241 0.008 0.210
Obedience 0.029 0.006 0.332 0.012 0.303
Note. The table shows the proportion of people that mentioned each of the eleven values in the two classes
identified by latent class analysis. We label employees in class 1 as "extrovert" and in class 2 as "obedient".
Chapter 3. Value Dissonance at Work 220
TABLE 3.8: Individual performance: extrovert vs obedient types
DV: Performance score
(1) (2) (3)
Financial Behaviour Potential
Extrovert 0.042* 0.029*** 0.093***
(0.022) (0.010) (0.020)
Observations 16,890 16,890 8,424
R-squared 0.058 0.032 0.066
Mean DV 0.02 0.01 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the standardized measure of financial performance in
Column (1) , behavioural performance in Column (2) and potential for progression in Column (3). The
table uses data at the individual level. The sample size is determined by the number of people whose
manager is also a respondent to the values questions. The variable "Extrovert" is an indicator equal to one
if the person was categorized by the latent class analysis as an extrovert" type. Controls include job role,
gender, tenure, customer facing role, ethnicity, top career band and assignment number.
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TABLE 3.9: Extroverts’ share and team performance
DV: Performance score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Financial Behaviour Potential
Extrovert prop /∈ [0.3, 0.6] 0.044** 0.045 0.061**
(0.021) (0.042) (0.027)
Extrovert prop ∈ [0, 0.3) 0.005 -0.010 0.006
(0.026) (0.034) (0.045)
Extrovert prop ∈ (0.6, 1] 0.058* 0.064 0.076**
(0.029) (0.048) (0.030)
Observations 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 5,548 5,548
R-squared 0.053 0.053 0.050 0.050 0.067 0.068
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Mean DV 0.0100 0.0100 0 0 0 0
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the standardized measure of financial performance in
Columns (1) and (2), behavioural performance in Columns (3) and (4) and potential for progression in
Columns (5) and (6). The variable “Extrovert prop /∈ [0.3, 0.6]" is equal to one if a team has a share of
extrovert employees below 30% or above 60%. Similarly, the variables “Extrovert prop ∈ (0.6, 1]" and
“Extrovert prop ∈ [0, 0.3)" are equal to one if a team has a share of extrovert employees above 60% or
below 30% respectively. Data are at the team level. Controls include job role, gender, tenure, customer
facing role, ethnicity, top career band and assignment number.
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3.A Appendix figures and tables
FIGURE 3.A.1: Bankers vs WVS respondents by continent
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Note. The figures show the percentage points difference in the proportion of people who mentioned a
given value in the bank and in the WVS, by continent. Proportions are first computed country by country
and averaged to get the illustrated overall difference in each continent.
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TABLE 3.A.1: Which values are correlated with performance?
DV: Performance score
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Financial Behaviour Potential
Independence -0.047 -0.029 0.001
(0.033) (0.032) (0.023)
Hard work -0.020 -0.009 0.034
(0.028) (0.024) (0.028)
Imagination -0.054* -0.011 0.111***
(0.028) (0.031) (0.025)
Tolerance -0.006 0.040 0.024
(0.033) (0.040) (0.039)
Thrift -0.060*** -0.029 0.000
(0.020) (0.022) (0.032)
Determination 0.017 0.034 0.128***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Faith -0.102** -0.034 -0.018
(0.047) (0.055) (0.051)
Unselfishness -0.052* -0.018 0.035
(0.027) (0.029) (0.054)
Obedience -0.050 -0.039 -0.029
(0.035) (0.041) (0.033)
Self expression -0.022 0.002 0.081**
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
Observations 16,890 16,890 8,424
R-squared 0.020 0.018 0.033
Controls Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y
Mean DV 0.02 0.01 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS regressions of financial, behavioural and potential performance (standardized) on a set of
ten indicator variables, one for each value that has been mentioned among the top five by a respondent.
The omitted category is for the value “responsibility", which was mentioned by more than 85% of re-
spondents.Controls include job role, gender, tenure, customer facing role, ethnicity, top career band and
assignment number.
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TABLE 3.A.2: Is misalignment in some values correlated with perfor-
mance?
DV: Performance score
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Financial Behaviour Potential
Independence -0.006 -0.005 -0.008
(0.010) (0.006) (0.009)
Hard work -0.008 -0.002 -0.009
(0.006) (0.008) (0.018)
Imagination -0.016 -0.004 0.022***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.007)
Tolerance -0.017** -0.017** -0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013)
Thrift -0.024*** -0.003 -0.014
(0.009) (0.007) (0.011)
Determination 0.010 -0.004 -0.003
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
Faith -0.024*** -0.011 -0.020*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Unselfishness -0.007 -0.009 0.002
(0.010) (0.007) (0.014)
Obedience -0.012 -0.026*** -0.029***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
Self expression 0.001 -0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
Responsibility 0.004 -0.014 0.008
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012)
Observations 16,890 16,890 8,424
R-squared 0.020 0.017 0.027
Controls Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y
Mean DV 0.02 0.01 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS regressions of financial, behavioural and potential performance (standardized) on a set of
eleven indexes of misalignment, one for each value. For instance, the coefficient on “imagination" is the
marginal effect of an increase in the ranking distance of “imagination" between a respondent and his/her
colleagues on the respondent’s performance (measures in terms of Absolute Spearman ρ). Controls in-
clude job role, gender, tenure, customer facing role, ethnicity, top career band and assignment number.
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TABLE 3.A.3: Summary statistics by extrovert and obedient type
Obedient Extrovert Diff
Mean SD N Mean SD N p-val
Gender .479 .5 16931 .507 .5 21799 0
Asian .696 .46 11250 .688 .463 14100 .16
White .262 .44 11250 .282 .45 14100 0
Black or Mixed .041 .198 11250 .029 .169 14100 0
Member of minority .112 .316 13457 .08 .271 17416 0
Age 20-30 .253 .435 16940 .255 .436 21810 .62
Age 30-40 .386 .487 16940 .389 .488 21810 .46
Age 40-50 .221 .415 16940 .225 .417 21810 .33
Age 50+ .141 .348 16940 .131 .337 21810 0
Tenure <1 .172 .377 16984 .164 .371 21843 .05
Tenure 1-4 .295 .456 16984 .3 .458 21843 .22
Tenure 5-9 .212 .409 16984 .217 .412 21843 .29
Tenure 10-20 .209 .407 16984 .218 .413 21843 .04
Tenure 20+ .112 .315 16984 .101 .301 21843 0
Customer facing .402 .49 16984 .379 .485 21843 0
Assignment number .131 .477 16821 .153 .537 21286 0
Line manager .287 .452 16984 .298 .457 21843 .02
Top career band .006 .078 16984 .01 .098 21843 0
Performance rating (std) -.037 .995 12786 .038 .998 16251 0
Values rating (std) -.036 1.007 12158 .03 .996 15087 0
Potential rating (std) -.041 1.005 7178 .037 1 9985 0
Note. The Table reports summary statistics by extrovert and obedient types. “Assignment number" is
equal to the total number of roles held by the employee in the bank. “Line manager" is an indicator
variable for having line management responsibilities (self-reported). “Top career band" is an indicator
variable for being in the top three hierarchical levels. “Performance", “Behaviour" and “Potential" ratings
are the standardized measures of performance collected by HR.
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TABLE 3.A.4: Individual value misalignment and team coordination
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Frequent meetings Informal Talked about Coordination
w/ team w/ mngr meetings strategy feedback index
Actual misgnment -0.006 0.027* -0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.003
(0.007) (0.014) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Perceived misgnment -0.036*** -0.033*** -0.010* -0.008*** -0.019*** -0.021***
w/ collagues (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Perceived misgnment -0.023** -0.036*** -0.005 -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.019***
w/ bank (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Observations 23,657 23,657 23,657 23,657 23,657 23,657
R-squared 0.121 0.174 0.045 0.050 0.044 0.178
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS regressions of each component of the communication index on actual and perceived misalignment at the
individual level. Variables in each of the first five Columns are constructed from answers to the following questions:
"How frequently do you have team meetings?", “How often do you check-in with your manager to discuss your
development?", “Have you participated in informal team meetings in the last 3 months?", “Do you discuss how
your work contributes to the strategy of the bank with the manager?" “Does your manager give you feedback to
improve?". Column (6) averages the answers to these questions to construct an index. Actual misalignment for
individuals is defined as the Absolute Spearman ρ index of misalignment with their team colleagues and manager.
Perceived misalignment is the distance (in terms of Absolute Spearman ρ) between the values that respondents
choose for themselves and the ones they choose for their colleagues or the bank. Controls include job role, gender,
tenure, customer facing role, ethnicity, top career band and assignment number.
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TABLE 3.A.5: Individual value misalignment and team communication
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Speak up Colleagues take Freedom of Communication
responsibility speak up opinion index
Actual misgnment -0.011** -0.002 -0.008* -0.015** -0.003 -0.008
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006)
Perceived misgnment -0.051*** -0.045*** -0.063*** -0.050*** -0.062*** -0.054***
w/ collagues (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
Perceived misgnment -0.055*** -0.073*** -0.039*** -0.053*** -0.084*** -0.061***
w/ bank (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
Observations 23,657 23,657 23,657 23,657 23,657 23,657
R-squared 0.044 0.069 0.055 0.039 0.056 0.067
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS regressions of each component of the communication index on actual and perceived misalignment at
the individual level. Variables in each of the first five Columns are constructed from agreement with the following
statements:“I feel able to speak up when I see behaviour which I consider to be wrong",“Where I work, issues of
right and wrong are discussed in team meetings", “Where I work, colleagues take responsibility for their actions",
“Where I work, everyone has the chance to say what they think about issues", “Where I work, people can state their
opinion without the fear of negative consequences". Column (6) averages the answers to these questions to construct
an index. Actual misalignment for individuals is defined as the Absolute Spearman ρ index of misalignment with
their team colleagues and manager. Perceived misalignment is the distance (in terms of Absolute Spearman ρ)
between the values that respondents choose for themselves and the ones they choose for their colleagues or the
bank. Controls include job role, gender, tenure, customer facing role, ethnicity, top career band and assignment
number.
FIGURE 3.A.2: Team size distribution
Note. The figure shows the distribution of team sizes in the sample.
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TABLE 3.A.6: Kendall τ index: value misalignment, individual and team
performance
DV: Performance score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Financial Behaviour Potential
Panel A. Individual level
Actual misalignment -0.021*** -0.031*** -0.010
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Perceived misalignment -0.024*** 0.003 0.003
w/ colleagues (0.005) (0.006) (0.014)
Perceived misalignment -0.013 -0.026** 0.016
w/ bank (0.011) (0.011) (0.014)
Observations 16,890 16,890 16,890 16,890 8,424 8,424
R-squared 0.058 0.059 0.033 0.033 0.064 0.064
Panel B. Team level
Actual misalignment -0.006* -0.007** -0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Perceived misalignment -0.003 0.001 -0.002
w/ colleagues (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Perceived misalignment 0.000 -0.006** 0.006
w/ bank (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 8,741 8,741 8,741 8,741 5,442 5,442
R-squared 0.055 0.054 0.051 0.051 0.067 0.067
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the standardized measure of financial performance
in Columns (1) and (2), behavioural performance in Columns (3) and (4) and potential for progression
in Columns (5) and (6). Panel A uses data at the individual level. Actual misalignment for individuals
is defined as the Kendall τ index of misalignment with their team colleagues and manager. Perceived
misalignment is the distance (in terms of Kendall τ) between the values that respondents choose for them-
selves and the ones they choose for their colleagues or the bank. Panel B aggregates data at the team level.
Actual and perceived team misalignment are obtained by averaging across individuals (without double-
counting pairs of employees). Controls include job role, gender, tenure, customer facing role, ethnicity,
top career band and assignment number.
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TABLE 3.A.7: Kendall τ index: value misalignment and trust
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Trust in coll Trust in mng Trust leaders Feel trusted
Actual misgnment -0.016*** -0.005 -0.012** -0.015**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Perceived misgnment -0.061*** -0.054*** -0.109*** -0.081***
w/ bank (0.014) (0.012) (0.023) (0.017)
Perceived misgnment -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.015 -0.020***
w/ colleagues (0.009) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007)
Observations 23,657 23,657 23,657 23,657
R-squared 0.046 0.049 0.131 0.082
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. OLS regressions. The dependent variables are different measures for trust in others. In Columns (1), (2)
and (3) the dependent variable is a self-reported measure of trust in colleagues, the manager and senior leaders.
The variable is measured on a scale from 1 (min) to 5 (max). The dependent variable in Column (4) is a measure
of the extent to which the respondent agrees with the statement "Senior leadership in my function trust me to do
what’s right" on a scale from 1 (min) to 5 (max). The table uses data at the individual level. Actual misalignment for
individuals is defined as the Kendall τ index of misalignment with their team colleagues and manager. Perceived
misalignment is the distance (in terms of Kendall τ index) between the values that respondents choose for them-
selves and the ones they choose for their colleagues or the bank. Controls include job role, gender, tenure, customer
facing role, ethnicity, top career band and assignment number.
